Copyright © 2009 by Chester B Cabalza (Abstract). All Rights Reserved.
Tourism is known to be the world’s largest industry to date especially in the age of globalization. The positive side of promoting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a single destination would mean a stronger cooperation and higher tourism receipts for the organization. In the renaissance of tourism industry in the region, ten-member countries of ASEAN are selling its tourist destinations like “brands” to the world. Massively advertising these hot items to all forms of local and international communications using tri-media and the internet to capture western as well as wealthy neighboring Northeast Asian tourists. This is to recognize that ASEAN tourism receipts are equivalent to almost ten percent of exports and five percent of regional economic activity. The paper shall also explore the varying threats like the current global economic meltdown, the inevitable effects of man-made and natural disasters such as terrorism and catastrophes, and the challenges of climate change as major problems to the tourism industry in the region. It eyes the benefits of ecotourism and ethnic tourism, the prominence of bird tourism, and the burgeoning market of medical tourism as examples of opportunities. The paper shall use data mining from secondary sources like scholarly books and journals, and the internet as references for the research. Based from this method, textual analysis and critical examination shall be drawn from to substantiate empirical data and guided by multi-disciplinal frameworks.
Thursday, November 26, 2009
Samson vs Judge Caballero
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Samson vs Judge Caballero
August 5, 2009
A.M. RTJ-08-3128
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
Held:
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review on October 28, 2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari. As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges against respondent.
However, in any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Samson vs Judge Caballero
August 5, 2009
A.M. RTJ-08-3128
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
Held:
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. It also denied the complainant’s motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review on October 28, 2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari. As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges against respondent.
However, in any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately. However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.
The first step towards the successful implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Prosecutor Reyes vs Judge
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Prosecutor Reyes vs Judge
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623
September 18, 2009
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Reyes is discharged from the service for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a judge.
Facts:
Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A. Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69 and one administrative case which Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño were consolidated and referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for investigation, report and recommendation, by this Court’s Resolutions of September 28, 2005 and December 12, 2007.
By letter-complaint of October 26, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Romana Reyes (Prosecutor Reyes), the public prosecutor assigned to Branch 69, charged Judge Reyes with grave abuse of authority and/or grave misconduct.
On October 1, 2004 at past 6:00 p.m., Prosecutor Reyes accidentally met Judge Reyes at the office of Police Inspector Jovita V. Icuin (Inspector Icuin), the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Pasig City Police Station. Judge Reyes was there to inquire about her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño (Migriño) who was earlier arrested for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 or the Anti-Gambling Law. When Judge Reyes was informed that Migriño was already released on orders of Judge Jose Morallos, Judge Reyes asked Prosecutor Reyes to conduct an inquest against Migriño for malversation on the basis of a photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Ariel Nuestro, purportedly executed and sworn to before Judge Reyes on September 15, 2004.
Prosecutor Reyes informed Judge Reyes that the case of malversation may not necessarily fall under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on Arrest without Warrant and thus cannot be the subject of inquest. Prosecutor Reyes explained that inquest could not be conducted as it was already past 6:00 p.m. whereas inquest proceedings could be conducted only until 6:00 p.m. unless authorized by the City Prosecutor. She added that since the crime was allegedly committed in 2003, Migriño would have to undergo preliminary investigation.
On December 13, 2004, Prosecutor Reyes wrote another letter to the OCA charging Judge Reyes with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, and Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure.
Prosecutor Reyes vs Judge
A.M. No. MTJ-06-1623
September 18, 2009
Gross ignorance of the law. Judge Reyes is discharged from the service for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming of a judge.
Facts:
Five administrative cases against Judge Julia A. Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69 and one administrative case which Judge Reyes filed against her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño were consolidated and referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), for investigation, report and recommendation, by this Court’s Resolutions of September 28, 2005 and December 12, 2007.
By letter-complaint of October 26, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Romana Reyes (Prosecutor Reyes), the public prosecutor assigned to Branch 69, charged Judge Reyes with grave abuse of authority and/or grave misconduct.
On October 1, 2004 at past 6:00 p.m., Prosecutor Reyes accidentally met Judge Reyes at the office of Police Inspector Jovita V. Icuin (Inspector Icuin), the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Branch of the Pasig City Police Station. Judge Reyes was there to inquire about her Branch Clerk of Court Timoteo Migriño (Migriño) who was earlier arrested for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1602 or the Anti-Gambling Law. When Judge Reyes was informed that Migriño was already released on orders of Judge Jose Morallos, Judge Reyes asked Prosecutor Reyes to conduct an inquest against Migriño for malversation on the basis of a photocopy of an affidavit of a certain Ariel Nuestro, purportedly executed and sworn to before Judge Reyes on September 15, 2004.
Prosecutor Reyes informed Judge Reyes that the case of malversation may not necessarily fall under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on Arrest without Warrant and thus cannot be the subject of inquest. Prosecutor Reyes explained that inquest could not be conducted as it was already past 6:00 p.m. whereas inquest proceedings could be conducted only until 6:00 p.m. unless authorized by the City Prosecutor. She added that since the crime was allegedly committed in 2003, Migriño would have to undergo preliminary investigation.
On December 13, 2004, Prosecutor Reyes wrote another letter to the OCA charging Judge Reyes with Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment or Order, and Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure.
Wednesday, November 25, 2009
People vs Cabalquinto
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
People vs Cabalquinto
G.R. No. 67693
September 19, 2006
Facts:
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in response to a letter from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.
The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the person's expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.
The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all court documents which state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain sexual assault, endangering the welfare and abuse and neglect cases should remain confidential. The name of the victim shall not appear in any public record; rather, initials or a fictitious name shall appear. The offenses covered by the law include aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of children, and any action alleging an abused or neglected child.
Issue:
Whether real name and relevant information to minors or children in conflict with the law should remain confidential from posting in the Internet Web page?
Held:
In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could include the use of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court instead replace the material information, such as the name of the child-victim, in its decisions.
In the case at bar, on 18 February 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted Melchor Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty in both Criminal Case No. Q-98-79683 and Criminal Case No. Q-98-79684, for Rape, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing accused MELCHOR CABALQUINTO Y MINGO to suffer the penalty of DEATH on both counts, pursuant to the penalty imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines as amended by RA 7659. Accused is further ordered to indemnify his daughter-victim the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for damages, in each count. SO ORDERED.
People vs Cabalquinto
G.R. No. 67693
September 19, 2006
Facts:
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in its Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in response to a letter from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter's case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on the Supreme Court Web Page.
The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it must be shown that the person's expectation of privacy is reasonable. The reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information pertaining to child abuse cases.
The OSG invites the Court's attention to a New Jersey statute which provides that all court documents which state the name, address and identity of a child victim in certain sexual assault, endangering the welfare and abuse and neglect cases should remain confidential. The name of the victim shall not appear in any public record; rather, initials or a fictitious name shall appear. The offenses covered by the law include aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual contact, criminal sexual contact, endangering the welfare of children, and any action alleging an abused or neglected child.
Issue:
Whether real name and relevant information to minors or children in conflict with the law should remain confidential from posting in the Internet Web page?
Held:
In conclusion, the OSG suggests the adoption of a system of coding which could include the use of pseudonyms in cases of a similar nature. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the OSG proposes that the Court instead replace the material information, such as the name of the child-victim, in its decisions.
In the case at bar, on 18 February 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted Melchor Cabalquinto (Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA. The dispositive portion of the decision states: WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty in both Criminal Case No. Q-98-79683 and Criminal Case No. Q-98-79684, for Rape, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing accused MELCHOR CABALQUINTO Y MINGO to suffer the penalty of DEATH on both counts, pursuant to the penalty imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines as amended by RA 7659. Accused is further ordered to indemnify his daughter-victim the sum of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for damages, in each count. SO ORDERED.
Monday, November 23, 2009
People vs Mamantak
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
People vs Mamantak
G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with her son XXX and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and son looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, XXX, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had XXX gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of XXX and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of XXX. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had XXX. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with XXX.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
XXX relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
People vs Mamantak
G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with her son XXX and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and son looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, XXX, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had XXX gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of XXX and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of XXX. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had XXX. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with XXX.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
XXX relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs Tangco
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Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
People vs Lara
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People vs Lara
G.R. No. 171449
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Lara possessed firearms with ammunition, and without authority or license to possess said firearms, nor permit to carry them outside his residence, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use his shotgun in killing Chito B. Arizala who was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard the premises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal.
Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, were ordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 before Branch 71 of the same court. On 16 April 1999, the cases were transferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designated to try heinous crimes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor?
Held:
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. After the prosecution rested its case, the lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
In a Decision dated 3 March 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA Y DAVID is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties: Death for Criminal Case No. 97-13706; Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000 for Criminal Case No. 97-13707; and imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 97-13708. Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs of Chito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. And to indemnify Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services in the amount of P24,800.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide and Robbery, but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
People vs Lara
G.R. No. 171449
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Lara possessed firearms with ammunition, and without authority or license to possess said firearms, nor permit to carry them outside his residence, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use his shotgun in killing Chito B. Arizala who was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard the premises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal.
Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, were ordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 before Branch 71 of the same court. On 16 April 1999, the cases were transferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designated to try heinous crimes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor?
Held:
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. After the prosecution rested its case, the lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
In a Decision dated 3 March 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA Y DAVID is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties: Death for Criminal Case No. 97-13706; Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000 for Criminal Case No. 97-13707; and imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 97-13708. Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs of Chito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. And to indemnify Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services in the amount of P24,800.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide and Robbery, but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
Romualdez vs Marcelo
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Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
PCGG vs Desierto
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals. Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
Friday, November 20, 2009
Pinoy Top Thinkers Today (2008)
Copyright © 2009 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.
The essay below is the author's personal choices and partial list of Top Pinoy Intellectuals in 2008. He is re-posting this essay, as a prelude, for his upcoming and updated list for the December 2009 publication of his Top Filipino Thinkers.
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The influential Foreign Policy (FP) Magazine in its May/June 2008 issue published the list of Top 100 Public intellectuals. Some of my favorite and mostly quoted thinkers fortunately appear in the cream of the crop list such as Thomas Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, Fan Gang, Jurgen Habermas, Al Gore, Amos Oz, Amartya Sen, Lee Kuan Yew, Rober Kagan, Samuel Huntington, Fareed Zakaria, Pope Benedict XVI and more.
Of the worldwide 100 public intellectuals, seventeen political scientists ruled the elite pool of leading influential thinking people; fifteen are known as economists; philosophers, scientists and journalists have vied for equal sharing with twelve each; eight of them aspired as artists and novelists; some make a reliable source of living as leaders/politicians, historians and activists with six thinkers each; religious leaders emerge with four counts; and the least are environmentalists with two.
Of the 100 modern living scholars, thirty-six come from North America yet some of them are immigrants; thirty settle from Europe, twelve live from Asia but mostly dominated by Indians and Chinese, eleven hail from the Middle East, four each from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and three from Southeast Asia and Oceania. (I wonder why they separated SEA from greater Asian region, maybe because it’s a shame that there’s only one great thinker from Oceania represented by Australia).
There are no Filipino public intellectuals in the global list that sometimes question my intent about the poll, given that Filipino intellectuals love public speaking, debates, commentaries. I feel so problematic because we fail to recognize our own great thinkers today - the counterparts of Jose Rizal and Apolonario Mabini in yesteryears, that if we translate in today’s setting these Pinoy thinkers can gauge ostentatious ideas and thoughts that have greater impacts in the world’s deterritorialized community of the 21st century.
Because of this, I made my own list of Pinoy great thinkers today based from the articles, books, columns, essays, lectures, views, poems, prose, and some comments from known mediums such as the boob tube and you tube, campaigns, speeches, accomplishments and academic distinctions that made them who they are today as leading intellectuals (remember these are my own personal choices).
They are the movers and shakers who make his or her living through the battle of ideas that can truly shape our distinct Filipino society and the world we live in as well.
The sequence of their names are not based from their colorful distinctions:
Cirilo Bautista(poet, fictionist, critic) – he’s more known for his poems and epic writings, thus winning the prestigious National Centennial Commission’s Literary Contest in English category with 3,050 lines that look like a monumental feat during the celebration of our country’s 100th year of independence. He’s a multi-awarded poet, fictionist, critic and essayist with a Hall of Fame award from the Don Palanca Awards Foundation, National Book Awards and other international honors for his literary works. He’s a leading Pinoy poet of his generation and a luminary in the guild of Philippine literature.
Leonor Briones (public administrator, bureaucrat) – she may be appearing in the boob tube to broadcast her thoughts about governance and anti-corruption issues in the government but her intelligent remarks was overshadowed when she recently sat down and eavesdropped with Boy Abunda and sang in front of a national TV. Beyond that entertaining episode, she’s widely educated, a respected academic, a former national treasurer of the Philippines, and knows very well her turf in public administration.
Randy David (sociologist, columnist, activist) – he’s been described in one of the blogs as once a fixture in television as a soft-spoken, even-tempered public intellectual on public-forum-styled programs focusing on socio-political topics. He maybe viewed as one of the highly regarded professors at the Sociology department in UP Diliman and the little president of the university during the time of President Nemenzo. But his outspoken dissatisfactions with the current administration are transcribed in his columns on the Philippine Daily Inquirer and are also voiced out during rallies along with his army of civil society members.
Conrado De Quiros (journalist, columnist, blogger) – how he weaves his chosen words for his column is superb. He writes so intensely and thinks so passionately. He has this unique gift of expressing his thoughts, unafraid of his ideas that certainly espouse tongues of fire.
Francis Escudero (senator, lawyer, commercial endorser) – he thinks and talks so fast, perhaps faster than a woodpecker. He may become our own Barack Obama with his audacity of hopeful ambition to become the next president of the country. With his youthful and energetic appearance, no wonder he can also become a poster boy for TV commercials that has become an envy for elder and insecure lawmakers. But notwithstanding his academic accolades and intellect. In his own website, he’s voted as one of the Young Global Leaders of 2008 by the World Economic Forum along with leading executives, public figures and intellectuals.
John Gokongwei (industrialist, philanthropist) – he has the riches-to-rags-to-riches story by becoming a breadwinner due to the sudden death of his rich Chinese immigrant father when he was still young and toiled so hard that paid off for more blessings in life. He’s regarded as one of Asia’s godfathers and one of the richest persons in Southeast Asia. He’s also known as a taipan, having been named as chairman of his widening conglomerate. And unbelievably, as a philanthropist he donated Php200 million for undergrad management students and to his alma maters and other schools. A bestseller book was written based from his biography entitled, The Path to Entrepreneurship, in his belief that entrepreneurship is a way out of poverty.
Carolina Hernandez (political scientist) – a professor emeritus of the political science department in UP Diliman. She’s a giant in countless intellectual forums and conferences in and out of the country, and the president of an influential think tank – the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. Her tough personality and beautiful mind can be translated on her impressive resume that speaks about her strength as a premier consultant for civil-military relations in the Philippines.
Francisco Sionil Jose (novelist, fictionist) – sages say that he may become our ultimate Nobel Peace Prize winner for literature. But I more admire Nick Joaquin as the foremost Filipino novelist. With whole honesty, F. Sionil Jose even proclaimed Nick Joaquin as ‘the greatest Filipino writer’ during his eulogy to a dear departed friend. But since my list speaks about living intellectuals, no wonder he’s a truly prolific writer, backed up by his ‘the Rosales Saga’ novels and other fiction and non-fiction books and collection of essays. He holds highest distinctions as recipients of the Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Awards (an Asian counterpart of the Nobel Peace Prize) for journalism, literature, and creative communication arts in 1980; the National Artist Award for Literature in 2001; the Pablo Neruda Centennial Award in 2004; and innumerable Palanca Awards.
Rosario Manalo (career diplomat, architect of ASEAN charter) – she speaks her mind very authoritatively during dialogues and a favorite lecturer/professor from Ateneo, La Salle, UP and NDCP because of her comprehensive insights about diplomacy, political science and international relations that are mostly based from experiences and knowledge as a former top ambassador. In one of the graduate students’ conferences that I convened, I called her as the ‘mother of ASEAN charter’ because of her expertise and involvement in designing the charter with her counterparts around the ASEAN region.
Solita "Winnie" Monsod (economist, broadcaster, columnist) – popularly known as ‘Mareng Winnie’ in her now-defunct TV talk show Debate with Mare and Pare of GMA 7. She’s feisty but composed in delivering her thoughts but sometimes some of her ideas are contradictory to the wider audience. In her wikipedia account, she’s described as a respected economist and political commentator. She may have lost her senatorial bid in the 2001 national elections but she conquered the media as a multi-awarded broadcaster, remained popular as a former bureaucrat of the Aquino administration, and is still admired in the academe.
Bienvenido Nebres (university president, religious leader) – he’s considered the longest-serving university president of the Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU). He’s a former provincial superior in the country of the elite congregation of the Society of Jesus or SJ. He’s known as a philosopher and a math wiz with a PhD in mathematics at the Stanford University. He made Ateneo a consistent top-notch Catholic university in the country. And just like a renaissance man as well as a religious leader, he remained formidable in spreading knowledge and faith, with his broad duties and responsibilities ranging from teaching and education, society and politics, leadership and business.
Ambeth Ocampo (historian, journalist, author) – he makes Philippine history entertaining and simplified. He likes writing books and papers about Jose Rizal, a leading intellectual of his generation that makes Ocampo’s ideas also popular and accessible today. He relives his thoughts through his bi-weekly editorial page column, and heads two government institutions: the Philippines’ National Historical Institute (NHI) in 2001 and the National Commission on Culture and the Arts (NCCA) in 2005. His published works have catchy titles that makes a reader titillate his or her mind?
Felino Palafox Jr. (architect, urban planner) – he leads an army of young architects, interior designers, landscape architects, and environmental/urban planners. Once you stride around the Rockwell Center or boardwalk and play golf at the Country Club, you can sense his bright ideas of creating livable cities with world-class designs. He’s a principal architect and an urban planner that has extensive works and consultancies in over 30 countries based from his website.
Annabelle Plantilla(environmentalist) – she has a say about the broad environmental issues, being the executive director of the Haribon Foundation – a respected NGO on the green revolution in the country. I have worked with her because of the collaboration of NDCP and DOT to spreading the mission and vision of ‘The Environmental Security on Tourism’ (TEST) on a nationwide leg. She exudes a warm and down-to-earth personality but has brilliant thoughts on global ecological issues that certainly caught my attention to include her in my list.
Fidel Ramos (former Philippine president, retired general) – one of the key figures of the first people power revolution in the Philippines that led to his path as the next president of the country in post-EDSA I. He pens a lot of books and articles ranging from military, economy, history, politics, international relations, governance, development, and regional cooperation. He’s the 1997 UNESCO Peace Awardee by achieving a peace agreement with the military rebels and the secessionist MNLF. More than that, he chairs the Boao Forum Asia (equivalent of the World Economic Forum held annually at Davos, Switzerland), where great minds in the Asia Pacific meet together. He was a West Point graduate, with a civil engineering degree at the University of Illinois, an MBA at ADMU, and an MNSA at NDCP. He holds 28 doctoral degrees honoris causa from various leading universities in and out of the country.
Maria Ressa (journalist, author) – she elegantly talks very clearly as she thinks so fast. She’s a small but terrible public intellectual. Her ‘Seeds of Terror’ book on terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia as then Jakarta chief bureau of CNN was loaded with mix criticisms by both foreigners as well as local experts. But this is a pioneering work on today’s security issue on terrorism made by a female expert scrutinizing local-to-regional-to-global connection of Muslim terror groups. Now, she heads the news and current affairs of ABS-CBN as a vice president, whose orders was recently defied by her senior reporter Ces Drilon not to enter the base camp of the terrorist ASG in Sulu to score a scoop that later turned into a controversial hostage-taking of Drilon’s crew but was soon freed. Drilon should have listened from this lady expert on terrorism.
Miriam Santiago (senator, lawyer) – known as Asia’s original iron lady and could be the second female president if not because of the alleged election rigging in 1992 presidential election. Her spirited commentaries and highfaluting vocabulary during sessions at the higher house poses her stellar stature as one of the best senior senators in the land. She has a very accomplished academic life, with Master of Laws and Doctor of Juridical Science from the University of Michigan Law School. She also attended summer programs in law at Oxford university and Harvard law school. She holds a Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service in 1998 and was ranked 69th among “The 100 Most Powerful Women in the World” in 1996 by The Australian Magazine.
Winston Sycip (industrialist, founder of AIM) – he’s a product of the finest public schools and universities and is not ashamed of it. His words of wisdom are often quoted by leading business magazines. He puts blame to the deterioration of education as one the prime factors why we are a lagging economy. His vision of founding the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) with its long tradition as a leading business and management academy in the Asia Pacific region is a living testament that the country was once a producer of topnotch managers in this side of the world, but AIM today is beleaguered with administrative weaknesses and tough problems of competitiveness in a globalized world.
Michael Tan (medical anthropologist, columnist) – his namesake is the teen star of GMA 7’s Talent Center. But between the two, he’s the geek one and is proud to admit it in his column, yet he looks a very intellectual anthropologist. He’s more known for his anthropological theory or sex and culture classes. And never mind if I got two straight uno or A+ during my batch’s fieldschool for the cultural anthropology part. He can make his afternoon class very engaging and entertaining for his students and discusses wide range of topics covering medical and socio-cultural issues effortlessly. His column in Philippine daily Inquirer is informative to better understand Filipino culture and society at its best.
Alfonso Yuchengco (industrialist, diplomat, educator) – his father maybe immortalized at the DLSU Taft Campus because of a neo-classical building named after him as the Don Enrique T Yuchengco Hall. But beyond his father’s image, he has gauged a niche for himself as a prominent industrialist, CPA, diplomat, and educator. His conglomerate is pioneering in some businesses like insurance, engineering college institution, banking, mining and telecom. His highest diplomatic post so far was when he was appointed as the Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
The essay below is the author's personal choices and partial list of Top Pinoy Intellectuals in 2008. He is re-posting this essay, as a prelude, for his upcoming and updated list for the December 2009 publication of his Top Filipino Thinkers.
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The influential Foreign Policy (FP) Magazine in its May/June 2008 issue published the list of Top 100 Public intellectuals. Some of my favorite and mostly quoted thinkers fortunately appear in the cream of the crop list such as Thomas Friedman, Francis Fukuyama, Fan Gang, Jurgen Habermas, Al Gore, Amos Oz, Amartya Sen, Lee Kuan Yew, Rober Kagan, Samuel Huntington, Fareed Zakaria, Pope Benedict XVI and more.
Of the worldwide 100 public intellectuals, seventeen political scientists ruled the elite pool of leading influential thinking people; fifteen are known as economists; philosophers, scientists and journalists have vied for equal sharing with twelve each; eight of them aspired as artists and novelists; some make a reliable source of living as leaders/politicians, historians and activists with six thinkers each; religious leaders emerge with four counts; and the least are environmentalists with two.
Of the 100 modern living scholars, thirty-six come from North America yet some of them are immigrants; thirty settle from Europe, twelve live from Asia but mostly dominated by Indians and Chinese, eleven hail from the Middle East, four each from Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, and three from Southeast Asia and Oceania. (I wonder why they separated SEA from greater Asian region, maybe because it’s a shame that there’s only one great thinker from Oceania represented by Australia).
There are no Filipino public intellectuals in the global list that sometimes question my intent about the poll, given that Filipino intellectuals love public speaking, debates, commentaries. I feel so problematic because we fail to recognize our own great thinkers today - the counterparts of Jose Rizal and Apolonario Mabini in yesteryears, that if we translate in today’s setting these Pinoy thinkers can gauge ostentatious ideas and thoughts that have greater impacts in the world’s deterritorialized community of the 21st century.
Because of this, I made my own list of Pinoy great thinkers today based from the articles, books, columns, essays, lectures, views, poems, prose, and some comments from known mediums such as the boob tube and you tube, campaigns, speeches, accomplishments and academic distinctions that made them who they are today as leading intellectuals (remember these are my own personal choices).
They are the movers and shakers who make his or her living through the battle of ideas that can truly shape our distinct Filipino society and the world we live in as well.
The sequence of their names are not based from their colorful distinctions:
Cirilo Bautista(poet, fictionist, critic) – he’s more known for his poems and epic writings, thus winning the prestigious National Centennial Commission’s Literary Contest in English category with 3,050 lines that look like a monumental feat during the celebration of our country’s 100th year of independence. He’s a multi-awarded poet, fictionist, critic and essayist with a Hall of Fame award from the Don Palanca Awards Foundation, National Book Awards and other international honors for his literary works. He’s a leading Pinoy poet of his generation and a luminary in the guild of Philippine literature.
Leonor Briones (public administrator, bureaucrat) – she may be appearing in the boob tube to broadcast her thoughts about governance and anti-corruption issues in the government but her intelligent remarks was overshadowed when she recently sat down and eavesdropped with Boy Abunda and sang in front of a national TV. Beyond that entertaining episode, she’s widely educated, a respected academic, a former national treasurer of the Philippines, and knows very well her turf in public administration.
Randy David (sociologist, columnist, activist) – he’s been described in one of the blogs as once a fixture in television as a soft-spoken, even-tempered public intellectual on public-forum-styled programs focusing on socio-political topics. He maybe viewed as one of the highly regarded professors at the Sociology department in UP Diliman and the little president of the university during the time of President Nemenzo. But his outspoken dissatisfactions with the current administration are transcribed in his columns on the Philippine Daily Inquirer and are also voiced out during rallies along with his army of civil society members.
Conrado De Quiros (journalist, columnist, blogger) – how he weaves his chosen words for his column is superb. He writes so intensely and thinks so passionately. He has this unique gift of expressing his thoughts, unafraid of his ideas that certainly espouse tongues of fire.
Francis Escudero (senator, lawyer, commercial endorser) – he thinks and talks so fast, perhaps faster than a woodpecker. He may become our own Barack Obama with his audacity of hopeful ambition to become the next president of the country. With his youthful and energetic appearance, no wonder he can also become a poster boy for TV commercials that has become an envy for elder and insecure lawmakers. But notwithstanding his academic accolades and intellect. In his own website, he’s voted as one of the Young Global Leaders of 2008 by the World Economic Forum along with leading executives, public figures and intellectuals.
John Gokongwei (industrialist, philanthropist) – he has the riches-to-rags-to-riches story by becoming a breadwinner due to the sudden death of his rich Chinese immigrant father when he was still young and toiled so hard that paid off for more blessings in life. He’s regarded as one of Asia’s godfathers and one of the richest persons in Southeast Asia. He’s also known as a taipan, having been named as chairman of his widening conglomerate. And unbelievably, as a philanthropist he donated Php200 million for undergrad management students and to his alma maters and other schools. A bestseller book was written based from his biography entitled, The Path to Entrepreneurship, in his belief that entrepreneurship is a way out of poverty.
Carolina Hernandez (political scientist) – a professor emeritus of the political science department in UP Diliman. She’s a giant in countless intellectual forums and conferences in and out of the country, and the president of an influential think tank – the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies, Inc. Her tough personality and beautiful mind can be translated on her impressive resume that speaks about her strength as a premier consultant for civil-military relations in the Philippines.
Francisco Sionil Jose (novelist, fictionist) – sages say that he may become our ultimate Nobel Peace Prize winner for literature. But I more admire Nick Joaquin as the foremost Filipino novelist. With whole honesty, F. Sionil Jose even proclaimed Nick Joaquin as ‘the greatest Filipino writer’ during his eulogy to a dear departed friend. But since my list speaks about living intellectuals, no wonder he’s a truly prolific writer, backed up by his ‘the Rosales Saga’ novels and other fiction and non-fiction books and collection of essays. He holds highest distinctions as recipients of the Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Awards (an Asian counterpart of the Nobel Peace Prize) for journalism, literature, and creative communication arts in 1980; the National Artist Award for Literature in 2001; the Pablo Neruda Centennial Award in 2004; and innumerable Palanca Awards.
Rosario Manalo (career diplomat, architect of ASEAN charter) – she speaks her mind very authoritatively during dialogues and a favorite lecturer/professor from Ateneo, La Salle, UP and NDCP because of her comprehensive insights about diplomacy, political science and international relations that are mostly based from experiences and knowledge as a former top ambassador. In one of the graduate students’ conferences that I convened, I called her as the ‘mother of ASEAN charter’ because of her expertise and involvement in designing the charter with her counterparts around the ASEAN region.
Solita "Winnie" Monsod (economist, broadcaster, columnist) – popularly known as ‘Mareng Winnie’ in her now-defunct TV talk show Debate with Mare and Pare of GMA 7. She’s feisty but composed in delivering her thoughts but sometimes some of her ideas are contradictory to the wider audience. In her wikipedia account, she’s described as a respected economist and political commentator. She may have lost her senatorial bid in the 2001 national elections but she conquered the media as a multi-awarded broadcaster, remained popular as a former bureaucrat of the Aquino administration, and is still admired in the academe.
Bienvenido Nebres (university president, religious leader) – he’s considered the longest-serving university president of the Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU). He’s a former provincial superior in the country of the elite congregation of the Society of Jesus or SJ. He’s known as a philosopher and a math wiz with a PhD in mathematics at the Stanford University. He made Ateneo a consistent top-notch Catholic university in the country. And just like a renaissance man as well as a religious leader, he remained formidable in spreading knowledge and faith, with his broad duties and responsibilities ranging from teaching and education, society and politics, leadership and business.
Ambeth Ocampo (historian, journalist, author) – he makes Philippine history entertaining and simplified. He likes writing books and papers about Jose Rizal, a leading intellectual of his generation that makes Ocampo’s ideas also popular and accessible today. He relives his thoughts through his bi-weekly editorial page column, and heads two government institutions: the Philippines’ National Historical Institute (NHI) in 2001 and the National Commission on Culture and the Arts (NCCA) in 2005. His published works have catchy titles that makes a reader titillate his or her mind?
Felino Palafox Jr. (architect, urban planner) – he leads an army of young architects, interior designers, landscape architects, and environmental/urban planners. Once you stride around the Rockwell Center or boardwalk and play golf at the Country Club, you can sense his bright ideas of creating livable cities with world-class designs. He’s a principal architect and an urban planner that has extensive works and consultancies in over 30 countries based from his website.
Annabelle Plantilla(environmentalist) – she has a say about the broad environmental issues, being the executive director of the Haribon Foundation – a respected NGO on the green revolution in the country. I have worked with her because of the collaboration of NDCP and DOT to spreading the mission and vision of ‘The Environmental Security on Tourism’ (TEST) on a nationwide leg. She exudes a warm and down-to-earth personality but has brilliant thoughts on global ecological issues that certainly caught my attention to include her in my list.
Fidel Ramos (former Philippine president, retired general) – one of the key figures of the first people power revolution in the Philippines that led to his path as the next president of the country in post-EDSA I. He pens a lot of books and articles ranging from military, economy, history, politics, international relations, governance, development, and regional cooperation. He’s the 1997 UNESCO Peace Awardee by achieving a peace agreement with the military rebels and the secessionist MNLF. More than that, he chairs the Boao Forum Asia (equivalent of the World Economic Forum held annually at Davos, Switzerland), where great minds in the Asia Pacific meet together. He was a West Point graduate, with a civil engineering degree at the University of Illinois, an MBA at ADMU, and an MNSA at NDCP. He holds 28 doctoral degrees honoris causa from various leading universities in and out of the country.
Maria Ressa (journalist, author) – she elegantly talks very clearly as she thinks so fast. She’s a small but terrible public intellectual. Her ‘Seeds of Terror’ book on terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia as then Jakarta chief bureau of CNN was loaded with mix criticisms by both foreigners as well as local experts. But this is a pioneering work on today’s security issue on terrorism made by a female expert scrutinizing local-to-regional-to-global connection of Muslim terror groups. Now, she heads the news and current affairs of ABS-CBN as a vice president, whose orders was recently defied by her senior reporter Ces Drilon not to enter the base camp of the terrorist ASG in Sulu to score a scoop that later turned into a controversial hostage-taking of Drilon’s crew but was soon freed. Drilon should have listened from this lady expert on terrorism.
Miriam Santiago (senator, lawyer) – known as Asia’s original iron lady and could be the second female president if not because of the alleged election rigging in 1992 presidential election. Her spirited commentaries and highfaluting vocabulary during sessions at the higher house poses her stellar stature as one of the best senior senators in the land. She has a very accomplished academic life, with Master of Laws and Doctor of Juridical Science from the University of Michigan Law School. She also attended summer programs in law at Oxford university and Harvard law school. She holds a Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service in 1998 and was ranked 69th among “The 100 Most Powerful Women in the World” in 1996 by The Australian Magazine.
Winston Sycip (industrialist, founder of AIM) – he’s a product of the finest public schools and universities and is not ashamed of it. His words of wisdom are often quoted by leading business magazines. He puts blame to the deterioration of education as one the prime factors why we are a lagging economy. His vision of founding the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) with its long tradition as a leading business and management academy in the Asia Pacific region is a living testament that the country was once a producer of topnotch managers in this side of the world, but AIM today is beleaguered with administrative weaknesses and tough problems of competitiveness in a globalized world.
Michael Tan (medical anthropologist, columnist) – his namesake is the teen star of GMA 7’s Talent Center. But between the two, he’s the geek one and is proud to admit it in his column, yet he looks a very intellectual anthropologist. He’s more known for his anthropological theory or sex and culture classes. And never mind if I got two straight uno or A+ during my batch’s fieldschool for the cultural anthropology part. He can make his afternoon class very engaging and entertaining for his students and discusses wide range of topics covering medical and socio-cultural issues effortlessly. His column in Philippine daily Inquirer is informative to better understand Filipino culture and society at its best.
Alfonso Yuchengco (industrialist, diplomat, educator) – his father maybe immortalized at the DLSU Taft Campus because of a neo-classical building named after him as the Don Enrique T Yuchengco Hall. But beyond his father’s image, he has gauged a niche for himself as a prominent industrialist, CPA, diplomat, and educator. His conglomerate is pioneering in some businesses like insurance, engineering college institution, banking, mining and telecom. His highest diplomatic post so far was when he was appointed as the Philippine Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.
Criminal Law1 Cases Digests: Part III
Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
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PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
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People vs Lara
G.R. No. 171449
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Lara possessed firearms with ammunition, and without authority or license to possess said firearms, nor permit to carry them outside his residence, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use his shotgun in killing Chito B. Arizala who was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard the premises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal.
Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, were ordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 before Branch 71 of the same court. On 16 April 1999, the cases were transferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designated to try heinous crimes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor?
Held:
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. After the prosecution rested its case, the lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
In a Decision dated 3 March 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA Y DAVID is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties: Death for Criminal Case No. 97-13706; Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000 for Criminal Case No. 97-13707; and imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 97-13708. Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs of Chito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. And to indemnify Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services in the amount of P24,800.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide and Robbery, but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
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Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
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People vs Mamantak
G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
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PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
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People vs Lara
G.R. No. 171449
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Lara possessed firearms with ammunition, and without authority or license to possess said firearms, nor permit to carry them outside his residence, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use his shotgun in killing Chito B. Arizala who was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard the premises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal.
Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, were ordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 before Branch 71 of the same court. On 16 April 1999, the cases were transferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designated to try heinous crimes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor?
Held:
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. After the prosecution rested its case, the lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
In a Decision dated 3 March 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA Y DAVID is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties: Death for Criminal Case No. 97-13706; Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000 for Criminal Case No. 97-13707; and imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 97-13708. Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs of Chito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. And to indemnify Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services in the amount of P24,800.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide and Robbery, but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
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Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
__________________
People vs Mamantak
G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
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