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| Photo from Inquirer.net |
Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
The mind over might strategy we saw in the recent legal battle of the Philippines against China at The Hague for the
maritime jurisdiction of the disputed islands specifically in the West
Philippine Sea demonstrates our dramatic show of force to stand on equal
footing with wealthier and powerful giant neighbor.
China through its ambassador to the
Philippines Zhao Jianhua expressed his continued intentions to offer for bilateral
talks with our country as the best way to peacefully settle these disputes. Prior
to China’s aggressive actions in the South
China Sea, it has indicated that it wants to avoid the
internationalization of the dispute, as evidenced by its continued drive for
bilateral negotiations.
However, during the opening salvo speech
of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario before the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in Peace Palace, he asserted that the Philippines has diligently
pursued to resolve the problem bilaterally and multilaterally for over two
decades.
Our government strongly believes to
counter China’s ambiguous historic claims by espousing a multilateral approach
to peacefully settle the maritime flashpoints.
Despite diplomatic efforts, China thinks
alone it possesses maritime rights in virtually the entirety of the South China
Sea and that the Philippines must recognize and accept China’s
sovereignty. Del Rosario enumerated
incidents where China lawfully violated international maritime laws under (Unclos) - the Constitution of the oceans and forcibly seized and built
structures in the disputed islands attracting dissenting opinions and violent
reactions from the international community.
A year ago, the Philippines proposed a
multilateral Triple Action Plan (TAP) of ASEAN in the South China Sea, which
identified Arbitration as the final and enduring resolution to address the
destabilizing activities in the region.
While China has indicated that it still
does not intend to participate in the Arbitration case filed against it by the
Philippines, the decision to issue a written response in the form of a position
paper from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that China is indeed
wary of the possible effects of the case.
Given two hypothetical and plausible strategic
dialogues for the Philippines to deal with its utmost challenging external
threat today, how do we weigh our options in case multilateral engagements will
falter and the only choice left would be bilateral negotiation?
Bilateral negotiation strong points
benefited the Asian way of looking at our historical bilateral trade relations
with China when early immigrant Chinese founded the world’s oldest Chinatown in
Binondo long before western colonization of the Spaniards and Americans
including the Japanese occupation in the Philippines. Over the centuries until
today, Chinoys and influential taipans and some intellectuals of
Chinese blood have become assimilated in our society.
Tina Clemente, a professor at the UP
Asian Center describes the patterns of the bilateral economic relationships
between the Philippines and China in terms of the investments, trade, labor,
and Official Development Assistance (ODA) based from official statistical data,
but the patterns look like asymmetric, critical and vulnerable. But China’s rising power has attracted many
ASEAN countries to open trade with them as its best economic partners, thus to
factor in hedging strategies.
When I studied in Beijing at China’s
National Defense University, my Chinese lecturers, most of them belonging to
the Corps of Professors of the People’s Liberation Army were outspoken of
bilateral negotiation to settle disputes with claimant-states in the South
China Sea. They would often brag ‘respect’ and ‘trust’ on how they would
shoulder the cudgel to painstakingly negotiate with sovereign smaller
countries.
Historically, bilateralism failed to
provide just and equitable solutions to conflicts. This option was elucidated
in highly controversial Agreements like the German-Russo Agreement in the late
1800s; German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty signed in 1939; Non-Aggression Pact
between Germany and USSR in 1939; and US-German Peace Treaty in 1921. All these
bilateral treatises failed and resulted to war between and among those nations.
Some strategists believe that bilateral
negotiations should be engaged by two states with almost equal economic status
and military capability. But even if with equal footing in terms of military
might as the above-mentioned examples have shown, still bilateral treatises
would fail and can damage the world security order. In this case, the
Philippines is way below the Chinese maximum credible deterrence, economic
prowess, and military power projections; therefore our country will certainly
end up at the losing end of the bilateral talks.
But there are recent notable successes
in bilateral cooperation courtesy of excellent negotiation skills used to
resolve territorial disputes in some other countries and regions including the
2007 Australia and Timor-Leste Agreement on the 50-year development zone and
revenue sharing arrangement; China-Russia Bilateral Agreement in 2004 on the
disputed islands of Amur and Assuri confluence and the Argun River; and
Norway-Russia Comprehensive Maritime Boundary Agreement in 2010, to name a few.
Some views that bilateral resolution of
the South China Sea issue will foster maritime regional cooperation to the
territorial disputes and it will pave more open communication between maritime
law and enforcement agencies as well as setting up a hotline between foreign
ministers for use in case of maritime emergencies. But the proposal looks ideal
only for two countries with long tradition of ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’.
Under a bilateral agreement, a range of
preventive measures could ease regional tensions and de-escalate the risk of
military conflict as both parties agree on resource-sharing agreement
considering bilateral controlling mechanisms that would deter potential sources
of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes arising from oil and gas
exploration. Stronger military to military communication would increase
dialogue to reduce conflict escalation.
But greed and megalomaniac claims over
disputed islands and atolls would ruin all facets of potential cooperation
under ideal bilateral agreements.
The Philippines has proactively engaged
in multilateral approach in dealing with this security threat as the best
prerogative since it involves many countries in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia,
and the Asia-Pacific in general with sprouting multi-dimensional regional and
global interests that cut across political, economic, socio-cultural, techno-scientific,
environmental, and military issues.
The South China Sea dispute is
multilateral in nature because it involves other claimants including Brunei,
China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Resolving issues between
two countries will not entirely solve the dispute as other states are also
claimants of islands. The dispute remains a potentially strong flashpoint
especially with the ASEAN’s recent shelving of a proposed code of conduct that
would have regulated aggressive activities of stronger claimants.
The
multilateral approach will also give the country leverage against bullying
tactics of the giant adversary as it will put international pressure to its
misbehaviors. The internationalization of the case should also be complemented
by the Philippines’ continuous strengthening of relationships with its current
allies. This is especially true for Japan, South Korea and other ASEAN
countries where China has ongoing territorial disputes.
Pessimist would argue that
multilateralism is generally viewed as ineffective involving various parties
with diverse interests which make it difficult to arrive at an acceptable
agreement. It will also invite major powers in the region, not so much involved
in the playing field, but will prefer to assume a neutral stance and declare
non-intervention posture or may just verbalize pronouncements without tangible
actions. In other words, it may not work in an anarchic international arena
where interests of nations will define their wants.
The diplomatic and legal actions our
country may have chosen will certainly affect the kind of strategic culture we
have mustered in the long run. The mind over might strategy we are pursuing
will sum up our deterrence in this David versus Goliath maritime dilemma that
we have had encountered with China.
Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards define
strategic culture as a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of
military force often molded according to historical experience. Given our weak
military might, alliance is a short-term remedy often favored than
self-reliance as a long-term strength to better achieve modernized armed
forces. It should also be noted that alliance as a form of strategic culture,
apparent in bilateral or multilateral approaches, will not ensure the
protection of our internal and external territories.
On the other hand, some experts may deem
that our shift to pursue Arbitration as a sign of soft power through the power
of international laws that would serve as the greater equalizer among states,
whether weak or mighty, has become our final resort to peacefully settle
maritime disputes with China. Obviously, China is determined to show off its
hard power in the Asia-Pacific as it continuously flexes muscles in the region.
The dichotomy between hard and soft
powers in terms of strategic cultures shown by the Philippines and China in
defining their bilateral and multilateral approaches in the South China Sea conundrum
would highlight two different poles on the continuum of power. Both concepts
imply different ideas, interactions, persuasions, and institutions for foreign
and defense policies when looking at the fields of politics, security, and
economics.
Christian Wagner deems that, ideally
hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and
economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in
confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In contrast, soft
power strategies emphasize common political values, peaceful means for conflict
management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions.
Perhaps with a mix verdict in the
arbitration tribunal and realistic intergenerational solutions in the naval
saga, the Philippines should rather play its cards conscientiously and become
pragmatic in its negotiations to fight for its maritime rights in the contested
islands. Despite our bravery to seek legal means in settling our bilateral
differences with China, whether we win or lose, the Philippines has indeed achieved
a moral ascendancy to pursue international rule of law and gained the respect
of the international community.
