Binondo's Paradoxes

Photo courtesy of  ManilaStandardToday

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

This article is based from my original ethnographic piece, entitled, “The Paradoxes of Binondo: A parachute ethnographer’s fieldnotes and reflections [Read the full text at https://www.academia.edu/13775356/The_Paradoxes_of_Binondo_A_parachute_ethnographers_fieldnotes_and_reflections]  

World’s Oldest Chinatown

Binondo throbs vibrantly while strolling along its filthy, narrow alleys. The rays of the sun kiss the humungous red bloody arc emblazoned with dragons and Sinitic calligraphy when we arrive at the mouth of the famous Chinatown in the city. My wife and kids’ sudden immersion with me certainly awed and struck them, telling me in gist, as if they reach Beijing.

Since Binondo is the earliest Chinatown to be established in the whole world, it probably has the largest concentration of Chinese population in Metro Manila or around the archipelago. Most of the Chinese in Binondo belong to the third generation of Chinese immigrants. They own business establishments in the booming area, flamboyantly exuding their expertise on entrepreneurship.

The abundance of Chinese businessmen in Binondo could be traced back from the Spanish colonial era where it became a place to confine to the ever growing Chinese population. Though initially of low status, the Chinese slowly gained the confidence of the Spanish officials since they heavily contributed in the Philippine economy as the Spanish empire began reforming its colonial policies.

Binondo as a political unit has been very attractive to Filipino writers for it can actually expose a different political take under a modernized Chinese community in the heart of Philippine political culture. Aside from the economic reverberations of Binondo as the earliest Chinatown in Asia, where extensive trade and commerce prosper, it also captures a perfect picture how culturally-different the Chinese community as a political unit can adapt to a larger and stronger political environment.

The extent of why political culture of the Filipino-Chinese community in the first place matters in the larger Philippine political system is on how such new political system may actually influence a traditional one. Another worth noting in this political dynamics is the flexibility of Chinese strict economic purpose to be subsumed by the need to extend politically side-by-side with their intentions to constitutionally orient their local bodies.

The alien Chinese population of Greater Manila was officially reckoned to be big in number. Defined in cultural and not in legal terms, whether they be Filipino citizens or not, full-blooded or not, they are distributed throughout all of the metropolitan area, but they tend to congregate in their own enclaves.

As they create their own identity, the descendants of the mythical dragon who settled in the Philippines, shaped by history and community, would later ascribe to call themselves Chinoys or Tsinoys (Chinese Filipinos).

Lesson # 1: As I converse with one local official in Binondo, I have learned that the place is not actually a Chinese community if residential population is to be considered based from walk-in interviews. A Chinoy discloses that most of their voters are Filipinos who are said to be either natives of the Binondo area or employees who decided to reside there permanently.

Fookienized

I have been in Binondo a lot of times before. But still, I cannot forget the feeling of excitement that caught me and my kids when we started immersing ourselves in Chinatown. When we went there to observe, we did not just gain knowledge of how the people live in the place, we also have our senses fed. Its mixture leads us to imagine ourselves in a new experience. Our eyes have savored the wonderful architectural designs; a whiff of the different scent that the place gives off. But as language learners, I have felt amazed again with the language, I thought at first as thorny and difficult.

There is excitement of going and exploring the place but at different levels; it feels like we are exploring a whole new world, but of course the adaptation of the people varies differently.

After surveying the area, the languages spoken in Chinatown are mainly Filipino, English, and Fookien. Filipino and English are heard in the area because these are the languages mainly used for non-Chinese in the community. In communication, local Chinese prefer Fookien in speaking to their fellow Chinese. Fookien is a Sinitic language from Fujian province in China; most of the Chinese community here in the Philippines come from that island-province. However, most of the Fookien speakers found in Chinatown are mostly elders. The second and third generations of Fookien speakers are now using English and Filipino in everyday communication, making them to have a less command of the Fookien language.

The reason, in Chinese society, Mandarin is a prestige language. It is more often used in formal settings like in schools, the media and business. To be able to speak Mandarin is a sign of good education and a higher social status.

In Chinatowns where you would find people coming from provinces in China and where the language demands a colloquial setting, regional languages are preferred than Mandarin; so with the case of Binondo. However, you would still be able to find Mandarin-speaking Chinese in Binondo.

In Binondo, the Chinese writings that are used are in traditional Chinese. Traditional Chinese characters are more complicated than simplified Chinese characters. They are preferred when writing signs and doing calligraphy in Chinese because of its intricateness and aesthetic value compared to simplified Chinese characters which have less number of strokes, and are plain to look at. Since simplified Chinese characters were instituted during the 1950s by the Communist government of China, the Chinese in Binondo who settled there even before 1950s until today have been using the traditional Chinese writing system.

Lesson # 2: When we went to Lucky Chinatown, a sprawling middle and high class shopping mall, I have heard a lot of elderly Chinese conversing in Fookien. If you are an outsider, you would expect Mandarin to be the preferred language in a Chinese-speaking community like Binondo, but in most Chinatowns around the world, you would hear more people speaking in a regional language like Cantonese or Fookien but not Mandarin.

Religious Syncretism

The fierce glare of the sun combined with smoke from vehicles choked in heavy traffic, has led us inside the beautiful church named after the first Filipino-Chinese saint, Lorenzo Ruiz. As we enter, I feel amused with the angelic paintings on the wall, as I submerge my fingers in a bowl of holy water.

In my rumination to better know the church’s history, I have great conversation with Reverend Fr. Luis Sierra, O.P., who has toured us around the church. The modest church looks like a chapel for me with over thirty pews, small confession boxes annexed to the wall, and the imposing statues of Jesus, Mother Mary, Saint Joseph, and San Lorenzo Ruiz – the patron saint of Binondo. Because of religious syncretism apparent in the culture of assimilated Chinese in the Catholic faith, some religious image looks like Chinese particularly the tiger eyes exuded by the appearance of the saints in most religious statues.   

According to him, the first bishop of Manila, Most Reverend Domingo Salazar, O.P., began the education of the Chinese into Christian Doctrine when the Dominican missionaries replaced the Augustinian missionaries in 1587. The Binondo Church, built in 1596, was actually the third church to be erected in a series of construction, the first being constructed in Parian, dedicated to the three Holy Kings, another in Longos, dedicated to the Purification of our Lady.

During the 1896 revolution, the Dominicans relinquished the church to the seculars which, after a few years, could not handle the influx of Chinese coming from the mainland. This is the reason why there are two back-to-back parishes within the area - the first being the Binondo Church itself and secondly the Binondo Chinese Church.

Fr. Sierra laughs in optimism when I ask how the two parishes get along together and he responds both churches exist in harmony. Tagalog mass is only held in the main church but Chinese mass is conducted the Chinese Church as part of indoctrinating pure Chinese immigrants from Mainland China and orient them about Christian living. But the Chinese Binondo Church celebrates mass in three languages in English, Mandarin, and Amoy or Fookien.

Religious syncretism often takes place when foreign beliefs are introduced to an indigenous belief system and the teachings are blended. The heterogeneous religion then takes a shape of its own. In this case, Buddhism and Confucianism are foreign beliefs blended with Catholic dogma as the indigenous belief system, and when merged, it forms a unique religious practice.

The said shrine is sacred among the Chinoys here to show the importance of religious syncretism, originally erected in Ongpin Street in 1984, now it stands majestically along Tomas Pinpin Street. Though the site is sacred along a busy street, it also magnifies its touristic appeal, carved off and is installed with a golden cross of five feet in height and four feet width.   

It has a candle stands but beside the corners it has cylinders filled with joss sticks or incense. As I observe, Chinoys and some local and foreign tourists light candles and burn incense at the same time before they say their prayers before the golden cross. Despite considered a Catholic Shrine, the fusion of cultures seems obvious, and religious syncretism highlights the faith of the people in Binondo.

Lesson # 3: The Catholic faith is very strong in Binondo regardless of the heavy Chinese influence observed in the area. It is common knowledge that the Chinese have been converting into Christianity, most notably Catholicism, since colonial periods. Religion, specifically Catholicism, could be considered a neutral ground as we enter the world of Binondo.

As we leave Binondo at dusk, I have simple reflections or perhaps questions that could be answered or only time can answer it. What if the Chinese did not come to the Philippines? I think that would be impossible because of early trading and migration in the past which is innate to every nationality. Many Chinese migrated to the Philippines as paupers but now many of them have become financially blessed and few are becoming tycoons undeniably occupying very significant positions in the capitalist economy of the Philippines. Then, why Chinoys are rich and prosperous compared to other ethnic groups in the Philippines? Scholars like Go Bon Juan would claim that the ethnic Chinese were never, by nature, businessmen but it was historical conditions which pushed them to play the role of businessmen in the Philippines. For me, Binondo shall remain special at the heart of Manila’s economic miracle; its cultural richness will enliven brightly as Chinese New Year in the country is annually celebrated; religious syncretism will flourish as a fusion of various faiths continuously grow; and local politics shall become the training ground for most Chinoys to expand their political clout and influence in the national political scene.

Tuguegarao City (Land of the Ibanags)

Poem and Photographs by Chester B. Cabalza
Copyright © 2011 by Chester B. Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

- To the Ybanag youth

When I have these qualms that I might not see
My culture's impeccable legacy
Before the faces of young men to be
Like helpless, endangered eagle as me

When I consider how my life is spent
In the rich culture once treasured in tent
memories of my ancestors extinct
Passing to youngsters, less I think

When the time I shall return unto dust
I'll bring in the sky customs I've spent last
Before my ancestors I offer present
Hold like a rich garner; rest in content

From: C.B. Cabalza's Anthology of Poems, entitled, "Earthbound Spirits and other Poems" (1998)

China's Paramount Leaders

Photo courtesy of Dreamstime

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

Since the birth of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai, Chinese post-modernizing society has never been the same way now. Definitely, the ruling party is the source of all political power that exudes all the exclusive right to legitimize and control all other political organizations. It alone determines the social, economic, and political goals for the society, mostly controlled by the elites, who themselves are leaders of the party hierarchy.

Mao Zedong dominated the “First Generation” leadership of the People’s Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts defined the “Second Generation” as China opened its economy to the world. Jiang Zemin spearheaded China’s peaceful development of the “Third Generation” stabilizing China’s post-Tiananmen economic reforms posting a consistent economic growth trajectory. Hu Jintao’s peaceful rise and harmonious society consolidated the “Fourth Generation” while the “Fifth Generation” under Xi Jinping will beyond doubt lead an army of confident Chinese dreamers.

The five charismatic and enigmatic paramount leaders of China have led and will be leading the most populous country in the world to its Manifest destiny as it prepares for the party’s centennial celebration by 2049 since the Chinese communists theoretically founded a new political dynasty in 1949, having its seat of power in Beijing.

Chairman Mao is revered as the architect-founder of the successful political party in China, though his dominating influence or charismatic appeal wanted to purify the party and state leadership. However, he may be faulted for introducing the Cultural Revolution, excessively manifested in the Great Leap Forward, which launched a massive personality cult.

French and Russian-educated Deng should be credited for China’s staying power. Not for his pragmatic economic brilliance, China could not have reached its global status today as the ‘other’ superpower. His economic pragmatism succumb many Chinese to believe that ‘to get rich is glorious,’ and ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice,’ generalized his realistic policies.

He consolidated his control over the central command structure of the armed forces, reformed the People’s Liberation Army military officer corps training, and replaced the large number of aging officers by younger in age and better educated officers. Therefore, the Mao-Deng extreme leadership values differ, as the first laid the ground on political reforms for 27 years, whereas the second paved the way for economic reforms for 14 years.

Under Jiang Zemin’s development dictatorship at the expense of ethics, he outlined his new vision. His ‘pay attention to politics’ campaign consolidated his obvious personal authority just as the Cultural Revolution was massively attached to Mao.

Three decades ago, PLA was considered a boxer suffering from ‘short arms and slow feet’. But the inferiority complex rapidly changed at the latter part of Jiang’s presidency in his effort to modernize the armed forces as it began to strengthen hardware capability and essentially contain enemies.

Stretched by Hu Jintao’s harmonious society concept, his hands on work for security, military, and defense matters greatly impacted the PLA as he earmarked more funds for the digitization of operations as well as the development and procurement of weapons. His concept of the army’s functions goes beyond ‘traditional’ tasks and embodied the role of armed forces to provide substantial force to ensure the consolidation of the ruling party status to provide strong security backing for China’s development.

When Xi Jinping ascended into power, he dreams even farther to modernize the PLA to fully realize national reunification with islands in South China Sea and renegade province Taiwan. These are all factors which place Chinese military under heavy pressure in securing the country and its border areas.

A decision to strengthen the reform of China’s national defense and armed forces was adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18^th Central Committee of the Party. Under Xi, China’s defense budget has increased by double digits nearly every year making China the world’s second largest military spender.

Now that China is aggressive in ocean filling, artificial island reclamation and infrastructure building within its controversial coastal geography through a U-shaped nine-dashed line map, Beijing has effectively put up its own Great Wall of the Sea in the South China Sea carrying out its Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, certainly aimed at denying other militaries access to the energy and marine rich resources in the disputed islands.

Using historical claims to secure its sovereignty over the contested islands, China’s Koumintang government, then in battle with the Communist Party in 1947, issued a local map of the South China Sea islands, enclosing it in irregular 11-dashed line of varied lengths and distances from nearby coasts.

But Chinese incursions resulted to illegal occupation of the West Philippine Sea that outlines China’s expanse in maritime projections in forming boundaries for China’s naval defensive perimeter.

Aggressively, the People’s Liberation Army Navy made a shift from ‘coastal defense’ or land-focused to ‘offshore defense’ or ocean-focused strategy, a shift to prepare them from safeguarding their shores in the seas off the Chinese littoral to perform a mix of sea and area denials and to flex power projections in the region.

From Mao’s foundation of ideology to Deng’s pragmatism to Jiang’s three represents to Hu’s harmonious society and peaceful rise to Xi’s Chinese dream, all of them reinforce the Chinese dictum that, ‘the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese dream’. This may vary in interpretations, but still, China is maligned with internal security challenges like massive corruption, extreme gap between the rich and the poor, imminent environmental degradation, among others.

Understanding Chinese wants and dreams under the grand visions of their paramount leaders will give us a broader perspective of their current actions and behaviors in the South China Sea. Definitely the sleeping dragon is wide awake now, a reality from French General Napoleon Bonaparte’s prophesy three centuries ago when he inferred that, ‘here lies the sleeping dragon, let him sleep, for when he wakes up, he will shock the world!’

But ultimately, will China become a responsible hegemon to its smaller neighbors or will it mightily flex muscles and keep puffing potent fires?  

Bilateral or Multilateral Talks

Photo from Inquirer.net

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

The mind over might strategy we saw in the recent legal battle of the Philippines against China at The Hague for the maritime jurisdiction of the disputed islands specifically in the West Philippine Sea demonstrates our dramatic show of force to stand on equal footing with wealthier and powerful giant neighbor.

China through its ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua expressed his continued intentions to offer for bilateral talks with our country as the best way to peacefully settle these disputes. Prior to China’s aggressive actions in the South  China Sea, it has indicated that it wants to avoid the internationalization of the dispute, as evidenced by its continued drive for bilateral negotiations.

However, during the opening salvo speech of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Peace Palace, he asserted that the Philippines has diligently pursued to resolve the problem bilaterally and multilaterally for over two decades.

Our government strongly believes to counter China’s ambiguous historic claims by espousing a multilateral approach to peacefully settle the maritime flashpoints.

Despite diplomatic efforts, China thinks alone it possesses maritime rights in virtually the entirety of the South China Sea and that the Philippines must recognize and accept China’s sovereignty.  Del Rosario enumerated incidents where China lawfully violated international maritime laws under (Unclos) - the Constitution of the oceans and forcibly seized and built structures in the disputed islands attracting dissenting opinions and violent reactions from the international community.

A year ago, the Philippines proposed a multilateral Triple Action Plan (TAP) of ASEAN in the South China Sea, which identified Arbitration as the final and enduring resolution to address the destabilizing activities in the region.

While China has indicated that it still does not intend to participate in the Arbitration case filed against it by the Philippines, the decision to issue a written response in the form of a position paper from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that China is indeed wary of the possible effects of the case.  

Given two hypothetical and plausible strategic dialogues for the Philippines to deal with its utmost challenging external threat today, how do we weigh our options in case multilateral engagements will falter and the only choice left would be bilateral negotiation?

Bilateral negotiation strong points benefited the Asian way of looking at our historical bilateral trade relations with China when early immigrant Chinese founded the world’s oldest Chinatown in Binondo long before western colonization of the Spaniards and Americans including the Japanese occupation in the Philippines. Over the centuries until today, Chinoys and influential taipans and some intellectuals of Chinese blood have become assimilated in our society.

Tina Clemente, a professor at the UP Asian Center describes the patterns of the bilateral economic relationships between the Philippines and China in terms of the investments, trade, labor, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) based from official statistical data, but the patterns look like asymmetric, critical and vulnerable.  But China’s rising power has attracted many ASEAN countries to open trade with them as its best economic partners, thus to factor in hedging strategies.

When I studied in Beijing at China’s National Defense University, my Chinese lecturers, most of them belonging to the Corps of Professors of the People’s Liberation Army were outspoken of bilateral negotiation to settle disputes with claimant-states in the South China Sea. They would often brag ‘respect’ and ‘trust’ on how they would shoulder the cudgel to painstakingly negotiate with sovereign smaller countries.      

Historically, bilateralism failed to provide just and equitable solutions to conflicts. This option was elucidated in highly controversial Agreements like the German-Russo Agreement in the late 1800s; German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty signed in 1939; Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and USSR in 1939; and US-German Peace Treaty in 1921. All these bilateral treatises failed and resulted to war between and among those nations.

Some strategists believe that bilateral negotiations should be engaged by two states with almost equal economic status and military capability. But even if with equal footing in terms of military might as the above-mentioned examples have shown, still bilateral treatises would fail and can damage the world security order. In this case, the Philippines is way below the Chinese maximum credible deterrence, economic prowess, and military power projections; therefore our country will certainly end up at the losing end of the bilateral talks.   

But there are recent notable successes in bilateral cooperation courtesy of excellent negotiation skills used to resolve territorial disputes in some other countries and regions including the 2007 Australia and Timor-Leste Agreement on the 50-year development zone and revenue sharing arrangement; China-Russia Bilateral Agreement in 2004 on the disputed islands of Amur and Assuri confluence and the Argun River; and Norway-Russia Comprehensive Maritime Boundary Agreement in 2010, to name a few.

Some views that bilateral resolution of the South China Sea issue will foster maritime regional cooperation to the territorial disputes and it will pave more open communication between maritime law and enforcement agencies as well as setting up a hotline between foreign ministers for use in case of maritime emergencies. But the proposal looks ideal only for two countries with long tradition of ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’.   

Under a bilateral agreement, a range of preventive measures could ease regional tensions and de-escalate the risk of military conflict as both parties agree on resource-sharing agreement considering bilateral controlling mechanisms that would deter potential sources of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes arising from oil and gas exploration. Stronger military to military communication would increase dialogue to reduce conflict escalation.

But greed and megalomaniac claims over disputed islands and atolls would ruin all facets of potential cooperation under ideal bilateral agreements.   

The Philippines has proactively engaged in multilateral approach in dealing with this security threat as the best prerogative since it involves many countries in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific in general with sprouting multi-dimensional regional and global interests that cut across political, economic, socio-cultural, techno-scientific, environmental, and military issues.  

The South China Sea dispute is multilateral in nature because it involves other claimants including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Resolving issues between two countries will not entirely solve the dispute as other states are also claimants of islands. The dispute remains a potentially strong flashpoint especially with the ASEAN’s recent shelving of a proposed code of conduct that would have regulated aggressive activities of stronger claimants.     

 The multilateral approach will also give the country leverage against bullying tactics of the giant adversary as it will put international pressure to its misbehaviors. The internationalization of the case should also be complemented by the Philippines’ continuous strengthening of relationships with its current allies. This is especially true for Japan, South Korea and other ASEAN countries where China has ongoing territorial disputes.

Pessimist would argue that multilateralism is generally viewed as ineffective involving various parties with diverse interests which make it difficult to arrive at an acceptable agreement. It will also invite major powers in the region, not so much involved in the playing field, but will prefer to assume a neutral stance and declare non-intervention posture or may just verbalize pronouncements without tangible actions. In other words, it may not work in an anarchic international arena where interests of nations will define their wants.   

The diplomatic and legal actions our country may have chosen will certainly affect the kind of strategic culture we have mustered in the long run. The mind over might strategy we are pursuing will sum up our deterrence in this David versus Goliath maritime dilemma that we have had encountered with China.

Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards define strategic culture as a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force often molded according to historical experience. Given our weak military might, alliance is a short-term remedy often favored than self-reliance as a long-term strength to better achieve modernized armed forces. It should also be noted that alliance as a form of strategic culture, apparent in bilateral or multilateral approaches, will not ensure the protection of our internal and external territories.   

On the other hand, some experts may deem that our shift to pursue Arbitration as a sign of soft power through the power of international laws that would serve as the greater equalizer among states, whether weak or mighty, has become our final resort to peacefully settle maritime disputes with China. Obviously, China is determined to show off its hard power in the Asia-Pacific as it continuously flexes muscles in the region.

   

The dichotomy between hard and soft powers in terms of strategic cultures shown by the Philippines and China in defining their bilateral and multilateral approaches in the South China Sea conundrum would highlight two different poles on the continuum of power. Both concepts imply different ideas, interactions, persuasions, and institutions for foreign and defense policies when looking at the fields of politics, security, and economics.

Christian Wagner deems that, ideally hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In contrast, soft power strategies emphasize common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions. 

Perhaps with a mix verdict in the arbitration tribunal and realistic intergenerational solutions in the naval saga, the Philippines should rather play its cards conscientiously and become pragmatic in its negotiations to fight for its maritime rights in the contested islands. Despite our bravery to seek legal means in settling our bilateral differences with China, whether we win or lose, the Philippines has indeed achieved a moral ascendancy to pursue international rule of law and gained the respect of the international community.

Madrid, Spain

     Photographs by CBCabalza. Copyright © 2015 by Chester B. Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

The successful foreign enhancement travel or study tour of  NDCP to military counterpart institutions and government ministries in Spain include the visit and engagement to the El Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN) or Higher Center for National Defence Studies; Ministerio del Interior (Ministry of Local Government); Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperacion or Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation; Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentacion y Medio y Ambiente (MAGRAMA) or  Ministry of Agriculture, Food and the Environment; Philippine Embassy in Madrid; side trips to Rizal's monument and a brief tour to the beautiful city of Toledo; and lastly, a talk and tour to Spain's multinational Airbus Industry! 

‘Great Wall of Sea’ hit

courtesy of PDI

By: Nikko Dizon and Cynthia D. Balana, Niña P. Calleja

Read more: http://globalnation.inquirer.net/124837/great-wall-of-sea-hit#ixzz3e7gfMNT6
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Security expert:China now illegally occupying parts of the Philippines

“China has effectively put up its own Great Wall of the Sea.”

China’s statement on Tuesday that it would soon start building infrastructure on its artificial islands in the South China Sea drew condemnation from the Philippines, Japan and the United States on Wednesday.

Manila said it was considering asking the United Nations arbitral tribunal to issue a provisional measure to stop Beijing from pursuing its expansion into disputed parts of the South China Sea.

Recent satellite images showed land reclamation on Kagitingan (Fiery Cross), Calderon (Cuarteron), Burgos (Gaven), Mabini (Johnson South), Panganiban (Mischief), Zamora (Subi) and McKennan (Hughes) reefs in the West Philippine Sea, South China Sea waters within the Philippines’ 370-kilometer exclusive economic zone.

With its massive and rapid building of artificial islands and infrastructure on those reefs, China has “illegally occupied” the Philippines, Chester Cabalza, a Filipino security expert, said on Wednesday.

“It has effectively put up its own Great Wall of the Sea,” Cabalza added.

“They are occupying our territory rapidly because they have a timeline that they need to meet. This is already an illegal occupation by China through their construction of infrastructure and as a result, we lose a lot of our resources,” Cabalza, a professor at the National Defense College of the Philippines, told the Inquirer on the phone.

Cabalza said that by building artificial islands in the South China Sea, China was now carrying out its Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, a military doctrine used to deny foreign militaries access to a certain area. By using A2/AD, China is denying other militaries access to the South China Sea and impinging on other countries’ freedom of navigation, he said.

“The more China blocks access to the South China Sea, [the more power it gets] in the region, as [it controls] the area,” Cabalza said.

Japan warned Beijing that its extensive land reclamation does not make its ownership of the South China Sea “a done deal.”

Washington said it was aware that China intended to complete some reclamation work in the South China Sea in the coming days, but Beijing’s plans for further construction work would not ease tensions in the heavily disputed sea.

China announced on Tuesday that it would soon complete some of its land reclamation on reefs in the Spratly Islands in the middle of the South China Sea and follow up with building infrastructure to carry out functions ranging from maritime search and rescue to environmental conservation and scientific research.

The announcement indicates China’s intention to seal its claim to almost the entire South China Sea ahead of a ruling from the UN arbitral tribunal on a Philippine challenge to that claim filed in 2013.

Int’l court action

On Monday, Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio of the Supreme Court urged the government to ask the international court to stop China’s land reclamation.

“It is not yet too late,” Assistant Secretary Charles Jose, spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), said on Wednesday in response to Carpio’s call. “We can still do that . . . hopefully immediately after July.”

Jose explained that the government considered it premature to file a request for a provisional measure because the arbitral court had yet to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the Philippine case.

The UN court has scheduled oral arguments for July 7 to 13 after which it will decide on jurisdiction and admissibility of the Philippine case, Jose said.

China has spurned the proceedings, insisting it has “undisputed sovereignty” over the South China Sea, but has been ordered by the tribunal to comment on the Philippine case just the same.

Jose added that the government was confident the five-member court headed by Judge Thomas A. Mensah of Ghana would rule in favor of the Philippines.

Jose said China’s land reclamation in the South China Sea had become a concern not just for the Philippines but the international community as well.

Besides the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan have claims that overlap with China’s in the South China Sea, a vital waterway where $5 trillion in global cargo passes every year.

Int’l pressure

Malacañang said the government would continue pursuing a resolution of the territorial dispute with China in accordance with international law, but the Department of National Defense (DND) said the Philippines should intensify its efforts to put international pressure on China.

Peter Paul Galvez, spokesman for the DND, said there was no indication that China would stop building artificial islands and infrastructure in the South China Sea.

“I think we just need some more [pressure]. We just have to continue . . . informing . . . the international community [about] what’s happening,” Galvez said.

“Let’s not discount the value of informing and telling people, making them understand what’s really happening, because we need to counter the lies behind these claims,” he said.

Galvez said the DND was pleased with the strong support of the United States, European Union, Group of Seven, Australia and Japan.

“That should be enough for [China] to realize that what [it is] doing is really contrary to international law. So we call on [China]: Come on, wake up to the truth,” he said.

Galvez said the airstrip that China was building on Kagitingan Reef was 75-percent complete. He said the airstrip was big enough to receive large cargo and military aircraft.

At the DFA, Jose said the government had launched a massive information campaign to inform the public on developments in the South China Sea.

PH documentary

On Friday, the DFA released a 20-minute documentary film, “Karapatan sa Karagatan” (Maritime Rights), dealing with the economic losses that the Philippines incurs due to the territorial dispute with China.

The documentary, hosted by Lourd de Veyra and Jun Sabayton and directed by RA Rivera, was aired by PTV 4. It was the first of a four-part series on the West Philippine Sea.

The DFA, however, is not supporting any campaign for a boycott of Chinese goods, Jose said.

Filipinos in the United States last week called for a boycott of Chinese goods to pressure China into giving up its claim to Philippine territory in the South China Sea.

The United States has called for an “immediate and lasting” halt to China’s island-building in the South China Sea.

On Tuesday, Washington said it “noted” Beijing’s announcement of the completion of some land reclamation work, but expressed concern that its plans for more construction work, including for defense, would not ease tensions in the region.

“China’s stated plans do not contribute to a reduction in tensions, support the emergence of diplomatic and peaceful solutions, or bolster China’s disputed maritime claims,” said a spokesperson for the US state department.–With wire reports