Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
JURISDICTION OF NLRC
ANDRES E. DITAN, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ASIAWORLD RECRUITMENT, INC., AND/OR INTRACO SALES CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 79560
December 3, 1990
Facts:
Andres E. Ditan was recruited by private respondent Intraco Sales Corporation, through its local agent, Asia World, the other private respondent, to work in Angola as a welding supervisor. The contract was for nine months, at a monthly salary of US$1,100.00 or US$275.00 weekly, and contained the required standard stipulations for the protection of our overseas workers.
Arriving on November 30, 1984, in Luanda, capital of Angola, the petitioner was assigned as an ordinary welder in the INTRACO central maintenance shop from December 2 to 25, 1984. On December 26, 1984, he was informed, to his distress that would be transferred to Kafunfo, some 350 kilometers east of Luanda. This was the place where, earlier that year, the rebels had attacked and kidnapped expatriate workers, killing two Filipinos in the raid. Naturally, Ditan was reluctant to go. However, he was assured by the INTRACO manager that Kafunfo was safe and adequately protected by government troops; moreover — and this was more persuasive — he was told he would be sent home if he refused the new assignment. In the end, with much misgiving, he relented and agreed.
On December 29, 1984, his fears were confirmed. The Unita rebels attacked the diamond mining site where Ditan was working and took him and sixteen other Filipino hostages, along with other foreign workers. The rebels and their captives walked through jungle terrain for 31 days to the Unita stronghold near the Namibian border.
They trekked for almost a thousand kilometers. They subsisted on meager fare. Some of them had diarrhea. Their feet were blistered. It was only on March 16, 1985, that the hostages were finally released after the intercession of their governments and the International Red Cross. Six days later, Ditan and the other Filipino hostages were back in the Philippines.
The repatriated workers had been assured by INTRACO that they would be given priority in re-employment abroad, and eventually eleven of them were taken back. Ditan having been excluded, he filed in June 1985 a complaint against the private respondents for breach of contract and various other claims. Specifically, he sought the amount of US$4,675.00, representing his salaries for the unexpired 17 weeks of his contract; US$25,000.00 as war risk bonus; US$2,196.50 as the value of his lost belongings; US$1,100 for unpaid vacation leave; and moral and exemplary damages in the sum of US$50,000.00, plus attorney's fees.
All these claims were dismissed by POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in a decision dated January 27, 1987. 2 This was affirmed in toto by respondent NLRC in a resolution dated July 14, 1987, 3 which is now being challenged in this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Ditan is entitled to any relief and his case is under the jurisdiction of NLRC?
Held:
Yes. The fact that stands out most prominently in the record is the risk to which the petitioner was subjected when he was assigned, after his reluctant consent, to the rebel-infested region of Kafunfo. This was a dangerous area.
The petitioner had gone to that foreign land in search of a better life that he could share with his loved ones after his stint abroad. That choice would have required him to come home empty-handed to the disappointment of an expectant family.
It is not explained why the petitioner was not paid for the unexpired portion of his contract which had 17 more weeks to go. The hostages were immediately repatriated after their release, presumably so they could recover from their ordeal. The promise of INTRACO was that they would be given priority in re-employment should their services be needed. In the particular case of the petitioner, the promise was not fulfilled. It would seem that his work was terminated, and not again required, because it was really intended all along to assign him only to Kafunfo.
The private respondents stress that the contract Ditan entered into called for his employment in Angola, without indication of any particular place of assignment in the country. This meant he agreed to be assigned to work anywhere in that country, including Kafunfo. When INTRACO assigned Ditan to that place in the regular course of its business, it was merely exercising its rights under the employment contract that Ditan had freely entered into. Hence, it is argued, he cannot now complain that there was a breach of that contract for which he is entitled to monetary redress.
The private respondents also reject the claim for war risk bonus and point out that POEA Memorandum Circular No. 4, issued pursuant to the mandatory war risk coverage provision in Section 2, Rule VI, of the POEA Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, categorizing Angola as a war risk took effect only on February 6, 1985"after the petitioner's deployment to Angola on November 27, 1984." Consequently, the stipulation could not be applied to the petitioner as it was not supposed to have a retroactive effect.
The paramount duty of this Court is to render justice through law. The law in this case allows two opposite interpretations, one strictly in favor of the employers and the other liberally in favor of the worker. The choice is obvious. We find, considering the totality of the circumstances attending this case, that the petitioner is entitled to relief. The petitioner went to Angola prepared to work as he had promised in accordance with the employment contract he had entered into in good faith with the private respondents. Over his objection, he was sent to a dangerous assignment and as he feared was taken hostage in a rebel attack that prevented him from fulfilling his contract while in captivity. Upon his release, he was immediately sent home and was not paid the salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. He was immediately repatriated with the promise that he would be given priority in re-employment, which never came. To rub salt on the wound, many of his co-hostages were re-employed as promised. The petitioner was left only with a bleak experience and nothing to show for it except dashed hopes and a sense of rejection.
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law.
WHEREFORE, the challenged resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondents are hereby DIRECTED jointly and severally to pay the petitioner: a) the current equivalent in Philippine pesos of US$4,675.00, representing his unpaid salaries for the balance of the contract term; b) nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00; and c) 10% attorney's fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
Monday, July 26, 2010
People v Goce
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused, NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 113161
August 29, 1995
Facts:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging —
That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987 he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt.
Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad.
Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00.
Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00.
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to leave for abroad.
Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Parañaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted several pertinent documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials.
In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to leave for abroad as promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments.
As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Parañaque. She informed him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00.
On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her.
Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at Tambo, Parañaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she acceded.
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses.
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment.
Issue:
Whether or not Agustin’s act of introducing couple Goce falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Art 13(b) in relation to Art 34 of the Labor Code.
Held:
The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.
All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused, NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 113161
August 29, 1995
Facts:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, alleging —
That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4) Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he declared that sometime in March or April, 1987 he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the corresponding receipt.
Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of the placement agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance that they could leave for abroad.
Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00.
Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of P4,000.00.
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office because the "NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to leave for abroad.
Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the Clover Placement Agency at Parañaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted several pertinent documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials.
In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of that same year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to leave for abroad as promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in installments.
As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in February, 1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Parañaque. She informed him that "madalas siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary of about $600.00 to $700.00.
On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but to no avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her.
Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at Tambo, Parañaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she acceded.
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple, Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses.
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment.
Issue:
Whether or not Agustin’s act of introducing couple Goce falls within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Art 13(b) in relation to Art 34 of the Labor Code.
Held:
The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.
All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas. It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. It is undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nelly D. Agustin.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
Association of Small Landowners of the Phil v Secretary of DAR
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Facts:
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657.
Held:
P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 78742
July 14, 1989
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."
Facts:
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land.
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Issue:
Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657.
Held:
P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
Rizal Empire Insurance Group v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
LABOR CODE, ARTICLE 5: RULES AND REGULATIONS
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73140
May 29, 1987
Facts:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement; Jaja Oftana
LABOR CODE, ARTICLE 5: RULES AND REGULATIONS
RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP AND/OR SERGIO CORPUS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TEODORICO L. RUIZ, as Labor Arbiter and ROGELIO R. CORIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73140
May 29, 1987
Facts:
In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on a technicality.
Held:
Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22, 1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement; Jaja Oftana
Lagatic v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE RULES
ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO, GRACE LIUSON, and ANDREW LIUSON, respondents
G.R. No. 121004
January 28, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold calls. The number of cold calls depends on the sales generated by each: more sales mean less cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the submission of daily progress reports on the same.
On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call reports for September 10, October 1 and 10, 1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 28, as well as for October 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1992. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance would result in his termination from the company. In a reply dated October 18, 1992, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest omission brought about by his concentration on other aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse inadequate and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for three days, with a similar warning.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given up to February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner, on February 16, 1993, wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?" and exhibited the same to his co-employees. To worsen matters, he left the same lying on his desk where everyone could see it.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland should not make good its previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written statement aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent a letter-reply alleging that his failure to submit cold call reports should trot be deemed as gross insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the damaging statement, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!"
Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him on February 26, 1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
Issue:
W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed?
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause.
Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with. Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . . has so plainly and completely been bared." 5 Petitioner's continued infraction of company policy requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal.
With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, must fail.
Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
RIGHT TO PRESCRIBE RULES
ROMEO LAGATIC, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, JESUS GO, GRACE LIUSON, and ANDREW LIUSON, respondents
G.R. No. 121004
January 28, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Romeo Lagatic was employed in May 1986 by Cityland, first as a probationary sales agent, and later on as a marketing specialist. He was tasked with soliciting sales for the company, with the corresponding duties of accepting call-ins, referrals, and making client calls and cold calls. Cold calls refer to the practice of prospecting for clients through the telephone directory. Cityland, believing that the same is an effective and cost-efficient method of finding clients, requires all its marketing specialists to make cold calls. The number of cold calls depends on the sales generated by each: more sales mean less cold calls. Likewise, in order to assess cold calls made by the sales staff, as well as to determine the results thereof, Cityland requires the submission of daily progress reports on the same.
On October 22, 1991, Cityland issued a written reprimand to petitioner for his failure to submit cold call reports for September 10, October 1 and 10, 1991. This notwithstanding, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for September 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 28, as well as for October 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14, 1992. Petitioner was required to explain his inaction, with a warning that further non-compliance would result in his termination from the company. In a reply dated October 18, 1992, petitioner claimed that the same was an honest omission brought about by his concentration on other aspects of his job. Cityland found said excuse inadequate and, on November 9, 1992, suspended him for three days, with a similar warning.
Notwithstanding the aforesaid suspension and warning, petitioner again failed to submit cold call reports for February 5, 6, 8, 10 and 12, 1993. He was verbally reminded to submit the same and was even given up to February 17, 1993 to do so. Instead of complying with said directive, petitioner, on February 16, 1993, wrote a note, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS! WHO CARES?" and exhibited the same to his co-employees. To worsen matters, he left the same lying on his desk where everyone could see it.
On February 23, 1993, petitioner received a memorandum requiring him to explain why Cityland should not make good its previous warning for his failure to submit cold call reports, as well as for issuing the written statement aforementioned. On February 24, 1993, he sent a letter-reply alleging that his failure to submit cold call reports should trot be deemed as gross insubordination. He denied any knowledge of the damaging statement, "TO HELL WITH COLD CALLS!"
Finding petitioner guilty of gross insubordination, Cityland served a notice of dismissal upon him on February 26, 1993. Aggrieved by such dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against Cityland for illegal dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, overtime and rest day pay, damages and attorney's fees. The labor arbiter dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the same was affirmed by the NLRC; hence the present recourse.
Issue:
W/N NLRC gravely abused its discretion in not finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed?
Held:
The petition lacks merit.
To constitute a valid dismissal from employment, two requisites must be met, namely: (1) the employee must be afforded due process, and (2) the dismissal must be for a valid cause.
Employers may, thus, make reasonable rules and regulations for the government of their employees, and when employees, with knowledge of an established rule, enter the service, the rule becomes a part of the contract of employment. It is also generally recognized that company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with. Corollarily, an employee may be validly dismissed for violation of a reasonable company rule or regulation adopted for the conduct of the company business. An employer cannot rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose . . . lack of regard for his employer's rules . . . has so plainly and completely been bared." 5 Petitioner's continued infraction of company policy requiring cold call reports, as evidenced by the 28 instances of non-submission of aforesaid reports, justifies his dismissal.
With the finding that petitioner's dismissal was for a just and valid cause, his claims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, must fail.
Resolution is AFFIRMED and this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Acknowledgement: Jaja Oftana
Cerezo v Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN DECISIONS
CLARA CEREZO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-10107
February 4, 1916
Facts:
This is an action for damages against the defendant for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge Ocumen, on the 7th of July, 1913, deceased being plaintiff's only means of support. Judgment was entered in a favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,250, together with interest and costs. Defendant appealed.
The deceased was an employee of the defendant as a day laborer on the 8th of July, 1913, assisting in laying gas pipes on Calle Herran in the city of Manila . The digging of the trench was completed both ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz, and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. The men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end, and there was no work in the progress at the east end of the trench. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer a call of nature, the bank caved in, burying him to his neck in dirt, where he died before he could be released. It has not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to enter the trench at this point; nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to be used as a water-closet; nor that the defendant acquiesced in the using of this place for these purposes. The trench at the place where the accident occurred was between 3 and 4 feet deep. Nothing remained to be done there except to refill the trench as soon as the pipes were connected. The refilling was delayed at that place until the completion of the connection. At the time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refilling the trench required him to be was at the west end. There is no contention that there was any danger whatever in the refilling of the trench.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff’s right to recover is based on the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 1874)
Held:
Act No. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act (Rev. Laws. 1902, chap. 106 secs. 71-79), it having been originally enacted in that jurisdiction in 1887. (Stat. 1887, chap. 270.) The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the English statute (43 & 44 Vict., c. 42).
This court is not finally concluded by the decision of any other State court or the British court, in their construction of a similar statute, but the opinion of learned courts upon similar questions are entitled to great weight and this is especially true when the statute, from which ours was copied, had been construed prior to its enactment by our legislature." ( Birmingham Ry. and Electric Co. vs. Allen, 99 Ala. 359, 371; 120 L. R. A., 457.)
The right of the master to shift responsibility for the performance of all or at least most of these personal duties to the shoulders of a subordinate and thereby escape liability for the injuries suffered by his workmen through his non-performance of these duties, was, in England, definitely settled by the House of Lords in the case of Wilson vs. Merry (L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. Appl Cas., 326; 19 Eng. Rul. Cas., 132). This was just two years before the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, and no doubt the full significance of such a doctrine was one of the impelling causes which expedited the passage of the Act, and chiefly accounts for the presence in it of subsection 1 of section 1.
The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him, but was due to suffocation. He was sitting or squatting when the slide gave way. Had he been even half-erect, it is highly probable that he would have escaped suffocation or even serious injury. Hence, the accident was of a most unusual character. Experience and common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such a trench as that in question. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week, without indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring the trench was remote. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in question would virtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the city of Manila for the gas mains. Upon a full consideration of the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion that ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code.
Effect upon the Law in this country
The act was not intended to curtail the any of the rights which an employee had under the pre-existing law. Under the act, the defense of contributory negligence would defeat an action for damages.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Acknowledgement: Janette Oftana
SIGNIFICANCE OF FOREIGN DECISIONS
CLARA CEREZO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-10107
February 4, 1916
Facts:
This is an action for damages against the defendant for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's son, Jorge Ocumen, on the 7th of July, 1913, deceased being plaintiff's only means of support. Judgment was entered in a favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P1,250, together with interest and costs. Defendant appealed.
The deceased was an employee of the defendant as a day laborer on the 8th of July, 1913, assisting in laying gas pipes on Calle Herran in the city of Manila . The digging of the trench was completed both ways from the cross-trench in Calle Paz, and the pipes were laid therein up to that point. The men of the deceased's gang were filling the west end, and there was no work in the progress at the east end of the trench. Shortly after the deceased entered the trench at the east end to answer a call of nature, the bank caved in, burying him to his neck in dirt, where he died before he could be released. It has not been shown that the deceased had received orders from the defendant to enter the trench at this point; nor that the trench had been prepared by the defendant as a place to be used as a water-closet; nor that the defendant acquiesced in the using of this place for these purposes. The trench at the place where the accident occurred was between 3 and 4 feet deep. Nothing remained to be done there except to refill the trench as soon as the pipes were connected. The refilling was delayed at that place until the completion of the connection. At the time of the accident the place where the deceased's duty of refilling the trench required him to be was at the west end. There is no contention that there was any danger whatever in the refilling of the trench.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff’s right to recover is based on the Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 1874)
Held:
Act No. 1874 is essentially a copy of the Massachusetts Employers' Liability Act (Rev. Laws. 1902, chap. 106 secs. 71-79), it having been originally enacted in that jurisdiction in 1887. (Stat. 1887, chap. 270.) The Massachusetts statute was "copied verbatim, with some variations of detail, from the English statute (43 & 44 Vict., c. 42).
This court is not finally concluded by the decision of any other State court or the British court, in their construction of a similar statute, but the opinion of learned courts upon similar questions are entitled to great weight and this is especially true when the statute, from which ours was copied, had been construed prior to its enactment by our legislature." ( Birmingham Ry. and Electric Co. vs. Allen, 99 Ala. 359, 371; 120 L. R. A., 457.)
The right of the master to shift responsibility for the performance of all or at least most of these personal duties to the shoulders of a subordinate and thereby escape liability for the injuries suffered by his workmen through his non-performance of these duties, was, in England, definitely settled by the House of Lords in the case of Wilson vs. Merry (L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. Appl Cas., 326; 19 Eng. Rul. Cas., 132). This was just two years before the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, and no doubt the full significance of such a doctrine was one of the impelling causes which expedited the passage of the Act, and chiefly accounts for the presence in it of subsection 1 of section 1.
The cause of Ocumen's death was not the weight of the earth which fell upon him, but was due to suffocation. He was sitting or squatting when the slide gave way. Had he been even half-erect, it is highly probable that he would have escaped suffocation or even serious injury. Hence, the accident was of a most unusual character. Experience and common sense demonstrate that ordinarily no danger to employees is to be anticipated from such a trench as that in question. The fact that the walls had maintained themselves for a week, without indication of their giving way, strongly indicates that the necessity for bracing or shoring the trench was remote. To require the company to guard against such an accident as the one in question would virtually compel it to shore up every foot of the miles of trenches dug by it in the city of Manila for the gas mains. Upon a full consideration of the evidence, we are clearly of the opinion that ordinary care did not require the shoring of the trench walls at the place where the deceased met his death. The event properly comes within the class of those which could not be foreseen; and, therefore, the defendant is not liable under the Civil Code.
Effect upon the Law in this country
The act was not intended to curtail the any of the rights which an employee had under the pre-existing law. Under the act, the defense of contributory negligence would defeat an action for damages.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs. So ordered.
Acknowledgement: Janette Oftana
Friday, July 23, 2010
Abaya, Garcia & Agustin v Ebdane
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Abaya, Garcia & Agustin v Ebdane
PLARIDEL M. ABAYA, COMMODORE PLARIDEL C. GARCIA (retired) and PMA ’59 FOUNDATION, INC., rep. by its President, COMMODORE CARLOS L. AGUSTIN (retired), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS, HON. SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. TREASURER NORMA L. LASALA, in her capacity as Treasurer of the Bureau of Treasury, and CHINA ROAD and BRIDGE CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007
Facts:
Based on the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999, the Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective representatives, namely, Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
The Exchange of Notes consisted of two documents: (1) a Letter from the Government of Japan, signed by Ambassador Ara, addressed to then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Siazon, confirming the understanding reached between the two governments concerning the loans to be extended by the Government of Japan to the Philippines; and (2) a document denominated as Records of Discussion where the salient terms of the loans as set forth by the Government of Japan, through the Japanese delegation, were reiterated and the said terms were accepted by the Philippine delegation. Both Ambassador Ara and then Secretary Siazon signed the Records of Discussion as representatives of the Government of Japan and Philippine Government, respectively.
The Exchange of Notes provided that the loans to be extended by the Government of Japan to the Philippines consisted of two loans: Loan I and Loan II.
The Parties
Petitioner Plaridel M. Abaya claims that he filed the instant petition as a taxpayer, former lawmaker, and a Filipino citizen. Petitioner Plaridel C. Garcia likewise claims that he filed the suit as a taxpayer, former military officer, and a Filipino citizen. Petitioner PMA ’59 Foundation, Inc., on the other hand, is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under the existing Philippine laws. It claims that its members are all taxpayers and alumni of the Philippine Military Academy. It is represented by its President, Carlos L. Agustin.
Named as public respondents are the DPWH, as the government agency tasked with the implementation of government infrastructure projects; the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as the government agency that authorizes the release and disbursement of public funds for the implementation of government infrastructure projects; and the Department of Finance (DOF) as the government agency that acts as the custodian and manager of all financial resources of the government. Also named as individual public respondents are Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Emilia T. Boncodin and Cesar V. Purisima in their capacities as former Secretaries of the DPWH, DBM and DOF, respectively. On the other hand, public respondent Norma L. Lasala was impleaded in her capacity as Treasurer of the Bureau of Treasury.
Private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation is a duly organized corporation engaged in the business of construction.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners mainly seek to nullify DPWH Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May 7, 2004, which recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of the civil works of CP I. They also seek to annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into by and between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation pursuant to the said resolution.
Preliminarily, the petitioners assert that they have standing or locus standi to file the instant petition. They claim that as taxpayers and concerned citizens, they have the right and duty to question the expenditure of public funds on illegal acts. They point out that the Philippine Government allocates a peso-counterpart for CP I, which amount is appropriated by Congress in the General Appropriations Act; hence, funds that are being utilized in the implementation of the questioned project also partake of taxpayers’ money. The present action, as a taxpayers’ suit, is thus allegedly proper.
In this connection, the petitioners opine that the contract subsequently entered into by and between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation is void ab initio for being prohibited by RA 9184. They stress that Section 31 thereof expressly provides that "bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from participating in the bidding." The upper limit or ceiling is called the ABC and since the bid of private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation exceeded the ABC for the CP I project, it should have been allegedly disqualified from the bidding process and should not, by law, have been awarded the said contract. They invoke Article 1409 of the Civil Code.
The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is neither a treaty, an international nor an executive agreement that would bar the application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or an executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the Philippine Government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.
The Respondents’ Counter-Arguments
The public respondents, namely the DPWH, DBM and DOF, and their respective named officials, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the petition on grounds that the petitioners have no locus standi and, in any case, Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 and the contract between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation are valid.
According to the public respondents, a taxpayer’s locus standi was recognized in the following cases: (a) where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional; (b) where there is a question of validity of election laws; (c) where legislators questioned the validity of any official action upon the claim that it infringes on their prerogatives as legislators; (d) where there is a claim of illegal disbursement or wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law; (e) where it involves the right of members of the Senate or House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill; or (f) where it involves an invalid law, which when enforced will put the petitioner in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result thereof, or that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. None of the above considerations allegedly obtains in the present case.
Issue:
W/N petitioners violated the Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4860, as amended, otherwise known as the "Foreign Borrowings Act".
Held:
It is hereby clarified that foreign-assisted infrastructure projects may be exempted from the application for the pertinent provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1594 relative to the method and procedure in the comparison of bids, which matter may be the subject of agreement between the infrastructure agency concerned and the lending institution. It should be made clear however that public bidding is still required and can only be waived pursuant to existing laws.
Memorandum Circular No. 108:
In view of the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4860, as amended, otherwise known as the "Foreign Borrowings Act", it is hereby clarified that, for projects supported in whole or in part by foreign assistance awarded through international or local competitive bidding, the government agency concerned may award the contract to the lowest evaluated bidder at his bid price consistent with the provisions of the applicable loan/grant agreement.
Specifically, when the loan/grant agreement so stipulates, the government agency concerned may award the contract to the lowest bidder even if his/its bid exceeds the approved agency estimate.
It is understood that the concerned government agency shall, as far as practicable, adhere closely to the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594 during loan/grant negotiation and the implementation of the projects.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments – treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments.
The Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999, stated, inter alia, that the Government of Japan would extend loans to the Philippines with a view to promoting its economic stabilization and development efforts; Loan I in the amount of Y79,8651,000,000 would be extended by the JBIC to the Philippine Government to implement the projects in the List A (including the Arterial Road Links Development Project - Phase IV); and that such loan (Loan I) would be used to cover payments to be made by the Philippine executing agencies to suppliers, contractors and/or consultants of eligible source countries under such contracts as may be entered into between them for purchases of products and/or services required for the implementation of the projects enumerated in the List A. With respect to the procurement of the goods and services for the projects, it bears reiterating that as stipulated:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines will ensure that the products and/or services mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of Part I and sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 4 of Part II are procured in accordance with the guidelines for procurement of the Bank, which set forth, inter alia, the procedures of international tendering to be followed except where such procedures are inapplicable or inappropriate.
The JBIC Procurements Guidelines, as quoted earlier, forbids any procedure under which bids above or below a predetermined bid value assessment are automatically disqualified. Succinctly put, it absolutely prohibits the imposition of ceilings on bids.
Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that "[a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed," the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
Abaya, Garcia & Agustin v Ebdane
PLARIDEL M. ABAYA, COMMODORE PLARIDEL C. GARCIA (retired) and PMA ’59 FOUNDATION, INC., rep. by its President, COMMODORE CARLOS L. AGUSTIN (retired), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS, HON. SECRETARY EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. TREASURER NORMA L. LASALA, in her capacity as Treasurer of the Bureau of Treasury, and CHINA ROAD and BRIDGE CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167919
February 14, 2007
Facts:
Based on the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999, the Government of Japan and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective representatives, namely, Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the Republic of the Philippines, and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. These loans were aimed at promoting our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts.
The Exchange of Notes consisted of two documents: (1) a Letter from the Government of Japan, signed by Ambassador Ara, addressed to then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Siazon, confirming the understanding reached between the two governments concerning the loans to be extended by the Government of Japan to the Philippines; and (2) a document denominated as Records of Discussion where the salient terms of the loans as set forth by the Government of Japan, through the Japanese delegation, were reiterated and the said terms were accepted by the Philippine delegation. Both Ambassador Ara and then Secretary Siazon signed the Records of Discussion as representatives of the Government of Japan and Philippine Government, respectively.
The Exchange of Notes provided that the loans to be extended by the Government of Japan to the Philippines consisted of two loans: Loan I and Loan II.
The Parties
Petitioner Plaridel M. Abaya claims that he filed the instant petition as a taxpayer, former lawmaker, and a Filipino citizen. Petitioner Plaridel C. Garcia likewise claims that he filed the suit as a taxpayer, former military officer, and a Filipino citizen. Petitioner PMA ’59 Foundation, Inc., on the other hand, is a non-stock, non-profit corporation organized under the existing Philippine laws. It claims that its members are all taxpayers and alumni of the Philippine Military Academy. It is represented by its President, Carlos L. Agustin.
Named as public respondents are the DPWH, as the government agency tasked with the implementation of government infrastructure projects; the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) as the government agency that authorizes the release and disbursement of public funds for the implementation of government infrastructure projects; and the Department of Finance (DOF) as the government agency that acts as the custodian and manager of all financial resources of the government. Also named as individual public respondents are Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Emilia T. Boncodin and Cesar V. Purisima in their capacities as former Secretaries of the DPWH, DBM and DOF, respectively. On the other hand, public respondent Norma L. Lasala was impleaded in her capacity as Treasurer of the Bureau of Treasury.
Private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation is a duly organized corporation engaged in the business of construction.
The Petitioners’ Case
The petitioners mainly seek to nullify DPWH Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May 7, 2004, which recommended the award to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of the civil works of CP I. They also seek to annul the contract of agreement subsequently entered into by and between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation pursuant to the said resolution.
Preliminarily, the petitioners assert that they have standing or locus standi to file the instant petition. They claim that as taxpayers and concerned citizens, they have the right and duty to question the expenditure of public funds on illegal acts. They point out that the Philippine Government allocates a peso-counterpart for CP I, which amount is appropriated by Congress in the General Appropriations Act; hence, funds that are being utilized in the implementation of the questioned project also partake of taxpayers’ money. The present action, as a taxpayers’ suit, is thus allegedly proper.
In this connection, the petitioners opine that the contract subsequently entered into by and between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation is void ab initio for being prohibited by RA 9184. They stress that Section 31 thereof expressly provides that "bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from participating in the bidding." The upper limit or ceiling is called the ABC and since the bid of private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation exceeded the ABC for the CP I project, it should have been allegedly disqualified from the bidding process and should not, by law, have been awarded the said contract. They invoke Article 1409 of the Civil Code.
The petitioners insist that Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 between the JBIC and the Philippine Government is neither a treaty, an international nor an executive agreement that would bar the application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or an executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, the parties are the Philippine Government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.
The Respondents’ Counter-Arguments
The public respondents, namely the DPWH, DBM and DOF, and their respective named officials, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the petition on grounds that the petitioners have no locus standi and, in any case, Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 and the contract between the DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation are valid.
According to the public respondents, a taxpayer’s locus standi was recognized in the following cases: (a) where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional; (b) where there is a question of validity of election laws; (c) where legislators questioned the validity of any official action upon the claim that it infringes on their prerogatives as legislators; (d) where there is a claim of illegal disbursement or wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law; (e) where it involves the right of members of the Senate or House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or condition imposed on an item in an appropriation bill; or (f) where it involves an invalid law, which when enforced will put the petitioner in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result thereof, or that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. None of the above considerations allegedly obtains in the present case.
Issue:
W/N petitioners violated the Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4860, as amended, otherwise known as the "Foreign Borrowings Act".
Held:
It is hereby clarified that foreign-assisted infrastructure projects may be exempted from the application for the pertinent provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1594 relative to the method and procedure in the comparison of bids, which matter may be the subject of agreement between the infrastructure agency concerned and the lending institution. It should be made clear however that public bidding is still required and can only be waived pursuant to existing laws.
Memorandum Circular No. 108:
In view of the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4860, as amended, otherwise known as the "Foreign Borrowings Act", it is hereby clarified that, for projects supported in whole or in part by foreign assistance awarded through international or local competitive bidding, the government agency concerned may award the contract to the lowest evaluated bidder at his bid price consistent with the provisions of the applicable loan/grant agreement.
Specifically, when the loan/grant agreement so stipulates, the government agency concerned may award the contract to the lowest bidder even if his/its bid exceeds the approved agency estimate.
It is understood that the concerned government agency shall, as far as practicable, adhere closely to the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594 during loan/grant negotiation and the implementation of the projects.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments – treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements – whether denominated executive agreements or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments.
The Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999, stated, inter alia, that the Government of Japan would extend loans to the Philippines with a view to promoting its economic stabilization and development efforts; Loan I in the amount of Y79,8651,000,000 would be extended by the JBIC to the Philippine Government to implement the projects in the List A (including the Arterial Road Links Development Project - Phase IV); and that such loan (Loan I) would be used to cover payments to be made by the Philippine executing agencies to suppliers, contractors and/or consultants of eligible source countries under such contracts as may be entered into between them for purchases of products and/or services required for the implementation of the projects enumerated in the List A. With respect to the procurement of the goods and services for the projects, it bears reiterating that as stipulated:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines will ensure that the products and/or services mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 3 of Part I and sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 4 of Part II are procured in accordance with the guidelines for procurement of the Bank, which set forth, inter alia, the procedures of international tendering to be followed except where such procedures are inapplicable or inappropriate.
The JBIC Procurements Guidelines, as quoted earlier, forbids any procedure under which bids above or below a predetermined bid value assessment are automatically disqualified. Succinctly put, it absolutely prohibits the imposition of ceilings on bids.
Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that "[a]ny treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory shall be observed," the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
Acuna v Arroyo
Acuna v Arroyo
G.R. No.79310
July 14, 1989
Facts:
RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was signed into law by then President Corazon Aquino. There were a number of legal questions challenging the constitutionality of the several measures enacted to implement the CARL.
In the instant case, the petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District in Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters’ Committee is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation No. 131 and EO No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a CARP as decreed by the constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection.
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.- There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agriarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PEOS to cover the estimated cost of the CARP from 1987 -1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the PCGG and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be appropriated automatically for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriated has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Petitioners contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Sec. 5 of EO No. 229.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters’ situation. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Proc. No. 31 and EO No. 229 are valid.
Held:
The Court upheld the presumption of constitutionality in favour of Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people’s opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be treated differently.
Regarding the issue of just compensation, it cannot be denied that the issue involved in the case is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation in the instant case affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community but of the entire Filipino nation.
Such a program will involve not mere million of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed that the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. we may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance, or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner.
Hence, the validity of Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229 is SUSTAINED.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
G.R. No.79310
July 14, 1989
Facts:
RA No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was signed into law by then President Corazon Aquino. There were a number of legal questions challenging the constitutionality of the several measures enacted to implement the CARL.
In the instant case, the petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District in Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters’ Committee is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation No. 131 and EO No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a CARP as decreed by the constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection.
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.- There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agriarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PEOS to cover the estimated cost of the CARP from 1987 -1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the PCGG and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be appropriated automatically for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriated has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Petitioners contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Sec. 5 of EO No. 229.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters’ situation. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
Issue:
Whether or not Proc. No. 31 and EO No. 229 are valid.
Held:
The Court upheld the presumption of constitutionality in favour of Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people’s opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be treated differently.
Regarding the issue of just compensation, it cannot be denied that the issue involved in the case is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation in the instant case affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community but of the entire Filipino nation.
Such a program will involve not mere million of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed that the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. we may therefore assume that their intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance, or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner.
Hence, the validity of Proc. No. 131 and EO No. 229 is SUSTAINED.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Vinta Maritime Company v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
Vinta Maritime Company v NLRC
G.R. No. 113911
January 23, 1998
Facts:
Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.
Held:
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s seaman’s book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondent’s services were “highly recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee’s dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the effectivity of his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.
Vinta Maritime Company v NLRC
G.R. No. 113911
January 23, 1998
Facts:
Leonides Basconsillo, private respondent, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration IPOEA) for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co. Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. petitioners alleged that Leonides was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M/V Boracay.
The POEA ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the POEA. Likewise, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is illegally dismissed.
Held:
The absence of a valid cause for termination in this case is apparent. For an employee’s dismissal to be valid, (1) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and (2) the employee must be afforded due process. Petitioners allege that private respondent was dismissed because of his incompetence, enumerating incidents in proof thereof. However, this is contradicted by private respondent’s seaman’s book which states that his discharge was due to an emergency leave. Moreover, his alleged incompetence is belied by the remarks made by petitioners in the same book that private respondent’s services were “highly recommended” and that his conduct and ability were rated “very good “. Petitioners’ allegation that such remark and ratings were given to private respondent as an accommodation for future employment fails to persuade. The Court cannot consent to such an accommodation, even if the allegation were true, as it is a blatant misrepresentation. It cannot exculpate petitioners based on such misrepresentation. When petitioners issued the accommodation, they must have known its possible repercussions.
Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires notice and hearing. Before the employee can be dismissed under Art. 282, the Code requires the service of a written notice containing a statement of the cause/s of termination and giving said employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A notice of termination in writing is further required if the employee’s dismissal is decided upon. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional guaranty.
Illegally dismissed workers are entitled to the payment of their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment where the employment is for a definite period. Conformably, the administrator and the NLRC properly awarded private respondent salaries for the period of the effectivity of his contract.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. The challenged decision and resolution are affirmed.
Darvin v Court of Appeals & People of RP
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Darvin v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998
Facts:
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.
Held:
Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her confinement.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Darvin v Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998
Facts:
Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.
Held:
Art. 13 of the Labor Code provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
...b.) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any reason person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so.
In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim his innocence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby granted and the decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonably doubt. The accused is ordered immediately released from her confinement.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
China Banking Corporation v Borromeo
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China Banking Corporation v Borromeo
G.R. No. 156515
Facts:
Respondent Mariano Borromeo was Assistant Vice-President of the Branch Banking Group of China Banking Corporation for the Mindanao Area.
Without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors of the bank, he approved several DAUD/BP (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purhcased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favour of Joel Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honoured by banks. This came to the knowledge of the bank authorities. A memorandum was issued to the Mariano seeking clarification relative to the matter. The respondent accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment and abuse of discretion.
Mariano resigned from the Bank and apologized “for all the trouble I have caused because of the Maniwan case.” The respondent, however, vehemently denied benefitting therefrom.
His acts having constituted violation of the Bank’s Code of Ethics, the respondent was directed to restitute the amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the Bank. However, in view of his resignation and considering the years of service in the Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the respondent’s total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded from Maniwan in a civil case filed against him by the bank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City.
The respondent made a demand on the bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits, but the bank maintained its position to withhold the sum of P836,637.08. Thus, Mariano filed with the NLRC a complaint for payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the bank.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however, alleging that respondent was denied his right to due process, set aside the NLRC decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further hearings on the factual issues involved.
The bank filed a motion for reconsidered but denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the bank has the prerogative/right to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The bank was left with no other course but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution. It was certainly within the bank’s prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
The petitioner’s bank business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect.
Significantly, the respondent is not wholly deprived of his separation benefits. As the Labor Arbiter stressed in his decision, “the separation benefits due the complainant were merely withheld. Even the petitioner bank itself gives “the assurance that as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case, the earmarked portion of his benefits will be released without delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The Resolution of the NLRC is reinstated.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
China Banking Corporation v Borromeo
G.R. No. 156515
Facts:
Respondent Mariano Borromeo was Assistant Vice-President of the Branch Banking Group of China Banking Corporation for the Mindanao Area.
Without authority from the Executive Committee or Board of Directors of the bank, he approved several DAUD/BP (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposits/Bills Purhcased) accommodations amounting to P2,441,375 in favour of Joel Maniwan. Such checks, which are not sufficiently funded by cash, are generally not honoured by banks. This came to the knowledge of the bank authorities. A memorandum was issued to the Mariano seeking clarification relative to the matter. The respondent accepted full responsibility for committing an error in judgment and abuse of discretion.
Mariano resigned from the Bank and apologized “for all the trouble I have caused because of the Maniwan case.” The respondent, however, vehemently denied benefitting therefrom.
His acts having constituted violation of the Bank’s Code of Ethics, the respondent was directed to restitute the amount of P1,507,736.79 representing 90% of the total loss of P1,675,263.10 incurred by the Bank. However, in view of his resignation and considering the years of service in the Bank, the management earmarked only P836,637.08 from the respondent’s total separation benefits or pay. The said amount would be released upon recovery of the sums demanded from Maniwan in a civil case filed against him by the bank with the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City.
The respondent made a demand on the bank for the payment of his separation pay and other benefits, but the bank maintained its position to withhold the sum of P836,637.08. Thus, Mariano filed with the NLRC a complaint for payment of separation pay, mid-year bonus, profit share and damages against the bank.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the bank. Respondent appealed to the NLRC but it affirmed in toto the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The CA, however, alleging that respondent was denied his right to due process, set aside the NLRC decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further hearings on the factual issues involved.
The bank filed a motion for reconsidered but denied the same. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the bank has the prerogative/right to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The bank was left with no other course but to impose the ancillary penalty of restitution. It was certainly within the bank’s prerogative to impose on the respondent what it considered the appropriate penalty under the circumstances pursuant to its company rules and regulations.
The petitioner’s bank business is essentially imbued with public interest and owes great fidelity to the public it deals with. It is expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. As a corollary, and like all other business enterprises, its prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations must be respected. The law, in protecting the rights of labor, authorized neither oppression nor self-destruction of an employer company which itself is possessed of rights that must be entitled to recognition and respect.
Significantly, the respondent is not wholly deprived of his separation benefits. As the Labor Arbiter stressed in his decision, “the separation benefits due the complainant were merely withheld. Even the petitioner bank itself gives “the assurance that as soon as the bank has satisfied a judgment in the civil case, the earmarked portion of his benefits will be released without delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA is reversed and set aside. The Resolution of the NLRC is reinstated.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon
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Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon
GR No. 81958
June 30, 1988
Facts:
PASEI is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas employment. It challenged the validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment in the character of Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.
Measure is assailed for being discriminatory against female domestic workers/helpers and that it is violative of the right to travel. Further, the company contended that the measure is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, being that police power is legislative and not executive in character.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order is a valid regulation.
Held:
The Labor Code has vested the Department of Labor and Employment with the rule-making powers in order to effectively promote the welfare and interests of Filipino workers.
Protection to labor does not only signify the promotion of employment alone, more important is that such be decent, just and humane.
The preference for female workers being covered by the said regulation has been motivated by a growing incidence of Filipina abuses overseas.
Official acts enjoy a presumed validity.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Philippine Association of Service Exporters v Drilon
GR No. 81958
June 30, 1988
Facts:
PASEI is engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas employment. It challenged the validity of Department Order No. 1 of the Department of Labor and Employment in the character of Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.
Measure is assailed for being discriminatory against female domestic workers/helpers and that it is violative of the right to travel. Further, the company contended that the measure is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, being that police power is legislative and not executive in character.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order is a valid regulation.
Held:
The Labor Code has vested the Department of Labor and Employment with the rule-making powers in order to effectively promote the welfare and interests of Filipino workers.
Protection to labor does not only signify the promotion of employment alone, more important is that such be decent, just and humane.
The preference for female workers being covered by the said regulation has been motivated by a growing incidence of Filipina abuses overseas.
Official acts enjoy a presumed validity.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Abella vs NLRC
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Abella v NLRC
GR No. 71818
July 20, 1987
Facts:
Ricardo Dionele, Sr. (private respondent) has been a regular farm worker since 1949 in Hacienda Danao-Ramona located in Ponteverde, Negros Occidential. Said farm land was leased to Rosalina Abella (petitioner) for a period of ten (10) years, renewable for another ten years.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed Ricardo and another co-employee.
Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After presenting their respective evidence, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents’ separation pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay?
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 284 of the Labor Code is the law applicable in this case.
“Art.284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year."
The purpose of the said article is obvious: the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the number of years served. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment are hereby affirmed.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Abella v NLRC
GR No. 71818
July 20, 1987
Facts:
Ricardo Dionele, Sr. (private respondent) has been a regular farm worker since 1949 in Hacienda Danao-Ramona located in Ponteverde, Negros Occidential. Said farm land was leased to Rosalina Abella (petitioner) for a period of ten (10) years, renewable for another ten years.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner dismissed Ricardo and another co-employee.
Private respondents filed a complaint against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and reinstatement with backwages. After presenting their respective evidence, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted the private respondents’ separation pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to separation pay?
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 284 of the Labor Code is the law applicable in this case.
“Art.284. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one month pay or to at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year."
The purpose of the said article is obvious: the protection of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the number of years served. Although they were absorbed by the new management of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be considered as new employees and the years of service behind them would amount to nothing.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
The instant petition is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment are hereby affirmed.
Acknowledgement: Flor Bonador
Monday, July 19, 2010
People v Panis
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986)
Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
People v Panis
142 SCRA 664 (1986)
Facts:
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee."
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code.
Held:
Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
Tierra International Corporation v NLRC
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TIERRA INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PERINI/MONENCO, CHERRY LYNN S. RICAFRENTE and KENNETH BUTT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, MANUEL S. CRUZ, RAYMUNDO G. NEPA and ROLANDO F. CARIÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 101825
April 2, 1996
Facts:
Private respondents Manuel S. Cruz, Raymundo C. Nepa and Rolando F. Cariño were recruited by petitioner Tierra International Construction Corporation to work as transit mixer, truck driver, and batch plant operator, respectively, in a construction project at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory.
Private respondents had barely started work in the foreign assignment when they had a disagreement with the plant supervisor, Engineer Terrance Filby. What exactly they had been ordered to do which they refused to execute — whether to dig and excavate canals and to haul bags of cement, cement pipes, heavy plumbing equipments and large electric cables, as they claimed, or only to do household chores consisting of keeping the work place clean, as the company alleges — is the question in this case. The fact is that private respondents refused to work as ordered and for this, they were dismissed on January 28, 1989 and sent back to the Philippines.
Petitioners denied the allegations of private respondents and claimed that the latter's dismissal was for cause. Petitioners claimed that, on January 27, 1989, private respondents were merely requested by the plant supervisor, Terrance Filby, to do housekeeping job since they were idle for the rest of the day. Because private respondents did not do what they had been ordered to do, they were confronted by Filby. This led to an altercation between Filby and private respondents. When brought before the project manager, private respondents allegedly said that they refused to execute Filby's order because it involved doing the menial job of cleaning up the mess. They allegedly said in the vernacular, "Nakakahiya naman yatang magpulot kami ng basura." According to petitioners, because private respondents were unyielding, they were given three options: apologize to their supervisors; (2) go back to work; or (3) repatriation. Private respondents refused to go back to work and instead asked to be repatriated. Accordingly, they were sent home on January 28, 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed?
Held:
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment is recognized. Let there be no doubt about this. This right, aptly called management prerogative, gives employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. But the exercise of this right must be in keeping with good faith and not be used as a pretext for defeating the rights of employees under the laws and applicable contracts.
Petitioners assert that private respondents were dismissed because they refused to go back to work and instead opted for repatriation. According to the report of the company's Site Administration Officer, private respondents were given three "options:" (1) to go back to work; (2) to apologize to their supervisor; and (3) to be repatriated. What private respondents were given were not really "options." They were given the choice of apologizing for their refusal to work and then resume working as ordered, or, else, resign and be sent back home. Under the circumstances they really had no choice but to resign. It was not pride or arrogance which made them refuse to work as ordered, but the assertion of their right not to be made to work outside of what they had been hired to do. For asserting their right, private respondents should not be punished. We, therefore, hold that private respondents' dismissal was illegal and that for this reason they are entitled to be paid their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment contract, in addition to their unpaid salaries prior to their dismissal, as found by both the POEA and the NLRC.
Acknowledgment: Peter De Guzman
TIERRA INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PERINI/MONENCO, CHERRY LYNN S. RICAFRENTE and KENNETH BUTT, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, MANUEL S. CRUZ, RAYMUNDO G. NEPA and ROLANDO F. CARIÑO, respondents.
G.R. No. 101825
April 2, 1996
Facts:
Private respondents Manuel S. Cruz, Raymundo C. Nepa and Rolando F. Cariño were recruited by petitioner Tierra International Construction Corporation to work as transit mixer, truck driver, and batch plant operator, respectively, in a construction project at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory.
Private respondents had barely started work in the foreign assignment when they had a disagreement with the plant supervisor, Engineer Terrance Filby. What exactly they had been ordered to do which they refused to execute — whether to dig and excavate canals and to haul bags of cement, cement pipes, heavy plumbing equipments and large electric cables, as they claimed, or only to do household chores consisting of keeping the work place clean, as the company alleges — is the question in this case. The fact is that private respondents refused to work as ordered and for this, they were dismissed on January 28, 1989 and sent back to the Philippines.
Petitioners denied the allegations of private respondents and claimed that the latter's dismissal was for cause. Petitioners claimed that, on January 27, 1989, private respondents were merely requested by the plant supervisor, Terrance Filby, to do housekeeping job since they were idle for the rest of the day. Because private respondents did not do what they had been ordered to do, they were confronted by Filby. This led to an altercation between Filby and private respondents. When brought before the project manager, private respondents allegedly said that they refused to execute Filby's order because it involved doing the menial job of cleaning up the mess. They allegedly said in the vernacular, "Nakakahiya naman yatang magpulot kami ng basura." According to petitioners, because private respondents were unyielding, they were given three options: apologize to their supervisors; (2) go back to work; or (3) repatriation. Private respondents refused to go back to work and instead asked to be repatriated. Accordingly, they were sent home on January 28, 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were illegally dismissed?
Held:
The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment is recognized. Let there be no doubt about this. This right, aptly called management prerogative, gives employers the freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignments, working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of work. But the exercise of this right must be in keeping with good faith and not be used as a pretext for defeating the rights of employees under the laws and applicable contracts.
Petitioners assert that private respondents were dismissed because they refused to go back to work and instead opted for repatriation. According to the report of the company's Site Administration Officer, private respondents were given three "options:" (1) to go back to work; (2) to apologize to their supervisor; and (3) to be repatriated. What private respondents were given were not really "options." They were given the choice of apologizing for their refusal to work and then resume working as ordered, or, else, resign and be sent back home. Under the circumstances they really had no choice but to resign. It was not pride or arrogance which made them refuse to work as ordered, but the assertion of their right not to be made to work outside of what they had been hired to do. For asserting their right, private respondents should not be punished. We, therefore, hold that private respondents' dismissal was illegal and that for this reason they are entitled to be paid their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their employment contract, in addition to their unpaid salaries prior to their dismissal, as found by both the POEA and the NLRC.
Acknowledgment: Peter De Guzman
SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
Gelmart Industries Phils, Inc v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILS., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND FELIX FRANCIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 85668
August 10, 1989
Facts:
Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as GELMART) sometime in 1971
As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and underchassis, as well as trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him.
On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used' motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and regulations. By reason thereof, petitioner, on April 13, 1987, was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of company rules and regulations. Under the said rules, theft and/or pilferage of company property merits an outright termination from employment.
After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment of backwages equivalent to six (6) months.
Held:
Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the underprivileged workingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen — and this was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his property.
Thus, without being too harsh to the employer, on the one hand, and naively liberal to labor, on the other, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations.
Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of the State, as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
GELMART INDUSTRIES PHILS., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND FELIX FRANCIS, respondents.
G.R. No. 85668
August 10, 1989
Facts:
Private respondent Felix Francis started working as an auto-mechanic for petitioner Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as GELMART) sometime in 1971
As such, his work consisted of the repair of engines and underchassis, as well as trouble shooting and overhauling of company vehicles. He is likewise entrusted with some tools and spare parts in furtherance of the work assigned to him.
On April 11, 1987, private respondent was caught by the security guards taking out of GELMART's premises one (1) plastic container filled with about 16 ounces of "used' motor oil, without the necessary gate pass to cover the same as required under GELMART's rules and regulations. By reason thereof, petitioner, on April 13, 1987, was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation for violation of company rules and regulations. Under the said rules, theft and/or pilferage of company property merits an outright termination from employment.
After due investigation, or on May 20, 1987, private respondent was found guilty of theft of company property. As a consequence, his services were severed.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. In a decision dated February 26, 1988, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed and, accordingly, ordered the latter's reinstatement with full backwages from April 13, 1987 up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Issue:
Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondent to his former position with payment of backwages equivalent to six (6) months.
Held:
Consistent with the policy of the State to bridge the gap between the underprivileged workingmen and the more affluent employers, the NLRC rightfully tilted the balance in favor of the workingmen — and this was done without being blind to the concomitant right of the employer to the protection of his property.
Thus, without being too harsh to the employer, on the one hand, and naively liberal to labor, on the other, the NLRC correctly pointed out that private respondent cannot totally escape liability for what is patently a violation of company rules and regulations.
Considering that private respondent herein has no previous derogatory record in his fifteen (15) years of service with petitioner GELMART the value of the property pilfered (16 ounces of used motor oil) is very minimal, plus the fact that petitioner failed to reasonably establish that non-dismissal of private respondent would work undue prejudice to the viability of their operation or is patently inimical to the company's interest, it is more in consonance with the policy of the State, as embodied in the Constitution, to resolve all doubts in favor of labor.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
Philippine Association of Services Exporters Inc v Drilon
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 81958
June 30, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment valid.
Held:
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
G.R. No. 81958
June 30, 1988
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether or not the Department Order 1, series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment valid.
Held:
"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.
Acknowledgement: Peter De Guzman
NFD Intl Manning Agents v NLRC
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER INTERNATIONAL A/S, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children CAESAR and ALPHA JOY, all surnamed MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and HENDRICK, all surnamed ENVIDIADO, respondents.
Facts:
The private respondents (wives of the two deceased husbands) filed for death compensation benefits under the POEA Standard Contract of employment before the petitioners but were denied on the ground that the seaman’s deaths were due to their own wilful act who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective sexual organs that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical. Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. POEA Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit. Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal. Respondent Commission reversed the POEA Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether respondent Commission gravely erred in finding that the deaths of the two seamen did not come as a result of their wilful and deliberate act.
Held:
The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of NLRC. According to Part II, Section C, no. 6 of POEA “Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels” No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. In this case, the testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that death of two seamen were caused by self-inflicted injuries and in fact Fajardo, one who did the same, did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. No autopsy report was presented to corroborate their testimonies. Based on medical reports cause of death of Misada was due to viral infection, while Envidiado was due to viral myocarditis. Hence, petitioner’s evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused by their own wilful and deliberate act.
Acknowledgement: Barbie Pinos
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS and BARBER INTERNATIONAL A/S, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NELIA MISADA, for herself and in behalf of her minor children CAESAR and ALPHA JOY, all surnamed MISADA and HIMAYA ENVIDIADO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children HENREA, HAZEL, and HENDRICK, all surnamed ENVIDIADO, respondents.
Facts:
The private respondents (wives of the two deceased husbands) filed for death compensation benefits under the POEA Standard Contract of employment before the petitioners but were denied on the ground that the seaman’s deaths were due to their own wilful act who implanted fragments of reindeer horn in their respective sexual organs that due to the lack of sanitary conditions at the time and place of implantation, all three seamen suffered "severe tetanus" and "massive viral infections;" that Misada and Envidiado died within days of the other; that the third seaman, Arturo Fajardo, narrowly missed death only because the vessel was at port in Penang, Malaysia at the time the tetanus became critical. Private respondents filed separate complaints before the POEA Adjudication Office. POEA Administrator dismissed the case for lack of merit. Private respondents appealed to respondent Commission. During the pendency of the appeal, private respondents submitted additional documentary evidence in support of their Memorandum on Appeal. Respondent Commission reversed the POEA Administrator and ordered petitioners to pay private respondents. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether respondent Commission gravely erred in finding that the deaths of the two seamen did not come as a result of their wilful and deliberate act.
Held:
The SC dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of NLRC. According to Part II, Section C, no. 6 of POEA “Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on Board Ocean-Going Vessels” No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to him. In this case, the testimonies of the officers are insufficient to prove the fact that death of two seamen were caused by self-inflicted injuries and in fact Fajardo, one who did the same, did not submit any testimony regarding the implantation. No autopsy report was presented to corroborate their testimonies. Based on medical reports cause of death of Misada was due to viral infection, while Envidiado was due to viral myocarditis. Hence, petitioner’s evidence insufficiently proves the fact that the deaths of the two seamen were caused by their own wilful and deliberate act.
Acknowledgement: Barbie Pinos
Norse Management Co. vs National Seamen Board
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
Facts:
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
Held:
The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
Acknowlwgement: Barbie pinos
NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.
Facts:
Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Board’s Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.
Held:
The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondent’s husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.
Acknowlwgement: Barbie pinos
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