Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2018 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
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| Photo courtesy of TIME |
The
recent assertion of President Rodrigo Duterte on sovereignty rights over the
disputed islands in the South China Sea while he has keenly recognized the
nomenclature as the West Philippine Sea before the Chinese-Filipino businessmen
strikes a resounding review on his external security policy after three biggest
reefs in Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi in the Spratly archipelago are ready
for use as the giant neighbour continuously expands its military might and
naval spaces. Cognizant of the shifting geopolitical tussle of major powers in
the newest Suez Canal of the Indo-Pacific region, the Philippines apparently
strives to achieve a robust strategic culture as it remains dwarfed by intense
power play of the US and China. Given the context, does the Philippines has
lacking or robust strategic culture?
World
War II Japanese navy minister and strategist, Takamori Saigo, deemed that there
are two kinds of opportunities: one which we chance upon, the other which we
create. In time of great difficulty, one must create his own opportunity. The
epic saga of the Philippines to make or break from certain security challenge
to formulate opportunity on its quest for a defined strategic culture can be
lifted from its legal victory, skilful diplomacy, and diversified military
alliance towards building capacities to foster the archipelagic nation’s
lacking or robust strategic culture. Carl von Clausewitz tells us that war is a
contest between two wills, and the will of belligerent is the product of moral
factors which can be summarized as culture but Sun Tzu was right in addressing
the importance of self-knowledge and of knowledge of one’s enemies.
Configurations
and patterns of strategic culture are rooted in the formative experiences of
the state influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural
and cognitive characteristics of the nation and its elites. Although states
initiate military transformations to avoid strategic defeats, prevent another
country from occupying its territory, and thwart the grand design of a new
enemy or its strategy. However the Philippines neglected to optimize two key
foundations in creating a robust strategic culture by crafting a National
Security Strategy and pursuing a realistic National Security Policy that should
be responsive to the volatile, uncertain, changing, ambiguous, threatening, and
hostile nature of the evolving security landscape. These written artefacts are
unified documents that embody the people’s traditions, habits, values, way of
life, and attitudes that prescribe the behaviour and action of any nation-state.
Nonetheless, China’s prominent militarization in the West Philippine Sea poses a
long-term security threat to the Philippines.
Out
of 196 countries worldwide, there are only 186 nation-states that have national
security strategy documents since 2012. Although strategy crafting is an art
and not a science, oftentimes strategies can work and sometimes not. Strategic
culture takes times to nurture as it takes a generation to develop. It defines
a set of patterns of and for behaviour on war and peace issues. Current
national laws, policies and military strategies suggest that the Philippines
has not fully taken into accounts its unique archipelagic and maritime
characteristics in addressing its national interests. The Southeast Asian
country has been progressing more as a maritime nation rather as an
archipelagic state largely because of its difficulties in defining its national
jurisdiction and sovereignty rights disrupted by its fragmented topography,
weak security culture, and how Filipino elite has carved the country’s
negotiated reality expressed in current national defense preferences and
aspirations.
The
rhetoric that Filipinos are good strategists remains debatable but it can be
validated. Templates of strategic culture’s robustness can be check mated in
some episodic instances to marvel at the country’s indomitable spirit. In 1952,
former President Fidel V Ramos and six other Filipino officers were celebrated
national heroes in North and South Koreas in the epic Battle of Eerie Hill.
Then Lieutenant Ramos led 44-men to Hill Eerie from the Red Chinese Army where
Ramos’s men suffered only one injury against 1,100 dead Chinese and 2,540
wounded Chinese. The paramount bravery, courage, and unstained strategy
commanded heights against invading Chinese in the Korean peninsula.
Narratives
about national heroes who shaped the reawakening of Filipino patriotism from
the bondage of colonialism which continued on during the 1986 bloodless People
Power celebration peaked when President Corazon Aquino pushed for the creation
of the remarkable 1987 Philippine Constitution that embarked various coded strategies
that may consciously and unconsciously built the foundations of Philippine contemporary
strategic culture. But the problem beholds to strategic behaviour and lack of
political will in attaining a consistent rules-based approach in dealing with
internal and external security challenges. Although one of the bones of
contention in Filipino strategic culture is carved through alliance and
considered a preference for partnership with a foreign power that may juxtapose
another feather of holding strategic culture to fill the gaps of its momentary
impairments amid an increasingly ill-tempered discourse over competing maritime
territories that may escalate into tit-for-tat actions at sea expanding to
naval skirmishes and provocative artificial island-building to build credible
deterrence.
But
as the Philippines strives for a robust strategic culture, its archipelagic
geography and diverse cultures of nations cannot homogenously represent the
strategic culture of the entire archipelago while the plurality of Filipino
culture may be a culprit to the inadequacy of its own strategic culture. With
the presumption that culture of strategy evolves especially when external
defense provides a severe shock that invalidates prevailing assumptions, it can
be construed that most of the time Philippine strategy is a reflection of
reactive policy decisions rather than a well-defined strategy based on
foresight and appreciation in the evolving regional and global security
landscape. Lastly, size and wealth should not become the basis of attaining a
dynamic strategic culture regardless of the country’s economic status which
should be culled from a strategic culture that combines scientific method and
artistic measures.
