The Hague Ruling’s Strategic Acquiescence Ensnared as ‘Philippinedization’

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By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

The Philippines commemorated the third anniversary of The Hague ruling on July 12, a landmark case awarded to the Southeast Asian archipelagic country penned by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague that invalidated China’s historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the debunked nine-dash line. The 501-page milestone decision explicitly cited China’s violations on sovereign rights in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone by interfering with fishing and petroleum exploration, building man-made islands, and failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone.

On the eve when the Philippines won a maritime entitlement, observers see it as the beginning of an end. The case arbitrarily has ended with no enforcement seal but it only has intensified power play between China and the US, two opposing titans, eventually dwarfing the Philippines. In a toss of tight competition of who controls the South China Sea and which country gets more resources, it clearly redounds to China’s grand strategy with ease despite inflicting harm to the marine environment and destroying evidence of the natural condition of features in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes of communications.

Last March 13, two respected Filipino leaders lodged a 17-page complaint for environmental damage in the South China Sea and persecution of Filipino fishermen by Chinese officials before the International Criminal Court (ICC), two days before the first Asian country officially departs from the independent judicial body, founded under the mantle of the Rome Statute, giving jurisdiction to prosecute global leaders for crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression. However Beijing discredits the accusation, notwithstanding the fact that the two state parties are now ICC non-members. The grievance itself becomes a strong reminder echoing the Philippines’ unfinished business at how China treats a strategic partner despite the latter won a case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2016 at The Hague.

The Philippine Navy builds up a defense posture through an acquisition of two missile-capable frigates armed with sensors and weapons launched on its 121^st founding anniversary last May 27 to bring into the high seas dignified surface-to-air missiles patrol ships. The realization came after a series of maritime humiliation and insecurities experienced from the 1995 Chinese structures on Mischief Reef in the Spartlys until the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff. The two major maritime and territorial insults to Philippines’ national sovereignty and territorial integrity succumbs for the passage of the Revised AFP Modernization Act of 2012, replacing the original version crafted 17 years in between.  

But on June 9, three days before the Philippines celebrated its Independence Day, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana revealed that a Chinese vessel hit the anchored Filipino vessel F/B GEMVIR 1 near Reed Bank, leaving 22 Filipino fishermen almost drowned in the open sea, but later rescued by a Vietnamese vessel. The episodic saga saw China’s overriding use of muscle flexing of hard power by securing the Spartlys where the oil-rich Reed Bank is located, outwitting the Philippines’ soft power or the use of lawfare.

The only recourse Beijing is good at comes on by exerting a hard power by militarizing the disputed islands showcasing a use of force over the presence of hundreds of Chinese militia near and within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. China's success of building the sea wall contributed to the massive terraforming accomplishments that buoys up in the expansive Chinese Lake conjoined with militarized acumen and economic perspicacity. It certainly cultivated a complex security environment that weak nation-states were caught in surprise and shock beyond China’s calculated salami-slicing attack.

Meanwhile, the Philippines’ policy of silence on asserting the arbitral award hounds the rapprochement of President Rodrigo Duterte on China’s encroachment in the West Philippine Sea. The recalibration of foreign policy in pursuit of defining the Philippines’ national interests strengthens further the giant neighbor’s gray zone strategy. It precisely shows a strategic acquiescence ensnared by Duterte’s unsophisticated strategy in dealing with Xi Jinping’s erudite scheme that offered a mixture of both danger and opportunity.

This strategic acquiescence combines economic gains and simultaneous military buildup leading one to coin the term, “Philippinedization,” which may well be appropriate especially in light of the historic Hague ruling that Duterte temporarily set aside. It is a process whereby a weaker state, backed by a powerful country, goes through great lengths in temporarily refraining from opposing a neighboring great power by resorting to economic and diplomatic rapprochements at the strategic level, but strengthening its national security infrastructure on the operational level with an eye for potential conflict in the foreseeable future.