Will the Philippines align to AUKUS for its submarine program?

Photo from Naval News

 By Chester B. Cabalza

Four days after the United States commemorated the decade-old September 11 terrorist attack that restored its glance on homeland security, the challenged superpower once again caught the world’s attention, when President Joe Biden co-founded a trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom known as the AUKUS to protect its external defence and regional interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

The September 15 AUKUS agreement gives Australia a preferential treatment to acquire nuclear-powered submarine from its Anglo-Saxon allies. Nine days after, Washington extended its arms with allies from Australia, India and Japan as it hosted the QUAD aimed at ensuring commitment to safeguarding rules-based norms in the Indo-Pacific region to pacify China’s aggressive militarization

While debates focused on Canberra’s strategic options to beef up its aerial and naval arsenals through the AUKUS, hanging up on Paris in the equation, emerging Southeast Asian capitals began laying down its cards for a shopping-spree list for submarines as alternative defence of Chinese destabilization beneath the blue seas.

Since the 1950s, Manila had been planning to acquire submarines for the Philippine Navy.  In 2010, the navy revealed future plans to acquire submarines as part of a follow up plan to the on-going 15-year 90 billion pesos AFP modernization program. As an archipelagic nation, the Philippines has yet to reach an upright maritime status, given its strategic location and pivotal role in the geopolitically constructed Indo-Pacific region.

After the Philippine Navy launched the ‘Offshore Territorial Defence Force 2020’ program, in response to Chinese massive incursions in the West Philippine Sea, the French shipbuilder Naval Group consolidated its plans to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) modernization program as it planned to open an office in Manila this year. In the 19^th century, France became the world’s second-largest navy that managed to dominate the seas during its prime and participate in naval global explorations.  In the 20^th century, the French naval build-up slowed down until it was outnumbered by the German and US navies.

Now in the 21^st century, with the French desire to help Filipino sailors in the Philippine Navy using the whole-of-alliance approach is intended to support the technology development of the Maritime Defense Industry through the improvement of controlling the national cyberspace, enhancing collaboration and alliance building in the external information operations, and modernizing national facilities of the Philippines’ armed forces.

But Manila’s affinity to Anglo-Saxon’s ties was strengthened when President Duterte revived the controversial Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) on July 31, 2021 after the courtesy call of US Secretary Defense Llyod Austin III to the Malacañan Palace amid the threat to scrap the military pact twice under his regime. Since 1945, the US has led and advanced a rules-based international system with allies and partners. An unprecedented era of wealth and peace has been created by free and open access to the world’s oceans. Unfortunately, the system is now in danger while the US maritime strategy targets the two major threats to global peace and prosperity - China and Russia.

Technological advancement has been affecting the maritime world. As a result, the security landscape of the global region has shifted dramatically. Many states are challenging the stability of power in the key regions, predominantly in the Indo-Pacific area, attempting to destabilize the prevailing security order. The substantial technological advancement and hostile military militarization of major powers like China are increasingly eroding the US military advantages.       

The proliferation of long-range precision missiles, unmanned aerial and underwater 3 vehicles, drones, artificial intelligence, and other technological advancements used for military operations cannot be assumed that the US has control of the unrestricted access operations to the world’s oceans during times of conflict. But the revisionist actions of China in the maritime domain endanger the American interests. It disrupts alliances and partnerships. If the current trends continue, the US Naval Service will be unable to maintain a competitive advantage at sea and secure national interests within the next decade.

In 2007, Manila and Canberra signed the Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA), following the VFA format, and was ratified by the Philippine Senate in 2012 in light of the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Through the SOVFA, Australia has been part of the Philippines-US naval exercises while the archipelagic Southeast Asian nation, remains one of the weakest armed forces in Asia and struggles to cement its strategic position as a middle power in Southeast Asia.    

Maritime exercises are conducted for the purpose of training, testing the interoperability of naval forces with other foreign navies; exploring the opportunity to upgrade one’s own naval forces with other foreign navies; and equally important, to support naval diplomacy for the promotion of regional peace and security, and the enhancement of maritime security cooperation in the region. For the Philippines, these naval exercises similarly serve as an effective instrument in support of the country’s foreign policy and interests through state-to-state collaboration.

Annually, close to 20 unilateral, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral naval exercises are conducted between Manila and its allies. The importance of these maritime exercises is made more significant in light of the tensions resulting from conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea and how effectively Beijing has an upper hand in the Philippine-claimed West Philippine Sea.

The limited resources of the AFP and other affiliate law enforcement agencies also pose daunting challenges in securing the vast Philippine archipelago. For one, the Philippine Navy is responsible for the naval defense of the seabed and other submarine areas. In reality, the country’s current naval assets and capabilities are disproportionate to the requirements of securing an island nation especially in the face of perceived threats emanating from our continuing maritime and territorial insecurities in the West Philippine Sea.

Manila’s dilemma on submarine acquisition falls now to limited resources more than its foreign relations with the newly-formed security group AUKUS and its French connection. The price is right mantra on submarine procurement will certainly shape the potential of its submarine program as along as it corresponds to the aerial and naval needs of Philippine external defence architecture that would provide a clearer, long-term maritime deterrent plan built on mobile coastal defence batteries armed with long-range anti-ship missiles and covered by integrated air defence shield.