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People vs Tahil and Tarson
G.R. No. L-5803
November 29, 1954
Facts:
The appellants, Datu Tahil and Datu Tarson, were convicted in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of the crime of rebellion, Datu Tahil being sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of $10,000, and Datu Tarso to five years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of $5,000, with sudsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in regard to Datu Tarson.
Having encountered certain difficulties in the collection of the land and the personal cedula taxes among the resident of Patikul, due to their refusal to make this payment, the provincial governor of Sulu, Carl Moore, turned the matter over to Lieutenant Angeles of the Constabulary for the purpose of employing such means as he might consider convenient to overcome these difficulties. Datu Tahil, then the third member of the provincial board of Sulu, being amongst those who refused to make this payment, Lieutenant Angeles tried and succeeded in having a conference with him, in which Datu Tahil suggested that he return the following day because he would call meeting of his people at his house in Liang in order to discuss the matter with them. Lieutenant Angeles went to Datu Tahil's house the day following this meeting and found about 70 persons present. After Lieutenant Angeles has explained to all the importance of the Government's collecting the land tax, Datu Tahil took several of those present into a room for a secret conference, after which he informed Lieutenant Angeles that he, personally, had no objection to paying the tax, but the others asked time to do so.
On January, 1927, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint against Datu Tahil and his followers charging them with sedition, and the proper warrant of arrest was issued on the 15th. Governor Moore, however, did not wish to proceed on this warrant of arrest and tried to persuade Datu Tahil and his followers to desist from their intention, using the influence of other prominent Moros to this end. Governor Moore even tried to have a conference with Datu Tahil for the same purpose, but was unsuccessful because he was informed that they intended to attack him. On January 30, the governor delivered the search warrant.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants committed sedition or rebellion?
Held:
The facts proven, however, constitute the crime of sedition, defined in section 5 of Act No. 292, and not of rebellion according to section 3 of the same law, the acts committed being limited to preventing the Government officials, throught force, from complying with their duties in connection with the judicial order, the enforcement of which was entrusted to them.
Thus, the crime committed is that of sedition, and the fine imposed upon Datu Tahil is therefore reduced to $5,000 and that imposed upon Datu Tarson to $2,500, the judgment appealed from being affirmed in all other respects, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
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Monday, February 8, 2010
People vs Umali
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People vs Umali
G.R. No. L-5803
November 29, 1954
Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Case Digest by: cbcabalza2010
People vs Umali
G.R. No. L-5803
November 29, 1954
Facts:
The complex crime of which appellants Narciso Umali, et. al were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong, Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. The raid took place resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023; the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians.
During and after the burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stores; and that the raiders were finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are liable of the charges against them of complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery?
Held:
Yes. The appellants were guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders, each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, the court finds it unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
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People vs Lovedioro
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People vs Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235
November 29, 1995
Facts:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135 or Murder under Article 248 of the RPC?
Held:
The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.
However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
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People vs Lovedioro
G.R. No. 112235
November 29, 1995
Facts:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body. On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic shock.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant committed Rebellion under Art. 134 and 135 or Murder under Article 248 of the RPC?
Held:
The court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said accused.
In his appeal, appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army.
However, the appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law. The trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
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People vs Mangllalan
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People vs Mangllalan
G.R. No. L-38538
April 15, 1988
Facts:
On September 3, 1972 in Barrio Punti East, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Ka Daniel who appears to be the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in the area directed Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos, and Virgilio Ballesteros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual. Manglallan carrying a Browning shotgun, Ramos a Thompson, Alvarez a carbine, and Ballesteros a homemade gun called Bulldog. They arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at the river bank giving his carabao a bath. Ramos went to him and after a while shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him with his Browning followed with another shot by Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed on the dead body of Ragual a writing and drawing made by their association warning the people and the PC of their activities. Thereafter, the group returned and reported to Ka Daniel that Ragual was already dead. Dr. Leonides Flores, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Ana, Cagayan conducted a post-mortem examination on the remains of Apolonio Ragual at about 4:00 P.M. of the same day, after which he issued an autopsy report showing multiple gunshot wounds suffered by the deceased and finding the cause of death to be severe hemorrhage, shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable for the crime of murder under Art. 248 and subversive act such as rebellion or insurrection under Arts. 134 and 135 of the RPC?
Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused Andres Manglallan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance offsetting each other, and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) without, however, serving subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The judgment appealed from is modified by convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and not of murder. Considering that the commission of the offense was attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrendered, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is hereby imposed an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months of prision correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as maximum to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Apolonio Ragual in the amount of P30,000.00. As the accused-appellant is a detention prisoner in the New Bilibid Prisons and he appears to have been under detention for a period beyond the period of the penalty herein-above imposed on him, he is hereby ordered Released immediately from detention unless he is being held for some other charges. This Decision is immediately executory.
Case Digest by: cbcabalza2010
People vs Mangllalan
G.R. No. L-38538
April 15, 1988
Facts:
On September 3, 1972 in Barrio Punti East, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, Ka Daniel who appears to be the leader of the New People's Army (NPA) in the area directed Andres Manglallan, Cesar Alvarez, Domingo Ramos, and Virgilio Ballesteros, members of the NPA to go to Barrio Punti and kill one Apolonio Ragual who was suspected by Ka Daniel to be a Philippine Constabulary (PC) informer. Said four went to the barrio of Ragual. Manglallan carrying a Browning shotgun, Ramos a Thompson, Alvarez a carbine, and Ballesteros a homemade gun called Bulldog. They arrived at Punti at 9:00 A.M. and they saw Ragual at the river bank giving his carabao a bath. Ramos went to him and after a while shot him with his gun. Manglallan also shot him with his Browning followed with another shot by Alvarez, as a result of which Ragual fell down and died. Manglallan then placed on the dead body of Ragual a writing and drawing made by their association warning the people and the PC of their activities. Thereafter, the group returned and reported to Ka Daniel that Ragual was already dead. Dr. Leonides Flores, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta. Ana, Cagayan conducted a post-mortem examination on the remains of Apolonio Ragual at about 4:00 P.M. of the same day, after which he issued an autopsy report showing multiple gunshot wounds suffered by the deceased and finding the cause of death to be severe hemorrhage, shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable for the crime of murder under Art. 248 and subversive act such as rebellion or insurrection under Arts. 134 and 135 of the RPC?
Held:
Yes. The Court finds the accused Andres Manglallan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance offsetting each other, and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) without, however, serving subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
The judgment appealed from is modified by convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code and not of murder. Considering that the commission of the offense was attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrendered, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant is hereby imposed an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months of prision correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as maximum to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Apolonio Ragual in the amount of P30,000.00. As the accused-appellant is a detention prisoner in the New Bilibid Prisons and he appears to have been under detention for a period beyond the period of the penalty herein-above imposed on him, he is hereby ordered Released immediately from detention unless he is being held for some other charges. This Decision is immediately executory.
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People vs Hernandez
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People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964
Facts:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held:
The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-appellants
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
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People vs Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6025
May 30, 1964
Facts:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal.
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?
Held:
The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
Advocacy of Communism put into Action
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-appellants
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
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People vs Cruz
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
People vs Cruz
G.R. No. L-11870
October 16, 1961
Facts:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicting appellants Paterno Cruz and Benito Cruz of "rebellion with robbery with homicide," and appellant Fermin Tolentino of "rebellion with arson, with murder and robbery." The penalty imposed upon appellants is being life imprisonment.
The appelants being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines and the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB)" otherwise known as the Hukbalahap (HUK). Thus, they are armed force of said Communist Party, having come to an agreement and having decided to commit the crime of rebellion in different events and instances.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. As stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion, inasmuch as the information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed to them were performed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino fall under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000, whereas appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the second paragraph of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10) years of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each a fine of P10,000, and appellant Paterno Cruz should be sentenced to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the proportionate part of the costs against said appellants.
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People vs Cruz
G.R. No. L-11870
October 16, 1961
Facts:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicting appellants Paterno Cruz and Benito Cruz of "rebellion with robbery with homicide," and appellant Fermin Tolentino of "rebellion with arson, with murder and robbery." The penalty imposed upon appellants is being life imprisonment.
The appelants being then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines and the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB)" otherwise known as the Hukbalahap (HUK). Thus, they are armed force of said Communist Party, having come to an agreement and having decided to commit the crime of rebellion in different events and instances.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. As stated in the brief for the Government, appellants herein are guilty of simple rebellion, inasmuch as the information alleges, and the records show that the acts imputed to them were performed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, although as Huk Commanders, appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino fall under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000, whereas appellant Paterno Cruz comes under the second paragraph of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to appellants Benito Cruz and Fermin Tolentino should be reduced to ten (10) years of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay each a fine of P10,000, and appellant Paterno Cruz should be sentenced to six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with the proportionate part of the costs against said appellants.
Case Digest by: cbcabalza2010
La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
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La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882.
December 1, 2004
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources?
Held:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos
G.R. No. 127882.
December 1, 2004
Facts:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.
The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the EDU of our natural resources?
Held:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of “every contract entered into in accordance with this [constitutional] provision within thirty days from its execution.” In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.” As aptly spelled out seven decades ago by Justice George Malcolm, “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.” Let the development of the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of government. And let not the Court interfere inordinately and unnecessarily. The Constitution of the Philippines is the supreme law of the land. It is the repository of all the aspirations and hopes of all the people.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and complexity of such agreements, the humongous amounts of capital and financing required for large-scale mining operations, the complicated technology needed, and the intricacies of international trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and enhance our country’s competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).
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