By Chester B Cabalza
Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2017 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
 |
| Photo courtesy of Washington Post |
Today the Philippines, Asia’s first republic, celebrates its 119th Independence Day. Long from its
young existence, the archipelagic nation has been historically colonized by
naval powers Spain, the United States of America, and Japan. Nevertheless the
country’s current territorial and maritime row with revisionist China in the
Spratlys archipelago and the Scarborough shoal places a dilemma for the Southeast
Asian member-state to succumb to the giant neighbor’s resurgence as a naval
power.
Taking off from President Rodrigo
Duterte’s bold pronouncement in September 2016, he rattled traditional allies
as he cements an “independent foreign policy” by diversifying defense and
economic relations apparent in his current pivot to Eurasian powers, Russia and
China, yet maneuvering a less dependence from the United States, the country’s oldest
treaty ally in the Asia-Pacific.
Considering the Philippines weak deterrence
and over reliance to major powers in protecting its territorial integrity and
sovereignty, how can the country overcome limited combat capabilities to persuasively
survive its “real” independence from foreign naval powers?
In
January 2013, the Philippines resorted to lawfare against China to the
spectacle of maritime states abroad. The Hague-based arbitral court ruled a
landmark case in favor of the Philippines in October 2015 and July 2016 to the
dismay of China as it radically altered the features of the controversial U-shaped contested islands
in the South China Sea while the Philippines immediately hedged to renew damaged
bilateral ties.
Nonetheless
the world’s second largest archipelago remained weak in defending its stolen territory
and maritime entitlements despite an increase to 13 million hectares on the
Philippine archipelagic territory based on endowment of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Benham Rise renamed to Philippine Rise
today.
In
March 2017, Mr Duterte promised to further modernize the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) with “more modern military aircraft, sea vessels, and other
equipment in the next two or three years to better patrol the country’s
territory and combat security threats,” when he spoke before the graduating
plebes at the premiere Philippine Military Academy.
The
defunct Republic Act No. 7898 in 1995 provides for the Modernization of the AFP
behooved to build up the country’s self-reliant defense force but it flunked to
address the defense sector’s needs which triggered for an amendment courtesy of
the Republic Act No. 10349 in 2012 establishing the Revised AFP Modernization
Program.
The
two-decade old AFP modernization programs addressed dual security situations that
challenged the country’s intermittent internal and external defense postures. Hence
the AFP modernization laws must be scrutinized from its contexts by the time it
was enacted to understand the country’s flip-flopping transformational strategies
down from the Internal Security Operations up to the Territorial Defense
Operations.
After
two failed attempts of modernizing the Philippines’ armed forces, the shopping lists
of military hardware from the current administration should match its own
desired needs to combat local insurgency or terrorism and guard maritime
domains from newly befriended gigantic neighbor that has the capability to
declare war against a vassal state to secure its own expanding sovereignty
rights.
Hence
Philippine defense laws and security executive issuances should essentially
identify fundamental interests, primarily for the fortification of the
country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic plans at all levels must
highlight the interplay between national interests, alliances, and the broad
capabilities required. International laws and other mechanisms should contribute
to the recognition of the validity of the Philippine interests while
capacitating to either bandwagon or hedge with allies and crooks for protection
and objection.
Independence
from a naval power pitches a long-term solution for the Philippines to own
self-reliant defense posture that it still lacks today abreast with meek
military ammunition and defense expenditures in the region. The development of
a muscular defense industry considerable in strengthening and sustaining the
national defense can provide for credible deterrence to supplant a robust defense
industry to flex capable infrastructure, materiel, and the technology needed to
the armed force of the nation.
Reality
bites the Philippines is still locked in a period when hegemony of naval powers
reign at seas to regain its real independence. Sea power theory paves way for
small states not to wage war but to avert it with a believable ability to
flight. In the long
run, the Philippine [in]dependence as evidently perceived on its recent diversified
alliance can be considered only a short-term remedy to stoutly hold a credible
deterrence paving a way for a long-term independence and/or self-reliance to
foster a robust strategic culture.
