Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Rule 115 - Rights of the Accused (Rules of Court)

Section 1. Rights of accused at trial. – In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel.

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf.

(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.

(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.

Yu Tek v. Gonzales

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

G.R. No. L-9935
February 1, 1915
Trent, J.


YU TEK v. GONZALES

Doctrine:

There is a perfected sale with regard to the “thing” whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles.


Facts:

Gonzalez received P3,000 from Yu Tek and Co. and in exchange, the former obligated himself to deliver 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second grade, according to the result of the polarization, within the period of three months. It was also stipulated that in case Gonzales fails to deliver, the contract will be rescinded he will be obligated to return the P3,000 received and also the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and damages.
Plaintiff proved that no sugar had been delivered to him under the contract nor had he been able to recover the P3,000.

Gonzales assumed that the contract was limited to the sugar he might raise upon his own plantation; that the contract represented a perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of the thing due.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale.

Held:

No. This court has consistently held that there is a perfected sale with regard to the “thing” whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles.
In the case at bar, the undertaking of the defendant was to sell to the plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second classes. Was this an agreement upon the “thing” which was the object of the contract? For the purpose of sale its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being denominated a “picul.” Now, if called upon to designate the article sold, it is clear that the defendant could only say that it was “sugar.” He could only use this generic name for the thing sold. There was no “appropriation” of any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar and say: “This is the article which was the subject of our contract.”

We conclude that the contract in the case at bar was merely an executory agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. There was no perfected sale.