Philippine Policy Options to China’s Grayzone Strategy

Photo from U.S. Navy

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

Last week, a Chinese naval escort fleet, two missile frigates and a supply ship docked at the shores of Manila Bay for a five-day friendly visit. The ships pass through en route the contested South China Sea, a validation of non-resistance from the host country’s soft stance to its new big brother, in spite of a placid bypass of authority from Philippine Navy and port authorities.

The Philippines’ policy of silence on asserting the arbitral award of the Arbitral Tribunal hounds the rapprochement of President Rodrigo Duterte on China’s encroachment in the West Philippines Sea. The recalibration of foreign policy in pursuit of Philippine national interest impacts the giant neighbour’s gray zone strategy. This geostrategic ambiguity falls between the wartime-peacetime spectrums. As China, a revisionist power, sophisticatedly applies a non-military, non-kinetic and unconventional means to achieve long term political goals, it also exploits available means of national power to attain political objectives employing ambiguous expanse of the peace and war continuum.

China recently downplayed its civilian activities plunked with the deployment of weather stations and permanent rescue ship including military aggressiveness despite the reported deployment of missile launchers and radar-jamming equipment on its man-made islands. For the time being, Beijing’s naval diplomacy can be summed up as a glossy promotion emanating from its international economic footprint on “Maritime Silk Road Initiative’ aimed at enhancing China’s good neighbourliness policy by creating a peaceful and harmonious environment within the region. On a strategic level, it may also extend the iota of mining opinions like a forum shopping from small-state neighbours to discuss uncertain maritime zone delimitation set by the ocean’s constitution through the UNCLOS.

Now that China’s friendship with the Philippines has been strategically elevated, cementing a self-ascribed status for its gigantic and historic sphere of influence, the two Asian sovereign states continuously renew a warmer bilateral relationship in different fronts, recalibrating a post-arbitration award. But the Philippines hedging policy, apparently acknowledging that China’s intentions in the South China Sea are not benign, crossing to no single betting approach, still carving a niche to its tenuous independent foreign policy into multiple and mutually counteracting and contradicting policies.

For instance, the Philippines’ 2018 National Security Strategy underscores the overarching principle that national security and economic development are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing concepts. The raison d’etre why the archipelagic Southeast Asian nation needs the “China money” as it hedges with its new big brother as an internal process of regime legitimation, anchored on the ruling elite’s ability to advance their interests is also a reality for the United States, the Philippines’ longest treaty ally, recognizing China as a strategic competitor with revisionist worldview that was explicitly transcribed in the US 2017 National Security Strategy emphasizing a new page in the Indo-Pacific region.

There are two scenarios in which cases China can displace the United States and its allied friends in the Philippines to become victor to the heart of Philippine government and lessen Filipinos’ anti-Chinese sentiments in one of Southeast Asia’s most acculturated countries. For China, the win-win solution will only happen if the Philippines sets side the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea and bandwagons with the new regional power through joint exploration, joint conservation of the environment, joint development and tourism, and sit down to incessantly engage dialogue with China by sharing with them their vision and will in the Indo-Pacific region.

Hence, “the greatest victory is that which requires no battle,” beautifully opines by revered Chinese strategist Sun Tzu. Harvesting the seeds of goodwill, China’s effective naval diplomacy to Manila sets a tone of a “new era” of ties between China and the Philippines, manifesting a promising bilateral relations, two months after President Xi Jinping’s productive visit, signing 29 juicy deals including a memorandum of understanding on the cooperation on oil and gas development with the Philippines last November, while some critics poke at the Philippines as part of the Middle Kingdom’s province amidst a major legal triumph over China in July 2016. 

The win-lose scenario could occur if the Philippines chooses war against China and puts it reliance with the US military which has more nuclear warships and submarines than all claimant-countries in the contested waterways in the South China Sea. By allowing China of an offensive strike, it can heighten a military campaign just like what the People’s Liberation Army did in the Battle of Chamdo, retaking the Chamdo Region from a de facto independent Tibetan government after months of failed negotiations on the status of Tibet.

Now that China, a new naval power under Xi Jinxing has resurged, the Philippines should not be complacent of the status quo and current asymmetrical bilateral defense with the giant neighbour. China’s domineering attitude can be summed up to Sun Tzu’s wisdom on the importance of self-knowledge and of knowledge of one’s enemies. Given the ambiguous security environment especially when external defense provides a severe shock that invalidates prevailing assumptions, it can be construed that most of the time, the Philippine strategy is a reflection of reactive policy decisions rather than a well-defined national security strategy based on foresight and appreciation in the evolving regional and global security landscape.