By Chester B Cabalza
Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
The Philippines is an archipelagic
nation of 7,107 islands covering 800,000 square miles or about 30 million
hectares. The country does not share any land borders with neighboring
countries; instead it is bordered by the Pacific Ocean in the east, the South
China Sea in the west, the Celebes Sea in the south, and the Bashi Channel up
north. In 2012, the Philippines’ island territory increased by 13 million
hectares when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea approved the
Philippines’ claim to Benham Rise; a seismically active region and volcanic
ridge located 250 kilometers off the northern coastline of Dinapigue, Isabela.
Interestingly, these vast surroundings
are complemented by a naval and air military that has no force to project. The
Philippines possesses an ill-equipped, deteriorated, and obsolete Navy and Air
Force in Asia. Military spending of the Philippines, especially the scale for
its navy upgrade and modernization, is significantly less than Vietnam,
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. That being said, there now exists
a huge capability asymmetry between the Philippines and its neighbors in
Southeast Asia, thus, it can only do so much to achieve parity with the surface
and air force capabilities. It can possibly consider shore-based missiles, mine
warfare, and submarine warfare to level the Asian playing field.
The limited resources of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other affiliate law enforcement agencies
also pose daunting challenges in securing the vast Philippine archipelago. For
one, the Philippine Navy is responsible for the naval defense of the seabed and
other submarine areas. In reality, the country’s current naval assets and
capabilities are disproportionate to the requirements of securing an island
nation especially in the face of perceived threats emanating from our
continuing maritime and territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea.
Despite the Revised AFP Modernization
that has three horizons to meet an effective minimum credible defense posture,
including its shift from territorial to internal defense, it seeks the
acquisition of further capabilities and other force requirements as means to
design new competencies and force to structure certain elements.
Securing Philippines’ Vital Interests
The
South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven (7) billion barrels and an
estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty.
The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant and may actually
occur. Freedom of navigation operations in the region is also a contentious
issue. These tensions are shaping and being shaped by rising apprehensions
about the growth of China’s military power and its regional intentions.
Apparently China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime
paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty
and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary.
The
Kalayaan Island Group is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding
waters that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known
as the Spartly Islands. Officially, the KIG is not the same as the Spartlys, as
there are features in the Spartlys that are not part of the KIG. Parts of the
Spratlys Islands lie just over 100 miles from the Philippines and more than
1,000 miles from China. The Philippines currently controls five islands, two
reefs and two sandbars. Pag-asa is the largest island occupied by the country.
For
the Philippines, vital interests lie in territorial integrity and sovereignty,
and the rights to exploit both marine and energy sources. An example challenges
rising from the South China Sea disputes is the oil exploration efforts that
started in 2010 and have been put on hold since 2015 for Service Contract Areas
58, 72 (Recto Bank) and 75 due to the lingering disputes and the continuous
presence of the Chinese government vessels at Scarborough Shoal.
Forcible
takeover of any of our occupied islands without a strong deterrent capability
to defend these critical features will give momentum to potential aggressors
which are also claimant countries in the South China Sea and will no doubt
continue to exploit the resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and may
eventually deny the Philippines its use of the sea or by using it there is a
plausible scenario of war or military operations against the country.
Possible
takeover can also be in the offing if mismanaged solutions are not met. The
Philippines should constantly think of deterrence or a state of mind brought
about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.
There should be a power projection or the ability to apply all or some of the
country’s elements of national power to rapidly and effectively deploy and
sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises
and contribute to deterrence while enhancing regional stability.
The
purpose of the armed forces of a small state is not to wage war but to avert
it. There is a significant difference even if the task of war prevention
implies a credible ability to fight. The main reason for this is that small
state cannot hope to achieve victory in war in the strictly military sense.
Instead, the purpose of the war is to end it on acceptable terms. The armed
forces of the small state contribute to averting war first by maintaining the
sovereignty of the state and by enforcing national jurisdiction in peacetime, in
an efficient and credible manner. Second, the armed forces are an instrument of
the state in crisis management, not least for their deterrent effect on the
opposition. Deterrence works when the costs of armed aggression in the mind of
potential aggressor seem larger than the benefits of going to war, so that in
the end he decides to keep the peace.
Sensors, Transport, Shooters
In
enhancing transparency and accountability while pursuing opportunities for
stable security structures, the AFP should improve its human, organization and
information capital. It shall build a culture of jointness, establish an
integrated secure communications and information system to institutionalize
integrated joint logistics support systems, and develop a professional and
highly motivated regular and reserve force. Highly competent and motivated
professionals should spearhead the crafting of sound and appropriate maritime
doctrines leading to the responsive naval reserve forces; and the same
professionals who should be building the corps of the same force.
There
is a need to operationalize naval support systems, facilities and capabilities
that contribute to the attainment of optimal level of operational readiness.
The Navy and Air Force should provide a secure maritime environment and satisfy
its stakeholders.
A
naval strategy to fight an asymmetric conflict is the object of naval warfare
where there is a competition to control Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC)
including the commercial and economic interests of an adversary. It
strategically includes the control of maritime communications, whether for
commercial or military purposes. The primordial object of the fleet is to
secure these SLOCS and put the enemy fleet out of action. Thus, the size of
one’s fleet is not much of a factor.
A
small naval force is unlikely to win a major fleet engagement but it still
could achieve significant results through minor naval actions, such as attacks
on sea lanes and coastal raids. Victory at sea is dependent on the relative strength
of one’s own fleet and the exploitation of one’s positions such as naval bases,
commercial and areas where maritime trade routes converge.
In
this view, operational fleet positioning allows a small naval force to restrict
he size and scale of enemy opposition, creating favourable conditions for
battle. Thus, luring an enemy fleet out into battle in an operating area where
one has all the advantages is more economical than mounting search-and-destroy
missions for huge fleet battles. For instance, cruiser-type vessels, which have
sufficient endurance for long independent voyages, enough firepower to defeat
enemy commerce raiders and protect SLOCs.
From
a macro perspective, the Philippine capability lacks notably air capability,
sea and air transport and Command and Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. These investments are required
for the AFP to achieve certain credible fighting force. This comes despite
Philippine investments in modernization such as those of BrahMos – India’s
supersonic missile that is a short-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that
can be launched from submarine, ships, aircraft, or land.
In
the course of submarine acquisition, the Philippine Navy should first acquire
the basing and support facilities before buying actual submarines. There should
also the creation of unit/s dedicated to submarine operations. Aside from
support facilities, basing, and a dedicated unit, the Philippine Navy should
craft corresponding doctrines, systems, and procedures for submarine
operations. Select PN personnel would have to be trained for submarine
operations and the necessary effectors such as missiles, mines, and torpedoes.
For
territorial defense, submarines have deterrent presence and varied weapons load
ensure lethality against various targets. For surveillance and defense of
offshore platforms, submarines can be used for covertly monitor and defend
these installations. It can be used for monitoring the presence of other
submarines. Even for internal security operations, submarines can provide
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) against terrorist routes,
and perform stealth insertion of special forces. Submarines can also be used to
augment existing naval capabilities. As an essential fleet component, it can
perform effectively in coastal defense, sea denial, and power projection.
Critical components include weapon systems, sensors, fire control systems, navigation
and control systems, pressure hull, environmental control, and propulsion.
But generally, the increasing
preponderance of submarines is a proven technology with deterrent and strategic
impact. The utility of submarines is a strategic tool employed in an asymmetric
fashion. But Philippine Navy’s readiness to develop submarine capabilities in
terms of personnel competencies needed to operate submarines completely
different from surface warships. Prospective submarine crew should be
physically, emotionally, mentally and psychologically prepared for the
job.
In
essence, the lack of resources for the AFP has produced excellent small unit
formations, as a result of ingenuity; however, overall combat capability is
extremely limited. The AFP lacks basic secure tactical communications coverage
across the operational zones and relies heavily on commercial
telecommunications networks. Joint force interoperability is hampered by the
lack of a secure networking capability.
Command and Control
The
command and control in a military organization is the exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. It is the system that
empowers designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over
assigned forces for the accomplishment of mission and tasks.
In
capacitating the Philippines to pursue strategic interests and sophisticated
tactical operations in the exercise of securing and protecting the country’s
external defense, there is a need for certain prescription through promotion of
harmonious relationships with neighbors and the rest of the world. The
development of a defense capability to protect sovereignty and strategic
maritime interests are observed but the means to achieve this are through the
promotion of maritime security, protection and defense of the integrity of
marine resources, and strengthening of the maritime security posture as part of
the external defense plan. Deterrence is absolutely needed but if deterrence
fails, the country must be prepared for a credible ability to fight and win.
Deterrence
operations are geared toward convincing adversaries not to take actions that
threaten vital interests by means of decisive influence over their
decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny
benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the
actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.
While
deterrence is an inherently defensive strategy, it may not involve defense;
that is, the deterring party may not actively protect its assets or try to
prevent its opponent from taking the action, but rather threatens the use of
violence to convince the opponent not to act in the first place. It may also
employ the calculated use of force which strongly communicates a states’
willingness to sink ships and fire upon aggressor vessels when deemed
necessary.
A
good example of this is the Falklands invasion. Everyone knew the 1982 invasion
but the public did not know about the 1979 invasion. It was here when the
British intelligence revealed that Argentina had prepared to invade the
Falklands and had begun to deploy a fleet. The plan was thwarted. The question
of how was answered when Prime Minister Callaghan called General Galtierri of
Argentina that he sent a submarine in case Falklands will be invaded and they
were willing to fight. Whether or not the Prime Minister was bluffing or not,
no one knows and the public won’t ever know. But one thing is sure is that that
General Galtierri did not attack the Falklands in 1979.
Three primary elements should also be
considered including the benefits of a course of action, the costs of action
and the consequences of restraint. By effecting deterrence, it should credibly
threaten to dent the adversary the benefits or gains being sought. It also
involves denying benefits through both offensive and defensive activities and
capabilities. When threating to impose costs that are viewed as unacceptable,
it involves convincing the adversary that the costs incurred in will be severe
and highly probable. Lastly, to encourage the adversary restraint by convincing
it that by not undertaking the action being deterred will result in an
acceptable outcome of the adversary.
Capability refers to whether the actor
issuing the deterrent threat is capable of carrying out the threat. The ability
to successfully deter depends to some degree on the power of the deterring
actor. Consequently, in order doe deterrence to work, a state must communicate
its threats. If the state does not know that an action is prohibited, it cannot
be deterred from taking that action. States have to work very hard at
establishing their credibility, especially in situations of extended
deterrence.
Hence
as explicitly provided by law that the country needs to develop a defensive
capability against perceived or real external security threats; the approach
toward reinforcing border security focuses on a comprehensive border protection
program anchored on the establishment and enhancement of surveillance,
deterrence and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force,
Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast Guard.
Air and Naval Forces
There
is a need to establish a strong link between planning an execution. The
development of a comprehensive institutional framework containing detailed
implementing guidelines to align, harmonize, and synchronize the intent of all
relevant policies. Regional defense spending provides a general indicator of
investments made by various countries into defense. The capability weakness
also translates into limited approach. Since the Philippines has limited
capabilities for the use of force.
The
National Military Strategy best captures the AFP’s objective to secure the
sovereignty and integrity of the national territory and protect maritime
interests. From thereon, concepts such as credible deterrence, intelligence
surveillance, and reconnaissance, sea and air patrols, maritime strike, and air
defense should be discussed comprehensively.
This
should be anchored on the increased Command and Control and Communication
capabilities, increased air defense capabilities, increased maritime strike
capabilities, and surface warfare capabilities inclusive of new vessels and
system upgrades for selected ships in the current fleet, subsurface warfare
capabilities, amphibious assault, ISR capabilities covering those provided by
air, sea, and land based systems, theatre mobility inclusive of strategic
sealift and airlift, missile defences against air surface and land targets.
The
requirements for development of sea and air powers are not limited to the
actual equipment alone. As stong policy is required to enable synergized and
coordinated action. The Philippines must draw the line and determine how far it
can go. The roles of the national defense leadership to capacitate the
country’s Sea and Air forces must be stressed.
