Assessment of Force Requirement of Philippines' Capability and National Interest in the South China Sea

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

The Philippines is an archipelagic nation of 7,107 islands covering 800,000 square miles or about 30 million hectares. The country does not share any land borders with neighboring countries; instead it is bordered by the Pacific Ocean in the east, the South China Sea in the west, the Celebes Sea in the south, and the Bashi Channel up north. In 2012, the Philippines’ island territory increased by 13 million hectares when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea approved the Philippines’ claim to Benham Rise; a seismically active region and volcanic ridge located 250 kilometers off the northern coastline of Dinapigue, Isabela.

Interestingly, these vast surroundings are complemented by a naval and air military that has no force to project. The Philippines possesses an ill-equipped, deteriorated, and obsolete Navy and Air Force in Asia. Military spending of the Philippines, especially the scale for its navy upgrade and modernization, is significantly less than Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. That being said, there now exists a huge capability asymmetry between the Philippines and its neighbors in Southeast Asia, thus, it can only do so much to achieve parity with the surface and air force capabilities. It can possibly consider shore-based missiles, mine warfare, and submarine warfare to level the Asian playing field. 

The limited resources of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other affiliate law enforcement agencies also pose daunting challenges in securing the vast Philippine archipelago. For one, the Philippine Navy is responsible for the naval defense of the seabed and other submarine areas. In reality, the country’s current naval assets and capabilities are disproportionate to the requirements of securing an island nation especially in the face of perceived threats emanating from our continuing maritime and territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea.

Despite the Revised AFP Modernization that has three horizons to meet an effective minimum credible defense posture, including its shift from territorial to internal defense, it seeks the acquisition of further capabilities and other force requirements as means to design new competencies and force to structure certain elements.

Securing Philippines’ Vital Interests

The South China Sea has proven oil reserves of seven (7) billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty. The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant and may actually occur. Freedom of navigation operations in the region is also a contentious issue. These tensions are shaping and being shaped by rising apprehensions about the growth of China’s military power and its regional intentions. Apparently China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary.

The Kalayaan Island Group is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spartly Islands. Officially, the KIG is not the same as the Spartlys, as there are features in the Spartlys that are not part of the KIG. Parts of the Spratlys Islands lie just over 100 miles from the Philippines and more than 1,000 miles from China. The Philippines currently controls five islands, two reefs and two sandbars. Pag-asa is the largest island occupied by the country.

For the Philippines, vital interests lie in territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the rights to exploit both marine and energy sources. An example challenges rising from the South China Sea disputes is the oil exploration efforts that started in 2010 and have been put on hold since 2015 for Service Contract Areas 58, 72 (Recto Bank) and 75 due to the lingering disputes and the continuous presence of the Chinese government vessels at Scarborough Shoal.

Forcible takeover of any of our occupied islands without a strong deterrent capability to defend these critical features will give momentum to potential aggressors which are also claimant countries in the South China Sea and will no doubt continue to exploit the resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and may eventually deny the Philippines its use of the sea or by using it there is a plausible scenario of war or military operations against the country.

Possible takeover can also be in the offing if mismanaged solutions are not met. The Philippines should constantly think of deterrence or a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. There should be a power projection or the ability to apply all or some of the country’s elements of national power to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises and contribute to deterrence while enhancing regional stability.

The purpose of the armed forces of a small state is not to wage war but to avert it. There is a significant difference even if the task of war prevention implies a credible ability to fight. The main reason for this is that small state cannot hope to achieve victory in war in the strictly military sense. Instead, the purpose of the war is to end it on acceptable terms. The armed forces of the small state contribute to averting war first by maintaining the sovereignty of the state and by enforcing national jurisdiction in peacetime, in an efficient and credible manner. Second, the armed forces are an instrument of the state in crisis management, not least for their deterrent effect on the opposition. Deterrence works when the costs of armed aggression in the mind of potential aggressor seem larger than the benefits of going to war, so that in the end he decides to keep the peace.

Sensors, Transport, Shooters

In enhancing transparency and accountability while pursuing opportunities for stable security structures, the AFP should improve its human, organization and information capital. It shall build a culture of jointness, establish an integrated secure communications and information system to institutionalize integrated joint logistics support systems, and develop a professional and highly motivated regular and reserve force. Highly competent and motivated professionals should spearhead the crafting of sound and appropriate maritime doctrines leading to the responsive naval reserve forces; and the same professionals who should be building the corps of the same force. 

There is a need to operationalize naval support systems, facilities and capabilities that contribute to the attainment of optimal level of operational readiness. The Navy and Air Force should provide a secure maritime environment and satisfy its stakeholders.

A naval strategy to fight an asymmetric conflict is the object of naval warfare where there is a competition to control Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) including the commercial and economic interests of an adversary. It strategically includes the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The primordial object of the fleet is to secure these SLOCS and put the enemy fleet out of action. Thus, the size of one’s fleet is not much of a factor.

A small naval force is unlikely to win a major fleet engagement but it still could achieve significant results through minor naval actions, such as attacks on sea lanes and coastal raids. Victory at sea is dependent on the relative strength of one’s own fleet and the exploitation of one’s positions such as naval bases, commercial and areas where maritime trade routes converge.

In this view, operational fleet positioning allows a small naval force to restrict he size and scale of enemy opposition, creating favourable conditions for battle. Thus, luring an enemy fleet out into battle in an operating area where one has all the advantages is more economical than mounting search-and-destroy missions for huge fleet battles. For instance, cruiser-type vessels, which have sufficient endurance for long independent voyages, enough firepower to defeat enemy commerce raiders and protect SLOCs.  

From a macro perspective, the Philippine capability lacks notably air capability, sea and air transport and Command and Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. These investments are required for the AFP to achieve certain credible fighting force. This comes despite Philippine investments in modernization such as those of BrahMos – India’s supersonic missile that is a short-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from submarine, ships, aircraft, or land.

In the course of submarine acquisition, the Philippine Navy should first acquire the basing and support facilities before buying actual submarines. There should also the creation of unit/s dedicated to submarine operations. Aside from support facilities, basing, and a dedicated unit, the Philippine Navy should craft corresponding doctrines, systems, and procedures for submarine operations. Select PN personnel would have to be trained for submarine operations and the necessary effectors such as missiles, mines, and torpedoes.

For territorial defense, submarines have deterrent presence and varied weapons load ensure lethality against various targets. For surveillance and defense of offshore platforms, submarines can be used for covertly monitor and defend these installations. It can be used for monitoring the presence of other submarines. Even for internal security operations, submarines can provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) against terrorist routes, and perform stealth insertion of special forces. Submarines can also be used to augment existing naval capabilities. As an essential fleet component, it can perform effectively in coastal defense, sea denial, and power projection. Critical components include weapon systems, sensors, fire control systems, navigation and control systems, pressure hull, environmental control, and propulsion.

But generally, the increasing preponderance of submarines is a proven technology with deterrent and strategic impact. The utility of submarines is a strategic tool employed in an asymmetric fashion. But Philippine Navy’s readiness to develop submarine capabilities in terms of personnel competencies needed to operate submarines completely different from surface warships. Prospective submarine crew should be physically, emotionally, mentally and psychologically prepared for the job. 

In essence, the lack of resources for the AFP has produced excellent small unit formations, as a result of ingenuity; however, overall combat capability is extremely limited. The AFP lacks basic secure tactical communications coverage across the operational zones and relies heavily on commercial telecommunications networks. Joint force interoperability is hampered by the lack of a secure networking capability. 

Command and Control

The command and control in a military organization is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commanding officer over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. It is the system that empowers designated personnel to exercise lawful authority and direction over assigned forces for the accomplishment of mission and tasks.

In capacitating the Philippines to pursue strategic interests and sophisticated tactical operations in the exercise of securing and protecting the country’s external defense, there is a need for certain prescription through promotion of harmonious relationships with neighbors and the rest of the world. The development of a defense capability to protect sovereignty and strategic maritime interests are observed but the means to achieve this are through the promotion of maritime security, protection and defense of the integrity of marine resources, and strengthening of the maritime security posture as part of the external defense plan. Deterrence is absolutely needed but if deterrence fails, the country must be prepared for a credible ability to fight and win.

Deterrence operations are geared toward convincing adversaries not to take actions that threaten vital interests by means of decisive influence over their decision-making. Decisive influence is achieved by credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs, while encouraging restraint by convincing the actor that restraint will result in an acceptable outcome.

While deterrence is an inherently defensive strategy, it may not involve defense; that is, the deterring party may not actively protect its assets or try to prevent its opponent from taking the action, but rather threatens the use of violence to convince the opponent not to act in the first place. It may also employ the calculated use of force which strongly communicates a states’ willingness to sink ships and fire upon aggressor vessels when deemed necessary.

A good example of this is the Falklands invasion. Everyone knew the 1982 invasion but the public did not know about the 1979 invasion. It was here when the British intelligence revealed that Argentina had prepared to invade the Falklands and had begun to deploy a fleet. The plan was thwarted. The question of how was answered when Prime Minister Callaghan called General Galtierri of Argentina that he sent a submarine in case Falklands will be invaded and they were willing to fight. Whether or not the Prime Minister was bluffing or not, no one knows and the public won’t ever know. But one thing is sure is that that General Galtierri did not attack the Falklands in 1979.

Three primary elements should also be considered including the benefits of a course of action, the costs of action and the consequences of restraint. By effecting deterrence, it should credibly threaten to dent the adversary the benefits or gains being sought. It also involves denying benefits through both offensive and defensive activities and capabilities. When threating to impose costs that are viewed as unacceptable, it involves convincing the adversary that the costs incurred in will be severe and highly probable. Lastly, to encourage the adversary restraint by convincing it that by not undertaking the action being deterred will result in an acceptable outcome of the adversary.

Capability refers to whether the actor issuing the deterrent threat is capable of carrying out the threat. The ability to successfully deter depends to some degree on the power of the deterring actor. Consequently, in order doe deterrence to work, a state must communicate its threats. If the state does not know that an action is prohibited, it cannot be deterred from taking that action. States have to work very hard at establishing their credibility, especially in situations of extended deterrence.

Hence as explicitly provided by law that the country needs to develop a defensive capability against perceived or real external security threats; the approach toward reinforcing border security focuses on a comprehensive border protection program anchored on the establishment and enhancement of surveillance, deterrence and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force, Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast Guard.  

Air and Naval Forces

There is a need to establish a strong link between planning an execution. The development of a comprehensive institutional framework containing detailed implementing guidelines to align, harmonize, and synchronize the intent of all relevant policies. Regional defense spending provides a general indicator of investments made by various countries into defense. The capability weakness also translates into limited approach. Since the Philippines has limited capabilities for the use of force.

The National Military Strategy best captures the AFP’s objective to secure the sovereignty and integrity of the national territory and protect maritime interests. From thereon, concepts such as credible deterrence, intelligence surveillance, and reconnaissance, sea and air patrols, maritime strike, and air defense should be discussed comprehensively.

This should be anchored on the increased Command and Control and Communication capabilities, increased air defense capabilities, increased maritime strike capabilities, and surface warfare capabilities inclusive of new vessels and system upgrades for selected ships in the current fleet, subsurface warfare capabilities, amphibious assault, ISR capabilities covering those provided by air, sea, and land based systems, theatre mobility inclusive of strategic sealift and airlift, missile defences against air surface and land targets.

The requirements for development of sea and air powers are not limited to the actual equipment alone. As stong policy is required to enable synergized and coordinated action. The Philippines must draw the line and determine how far it can go. The roles of the national defense leadership to capacitate the country’s Sea and Air forces must be stressed.