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| Photo from South China Morning Post |
Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
Rodrigo Duterte, the first Philippine president from Mindanao, has recently
staged a climactic tribute mission to Beijing to discuss the volatile sea row
and harvest unfulfilled economic pledges from China. Taking a bolder step in
the negotiating table to Asia’s most powerful country, he elevates the Philippines’
national interests over sovereignty rights and maintaining peaceful regional
security architecture emanating from his promises to the Filipino people since
his election in 2016.
His
fifth visit to Beijing bears a critical success in managing risk assessment and
treatment to the escalating global insecurity affecting the South China Sea
(SCS) including the proliferation of trade war between the United States and
China. Understandably, the ultimate goal of China reflects the goals of the
Communist Party of China (CPC), declaring the SCS as a core interest which may
become a prerogative of the CPC. Hence, the survival of the regime is premised
on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strengths and capability to consolidate
and unify China’s lost territories.
In
October 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping initially rolled out his red carpet
to Southeast Asia’s strongman. Duterte’s state visit pompously tested the
waters of friendship and repaired the broken lines held two months after the
Philippines won the arbitral award spelling out China’s excessive maritime
entitlements and violations on sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) of the Philippines.
China
responded aggressively by militarizing the artificial islands that the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) built in order to strengthen China’s anti access
and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that would limit the strategic
capabilities of the United States including other Southeast Asian claimant-countries
to deter future offensive actions. Intermittent aggressions of continental China
to archipelagic Philippines spurred through constant close-in air and sea
surveillance and reconnaissance to unveil its own strategic ambiguity and gray
zone strategy. The ambiguity on how Beijing is communicating the issue on its
forceful defense of the SCS is a core national interest that is seen risky by
the international community. Thus, the strategic ambiguity intends to induce
uncertainties that will affect the decision making process of another white elephant
in the room which is the US foreign affairs with the Philippines.
On
the other hand, it also allowed the former Davao City mayor to loosen up on
Beijing by accommodating a paradigm shift and preferential treatment for
Chinese plane seen in the country’s largest city in June 2018. The recurrent
passage of foreign ships through Philippines’ territorial waters without
securing a clearance from Philippine government became problematic recently. But
critics blamed Manila’s policy of silence on asserting the arbitral award while
Duterte seems to temporarily refrain from opposing on Chinese belligerence by
resorting to economic and diplomatic rapprochements at the strategic level
while the Philippines aspires for a robust defense posture by hedging to opposing
regional rivals, China and the United States, setting a strategic acquiescence
of economic gains and simultaneous military buildup.
In
sum, the use of dashes and not solid lines illustrate the compromises that may
be accommodated in the future. Two strengths of China’s flexing of muscle
specify the militarization of occupied features in the SCS and the
modernization of the PLA and its maritime forces. Apparently, China has
invested heavily in technology development as a primary driver of China’s de
facto control of the contested waters.
Duterte’s
annual visits to the Middle Kingdom recreates the infancy of the Philippines
and China diplomatic relations that paved way in 1417 when a Sulu royalty from
Mindanao, Paduka Batara, also known as the “eastern king” sailed to Hangzhou
for bridging diplomacy to Ming dynasty’s Emperor Yongle. The emperor was
responsible in transferring the seat of power to Beijing, where the Filipino
and Chinese monarchs met. During Yongle’s reign, he marvelously built the
Forbidden City, amidst the dynasty’s maritime expansion while consolidating
China’s hard power.
The
machination of economic security bolstered Beijing and Manila’s warming
relationship for almost four years since
the two prominent Asian leaders inked a strategic partnership paving a way for
China’s growing regional centrality in the Indo-Pacific and solving China’s
Malacca dilemma on its economic efforts to tame Southeast Asian neighbors. The
Philippine president recognized China’s Belt Road Initiatives (BRI) by solidly
supporting it to finance his ‘Build, Build, Build’ infrastructure programs,
apparently shown through his annual participation to the Belt Road Forums (BRF)
in different cities of China since 2017 to this year.
The
two populist and strongmen opted to foster a strategic partnership to slow down
coercing activities; however, there are a number of high and low armed
conflicts in the contested SCS that raised the bar of Chinese
dominance. The June 2019 ramming incident of Chinese militia to a Philippine
fishing vessel in the oil-rich Reed Bank in the Spratlys archipelago within the
Philippines’ EEZ had outwitted Manila’s soft power and the use of legal means.
Only in November 2017 when the two countries permitted a framework for joint
exploration undersea through a Mutual of Understanding (MOU) on Energy Cooperation
thereby suggesting a majority of share to the Philippines.
Lastly,
Duterte’s longest state visit yet to Beijing has tested his maturing diplomatic
and trading skills in dealing with the erudite President Xi to prove to the
Filipino people that China can also become a true friend of the Philippines.
Moving forward, Xi’s past visit to Manila laid down the controversial MOU on
Energy Cooperation as a roadmap for the joint oil and gas exploration of the two
countries amidst solving their differences in disputed Reed Bank. Meanwhile, Duterte’s
current visit to Beijing allows the next step for a possible Terms of Reference
(TOR) for proper implementation of the megaproject. Hence, the arbitral ruling
and joint exploration may reach an end result of successful risk management to
safeguard maritime rights and economic interests to realize a matured
cooperation with the acceleration of the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS.
