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| Photo from U.S. Navy |
Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2019 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
Last
week, a Chinese naval escort fleet, two missile frigates and a supply ship docked at the shores of Manila Bay for a five-day friendly visit. The ships
pass through en route the contested South China Sea, a validation of
non-resistance from the host country’s soft stance to its new big brother, in
spite of a placid bypass of authority from Philippine Navy and port
authorities.
The
Philippines’ policy of silence on asserting the arbitral award of the Arbitral
Tribunal hounds the rapprochement of President Rodrigo Duterte on China’s
encroachment in the West Philippines Sea. The recalibration of foreign policy
in pursuit of Philippine national interest impacts the giant neighbour’s gray
zone strategy. This geostrategic ambiguity falls between the wartime-peacetime
spectrums. As China, a revisionist power, sophisticatedly applies a
non-military, non-kinetic and unconventional means to achieve long term
political goals, it also exploits available means of national power to attain
political objectives employing ambiguous expanse of the peace and war
continuum.
China
recently downplayed its civilian activities plunked with the deployment of
weather stations and permanent rescue ship including military aggressiveness
despite the reported deployment of missile launchers and radar-jamming
equipment on its man-made islands. For the time being, Beijing’s naval
diplomacy can be summed up as a glossy promotion emanating from its
international economic footprint on “Maritime Silk Road Initiative’ aimed at
enhancing China’s good neighbourliness policy by creating a peaceful and
harmonious environment within the region. On a strategic level, it may also
extend the iota of mining opinions like a forum shopping from small-state
neighbours to discuss uncertain maritime zone delimitation set by the ocean’s
constitution through the UNCLOS.
Now
that China’s friendship with the Philippines has been strategically elevated,
cementing a self-ascribed status for its gigantic and historic sphere of influence, the two Asian
sovereign states continuously renew a warmer bilateral relationship in
different fronts, recalibrating a post-arbitration award. But the Philippines
hedging policy, apparently acknowledging that China’s intentions in the South
China Sea are not benign, crossing to no single betting approach, still carving
a niche to its tenuous independent foreign policy into multiple and mutually
counteracting and contradicting policies.
For
instance, the Philippines’ 2018 National Security Strategy underscores the
overarching principle that national security and economic development are
closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing concepts. The raison d’etre why
the archipelagic Southeast Asian nation needs the “China money” as it hedges
with its new big brother as an internal process of regime legitimation,
anchored on the ruling elite’s ability to advance their interests is also a
reality for the United States, the Philippines’ longest treaty ally, recognizing China as a strategic competitor with revisionist worldview that was explicitly transcribed in the US 2017 National Security Strategy emphasizing a
new page in the Indo-Pacific region.
There
are two scenarios in which cases China can displace the United States and its
allied friends in the Philippines to become victor to the heart of Philippine
government and lessen Filipinos’ anti-Chinese sentiments in one of Southeast
Asia’s most acculturated countries. For China, the win-win solution will only
happen if the Philippines sets side the sovereignty issue in the South China
Sea and bandwagons with the new regional power through joint exploration, joint
conservation of the environment, joint development and tourism, and sit down to
incessantly engage dialogue with China by sharing with them their vision and
will in the Indo-Pacific region.
Hence,
“the greatest victory is that which
requires no battle,” beautifully opines by revered Chinese strategist Sun
Tzu. Harvesting the seeds of goodwill, China’s effective naval diplomacy to
Manila sets a tone of a “new era” of ties between China and the Philippines,
manifesting a promising bilateral relations, two months after President Xi
Jinping’s productive visit, signing 29 juicy deals including a memorandum of
understanding on the cooperation on oil and gas development with the
Philippines last November, while some critics poke at the Philippines as part
of the Middle Kingdom’s province amidst a major legal triumph over China in
July 2016.
The
win-lose scenario could occur if the Philippines chooses war against China and
puts it reliance with the US military which has more nuclear warships and submarines
than all claimant-countries in the contested waterways in the South China Sea. By
allowing China of an offensive strike, it can heighten a military campaign just
like what the People’s Liberation Army did in the Battle of Chamdo, retaking
the Chamdo Region from a de facto independent Tibetan government after months
of failed negotiations on the status of Tibet.
Now
that China, a new naval power under Xi Jinxing has resurged, the Philippines
should not be complacent of the status quo and current asymmetrical bilateral
defense with the giant neighbour. China’s domineering attitude can be summed up
to Sun Tzu’s wisdom on the importance of self-knowledge and of knowledge of
one’s enemies. Given the ambiguous security environment especially when external
defense provides a severe shock that invalidates prevailing assumptions, it can
be construed that most of the time, the Philippine strategy is a reflection of
reactive policy decisions rather than a well-defined national security strategy
based on foresight and appreciation in the evolving regional and global
security landscape.
