Spouses Centeno v. De Guia-Slavador et. al.

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SPS RODOLFO CENTENO AND NENA (NELIA) CENTENO, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DE GUIA-SALVADOR, Chairperson, VILON, S.E., and LAZARO-JAVIER, A.C., JJ,
MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA ISABELA, GLOBE TELECOM, INC., REPRESENTED BY
CHRISTOPHER Q. HANDOG AND MAGNA RESTU PHILIPPINES, INC. REPRESENTED
Promulgated: BY FRANCISCO G. DURAN, Defendants-Appellees,

November 22, 2010

Facts:

Spouses Centeno, from Calaocan, Alicia, Isabela filed a petition for “Mandatory Injunction for the Issuance of preliminary Injunction and Damages” against the Municipality of Alicia in Isabela.

The plaintiffs objected the approval of Globe’s application to construct a Tower Antenna in their place, claiming that they were deprived of their right to due process.

On June 9, 2005, the appellate court rendered a decision stating that the plaintiffs could have also presented their grievances to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when in reviewed Resolution No. 2003-119, with the view of having it disapproved because it is hazardous to the health of the plaintiff and other residents similarly situated, They opted to come to Court immediately invoking judicial intervention inspite of the existence administrative remedies available to them.

Thus, the complaint was dismissed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA has a jurisdiction over the case at bar;

2. Whether the complaint is pre-mature for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the complaint has no cause of action;

3. Whether the health, lives and properties of plaintiffs-appellants are put to imminent danger by the construction of the Globe tower antenna; and

4. Whether the municipality of Alicia, Isabela acting through its SB committed grave abuse of discretion

Held:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review, and nonobservance thereof is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. Thus, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.

The requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1 when the question raised is purely legal; 2 when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3 when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4 when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5 when the claim involved is small; 6 when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7 where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8 when strong public interest is involved; 9 in quo warranto proceedings; 10 when there is a violation of due process; 11 when respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the president, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; 12 when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be reasonable; 13 when the rule of qualified political agency applies; 14 when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; and from among these exceptions, appellants claim principally the denial of due process arising from alleged want of notice to them of the proceedings before the Sangguniang Bayan resulting to violation of their constitutional right for safe, healthy and convenient social environment.

On the issue of plaintiffs not given due process, it bears stressing that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. Also in the case at bar, the plaintiffs-appellants sought absence of waiver or estoppel which the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.

The appellate court ruled that plaintiffs could have availed of the remedies envisioned under the Local Government Code, rep. 7160. First, is the veto power of the Mayor and second, the review by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Resolution No. 2003-119.

Because the plaintiffs opted to come to court immediately invoking judicial intervention inspite of the existence of administrative remedies available to them, wherefore, in view of all the foregoing, the instant appeal is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the RTC in Cauayan City is hereby affirmed and upheld.

Case Digest by CbCabalza 2010