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Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2018 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
The idea of a full federal system of “coming together” or shared
sovereignty and “holding together” or shared governmental powers presumes
symmetric and asymmetric balance of power in the electoral process. But Filipino policymakers and scholars talk
about decentralization but not federalism paramount to issues on fragmentation
and secessionism. In this context, decentralization was perceived to be an
effective means of diffusing power from the center that would effectively
prevent an authoritarian regime. Hence the shift to federalism removes the
restrictions to the martial law powers of the president as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution.
Federalism can be taken advantage to deepen the discourse of devolution
that flexes opportunity to implement reforms on amalgamation highlighting
inter-local cooperation. Since 1967, Republic Act No. 5185 or the
Decentralization Act was enacted to increase the financial resources and powers
of local governments.
On the other hand,
the Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of the Philippines institutionalized
a systemic allocation of powers and responsibilities between national and local
governments. The Local Government Code assures that powers and structures of
cities, municipalities, and barangays shall remain. However, not all regions
are equal in terms of opportunities and resources; but proposed federal government
shall be created to provide more funding support to depressed regions in order
to accelerate development to equalize with other progressive regions, in which
effect regions shall acquire more power to control over their funds and
resources in pursuit of subsidiarity and solidarity.
Whether or not the fiscal decentralization succeeded or failed in the
span of almost three decades, there have been no sharp improvements in local
public service delivery. Fiscal autonomy becomes inutile when more local
government units depend on the Internal Revenue Allotment from the Philippines
national coffers. This will result to massive accountability from the central
government where people will demand more services if they are paying their
taxes properly. The dilemma also rises with the mismatch of the assignments of
revenues and expenditures; on the contrary, local governments have not fully
exploited their local taxing powers. In the end, the fiscal social contract
should therefore feed accountability in all local levels. If national government
refuses to be true to decentralization then policy implementation becomes the
biggest challenge.
The current discourse
on federalism catches the contours of the form rather on the substance of the
subject that bespeaks accountability, transparency, democracy or autocracy. If
the common denominator in the parlance of federalism in the Philippines calls
for accountability and political participation, in spite of the form of the
government, these values should have been the bases of founding a stronger
government even before.
Benchmarking from the experiences of other countries on how federalism
had worked on to their advantage is conceived as cultural expressions of their
political aspirations and synergy to commit to innovative calls of their
security environments. The Philippines should breed its own indigenous form of
federalism as a prescription to alter the mindset and perspective of Filipino
civil servants to assume proactive roles to stand with the aphorisms of the
basic local governance as building blocks of robust nationhood.
Rhetoric on demystifying the spoiled Philippine political structures of
overconcentration of central power in Imperial Manila, corruption, patronage
politics, political dynasty, secessionism and terrorism can be addressed with
the promising face of federalism. The devil is in the detail when political
ambitions can be launched for an extension of power of leaders characterized by
desynchronized or suspended local and national elections. This opens up a
judicialization of politics which vest enough powers to key positions in the
government.
To counter such scenario, the Philippines’ emancipation from
oligarchical system of clientelistic politics, political reforms must not be
limited to relational dynamics between the balance of power of the central and
local governments. Federalism must pave way for electoral and party reforms, debate
on anti-political dynasty provision in the Constitution, amalgamation of fragmented
local government units, restructuring of tax system, reconfiguration of the
presidential system, and professionalizing the civil service.
The assurance that Filipinos shall fully enjoy the benefits of democracy
by uplifting their lives espouses the campaign of a semi-parliamentary system
with a strong presidential system, directly voted in tandem with the vice
president. The president nominates the prime minister who will act as the chief
executive officer of the country. However, this precludes a condition of a
stronger party dynamics for which the president’s political survival relies on
the strength of political parties supporting him that contradicts the nonexistence
of strong parties in the Philippines.
More so, the promise of political participation insinuates the greater
respect for ethnic diversity and political culture change which spans for
intergeneration. The centuries-old reality of Philippine regionalism debunks
the pitch that through federalism and decentralization, devolution of regional
financial and political powers will wield good governance, peace and order, and
competitiveness.
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