Asean’s shared cultural destiny with India

Photo courtesy of ISIS Malaysia/RIS India

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

Last month, I was invited by ISIS Malaysia and RIS India to attend the Fourth ASEAN-India Network of Think Thanks in the beautiful city of Kula Lumpur. I talked about Asean-India’s shared destiny and rebuilding cross-cultural exchanges and future ties.

But before sharing important insights about my topic, I would like to commend the organizers for the job well done. More substantive ideas were exchanged in just a two-day high-level dialogue. During the short visit, my appreciation extends to the Malaysian government for having an Asean lane in their immigration, making it convenient for many travelers around the region. This tangible action shows Malaysia’s serious take on the Asean integration that will commence by end of the year.

I would also like to thank few Malaysian colonels who were my former students at the National Defense College of the Philippines for hosting my visit to Malaysia’s seat of power in Putrajaya.   

Going back to the successful conference, the organizers gathered together distinguished scholars, seasoned diplomats, and respected practitioners from Asean and India to share their expertise on various dimensions including non-traditional security threats, regional security architecture, economic partnership, cultural links, and way forward.  

Shared destiny

‘Shared destiny’ is a fluid concept to describe the relationship of the regional group Asean and subcontinental India. The undeniable provocation of shared destiny is an overstatement of the overflowing cultural and historical ties. Such dramatization of strengthened partnerships has been embroidered and cemented by rich traditional heritage in the past and current cultural commonalities of our peoples and societies to continuously rebuild cross-cultural exchanges by laying the ground and carving possible niches for future ties. 

Historical narratives describe that Indian influences continued to operate on Southeast Asia until the present. But countries in the region retained its own recognizable social and cultural forms, preserved and evolved from their separate origins before the coming of Indian elements.

It seems like that the favored camaraderie is viewed as a major breakthrough for this lasting partnership molded by a rich history of regional resilience and understanding with respect to the presence of multitude heterogeneous languages, cultures, and religions in the spirit of shared common values empowered by unity in diversity to adapt/adopt to present realities and future discourses of cultural cooperation.

Indianized

‘Indianized’ is also a heavy concept to describe India’s past link with Southeast Asia. Historical connection calls it the Indianization of the region since the beginning of anno domini (A.D.) until western colonialism.

But the connection between Southeast Asia and India is an anthropological approach to our centuries-old historical and cultural links. These are formed through inevitable diffusion of cultures since antedated maritime traditions and terrestrial explorations, as evidenced by the rise of civilizations along the great rivers and its tributaries around these nations, enriched by the presence of important archaeological excavations, linguistic expressions, and philosophical manifestations embedded in our shared heritage.

Undoubtedly, classical India was an ancient geocultural power in South Asia that cultivated a deep respect for learning and for education, beginning with literacy, mathematics described by Arabs as India’s art, medical sciences and philosophy.

With the confluence of maritime trade and high culture, Indians began to transmit their wide knowledge, religious practices, traditions and customs to peoples in other geographical regions.

India secured intermittently naval posts and commanding cultural influence to the vastness of islands in the south of India and east of China that would later become today as the geographical and geocultural region of Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, Islam’s lasting footprint to insular Southeast Asia, a patchwork of sprouting Muslim sultanates at the beginning had advanced for dominion and control over the Malacca Strait at the heart of the region due to its strategic location as a great center of commerce, following the Islamic conquest of northern India and setting its stronghold through Delhi Sultanate by thirteenth century.

This newfound religion was farther carried out to Southeast Asia by Indian traders who received favorable approval to spread Islam. These and other aspects of Indian civilization were overlaid on a well-developed preexisting base whose character was distinctly different. Islam was transmitted eastward along the sea routes while earlier Indian merchants did the other way to stretch the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism westward at India’s backdoor.

Compared with India, full colonialism came late to most of Southeast Asia. It took time for smaller kingdoms and sultanates to develop a national response to colonialism. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that modern nationalism and common effort were late and slow to grow.

As in India, some Southeast Asians found the colonial system attractive and personally rewarding, but generally it gained wider resistance among local political elites. In most of Southeast Asia’s colonial rule, it left very few educated people to form a stable political base and too few with any political experience. Simply stated, both Southeast Asia and India suffered the same fate of western colonialism.

Indian scholar Prakash thinks that Indian culture was believed to have been transmitted in three phases. (1) the establishment of the stations and emporia of Indian traders and mariners along the coastal region; (2) foundation of colonies and settlements of Indian people, Brahmans and Buddhists, in some localities; and, (3) setting of fully Indianized states, characterized by purely Indian civilizations, in the islands and peninsulas.

But Filipino Indologist Joefe Santarita deems that the culture of early Southeast Asians were neither eliminated nor cornered. It implied effective commingling and cooperation with the natives and their consequent conversion and merger in the complex of an Indo-Asian civilization.

Recent studies on Indian contact to prehistorical Southeast Asia are mushrooming now, with increasing number of scholars specializing in the region. New studies should give new fresh perspectives and interpretations on such grand engagements between India and Southeast Asia.

Again Santarita’s research shows that the naming of the Philippines as Panyupayana clearly gives a clue that the archipelagic Philippines has been in the radar of Indians for millennia.

Filipino archaeologist Eric Casino believes that archaeological discovery of material cultures like large ocean-going balangay in Butuan, Agusan del Norte based from carbon-14 dated artifacts unearthed in different locations in 320 AD, 1250 AD, and 900 AD; the discovery of the Golden Tara of Agusan conceived as a female Boddhisattva of the Buddhist pantheon – a counterpart of the Hindu goddess Saki as a Tara, or wife of a Buddhist god dated around the 13^th or 14^th century; and the presence of the Silver Paleograph, a strip of silver metal inscribed with ancient ideograms of Indic writings, are indications of Indian mediation through the Indianized states of Indonesia and Indochina.

These prognostic views based from archaeological and cultural case studies in some important archaeological sites in Southeast Asia, although less expounded in my research, should ignite more production of knowledge that would usher to numerous local studies and new interpretations of ancient engagements to be written and reviewed by Southeast Asian and Indian contemporary scholars to emphasize the value of past relations.    

Rebuilding cross-cultural exchanges

Southeast Asia lies between two great economic powers and cultural influences of India and China in the region. They combine shipping and land crossings. Cultural bearers from the two giant nations had to wait for the change of winds during monsoon season in the past to transmit and receive hybrid customs and traditions.

But the central dynamics in Southeast Asian and Indian rich history and close-knitted cultural links are products of interaction between and amongst peoples, primarily through trade in the down rivers, along the coasts, across the seas and oceans, networks of transnational trains, sophisticated land transport networks, and to more open skies.

Given the context of cross-cultural exchanges, imperative social and cultural problems are scrutinized to understand its effects to Southeast Asia in particular, or Asean and India as a whole.

This broader picture seen at the complex social and cultural landscapes in Asean shows that diversity does provide opportunities but challenges as well. The region alone is a plural regional bloc that may test its intact integration. The discrepancy in beliefs could potentially hinder programs because unanimous decision will be hard to get, although there may be mechanisms to contain it.

In relation to prospects of elevating Asean-India social and cultural cooperation, we have seen today elevated cultural links embarked by past connections and future ties expanded in higher education level.

This sector of education should be tackled seriously since the skills embodied in the new generation are honed over the years inside the education system. The task is to sense future needs for skills so that the supply of skills matches the demand of skills.

Creativity is the driver for society to turn out new products. It is more of a societal competitive parameter than an economic one considering that traditional economic instruments and economic policies will not do much to enhance creativity.

Over the years, Asean-India’s socio-cultural collaborations increased to include human resource development, science and technology, people-to-people contacts, health and pharmaceuticals, transport and infrastructure, small and medium enterprises, tourism, information and communication technology, agriculture, energy and Initiative for ASEAN Integration.

Although, each member-state in the Asean vary on their bilateral engagement with India, based from the core political interests and past cultural dependency with India, covering the extent of holistic foreign policies using soft power approach based on cultural and historical ties. Soft power approach may consist of soft power strategies emphasizing common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions.

Future ties

Communication and dialogues are important elements for successful interregional ties. The historical and cultural links of Asean and India are affirmations of continuous intensification of regional cooperation to enhance national and strengthen regional capacities without impinging on competitiveness of common but differentiated responsibility, respective capabilities as well as reflecting on different social and economic conditions of different stakeholders.

However, the most immediate concern that has to be addressed in narrowing the development gap in two regional blocs is also the most basic agreement on the definition of development and provision of milestones. It is difficult to measure development gap and whether the government and other member-states have been successful in narrowing down the gaps if no clear metrics or measures as well as mechanisms are in place. For sure culture-bound measurements can be used to address social-based problems to cultivate stronger regional ties between Asean and India.

Together, Asean and India should hand in hand and equally engage each other in many fronts. Its cultural ties and historical links could cement this mutual relationship. Given all the confidence and potential each country has in the region and its cultural relations with India, they must continue to gauge assistance and learn best practices from each other in education, people-to-people contacts, and other artistic and cultural avenues to strongly forge this bond. 

Will the Philippines bandwagon on the US led Trans-Pacific Partnership?

Photo courtesy of bibliotecapleyades.net  

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

The alliance of the Philippines with the United States is cemented not only militarily but also economically. This robust economic relationship, apparently seen on how the Philippines gives support to the grand plan of the lone superpower in the world in crafting a “Trans-Pacific Partnership” or TPP, is undeniable and unprecedented, despite the country’s non-membership in the newest US-led economic agreement.  

It is however noted that the TPP is a multinational trade agreement proposed by the Philippines’ oldest ally. But in contextualizing the current economic global landscape, China is rising as well as the “other superpower” and stands tall as the second largest economy worldwide after the US.

China recently proposed for the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to relive the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ and counter Japan’s Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the United States’ World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is in time when member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are on the verge of economic regional integration this year.

The game-changing economic landscape are pushing major global powers to boost its financial assets and trading clout, thereby, creating transnational and multinational financial institutions robed under trans-border agreements that would increase their economic influence worldwide.

Definitely, there are two faces of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA). On the positive note, the United States through the TPPA, is guiding member economies to higher standards of production by either reducing or eliminating tariffs. On the other hand, it would bring menace to the restrictive intellectual property (IP) laws across the globe and rewriting international rules on its enforcement, according to activist Rick Esguerra.

It is deemed that in the intellectual property issue, there found leaked draft texts of the agreement showing extensive ramifications for users of freedom of speech, right to privacy and due process, and hindering peoples’ right to innovate.

Given the binary oppositions of opportunities and challenges that the TPPA may inject on our economic policies, this will give us a leverage to rethink our negotiating membership in the said agreement, as it would require the Philippines to implement domestic reforms in trade and industry, realign our objectives in international trade, increase external demand for domestic products and labor, and renew our economic engagement with the United States.   

Deal or No Deal

The Philippines has remained the darling of investments today by continuously positioning itself as the economic leader in Southeast Asia. This perceptible notion is evident in the country’s economic environment propounded by a relatively good business climate and sturdy government fiscal expenditures, solidifying several market fundamentals.

These, however, are good signs of economic recovery inspired by the Philippines’ continuous rating upgrade from reputable global credit rating organizations, affirming the current administration’s structural reforms demonstrated by the significant economic reforms by improving transparency and accountability in line with the goal of promoting economic growth and poverty reduction.

It should be noted that the past GPH-US economic relations have declined over the years after the Americans withdrew its largest bases in the Philippines. As a result of the changing conditions in the world market and increasing regional integration and global competition, trade agreements have become part of any economic and development strategies of every nation-state.

Filipino economist Erlinda Medalla thinks that like many other countries, the Philippines was characterized in the past by a heavily protectionist trade regime. Starting in the 1980s, it embarked on unilateral trade liberalization reforms, even before joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). It has been a firm supporter of the WTO principles, and continues to place primary importance on multilateralism.

Therefore, there is a need for the Philippines to renew its bilateral economic relations with the United States by engaging in a pluralistic approach. On this case, since the TPP is a multilateral agreement, twelve nations have already signified interests, including the US, Japan, Australia, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Canada, Mexico, and Brunei Darussalam, in which the Philippines may opt to bandwagon, weighing strategic preferential treatment from the agreement.

To have a holistic view of the newest US-led trans-regional trade agreement, it should be viewed that the Asia-Pacific, in which the Philippines is strategically located in the most important region, is experiencing very vibrant vignettes, and it is in the unique position of moving the global economy forward and bringing regional relations to a whole new level of cooperation and peace.

According to Monica Liempo, the potential for strategic and economic collaboration within the region is enormous, thus, realizing these opportunities and seizing the moment to usher in the age of Trans-Pacific peace and prosperity is a must. 

Then what would be the benefits, in case the Philippines specifically and Asia generally, would bandwagon on this lucrative agreement with the United Sates as the original signatory? 

In the purview of economic security, this is a way for the United States’ commitment to Asia as part of its “pivot” or rebalancing act to the most populous and important continent on earth; a way to strengthen US ties with Japan; stronger and closer ties between the US and alliances, such as Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore; and lastly, this is a desire to see US continued presence in the region fully committed in its policing role in the regional security and apparently a shift to strengthening its economic ties in the region through the TPPA.  

Singaporean legalist Ravindran thinks that on the regional context, seven (7) probable negotiating members that are also members of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnerships (RCEP) economies are in TPP negotiations. Four (4) more RCEP economies including Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand are potentials in the ‘second tranche’ of the TPP.

He deems that these countries are attracted to TPP participation because of the benefits from TPP-inspired regulatory reforms and deeper liberalization, as well as fear of trade diversion from non-participation. Some would argue that TPP has always been declared open to potential new members while some TPP architects have put forward the prospect of building eventual free trade agreements from the foundations of the TPP. 

Thus, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies could gradually join the TPP when it is already prepared as a process analogous to the WTO accession. TPP negotiations are on parallel tracks towards the ASEAN and APEC visions of economic integration leading towards broader free trade agreements.

What’s stopping others?

With a ‘new age’ regionalism which appears to be a viable option and possible support to waning multilateralism, any further erosion of the multilateral trading system could dissolve their complementary interface.

There are doubts about the eventual form of the mega-blocs currently under negotiation – particularly the US-led TPP involving the United States and the other Asia-Pacific countries. There is also a brewing United States-European Union (US-EU) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) that would definitely affect the global economic and political landscape, according to Medalla. 

In this sense, the United States’ concoction of the TPP and TTIP compact could become as a ‘free-trade charades’ whose goal is “managed trade regime – managed to serve the special interests that have long dominated trade policy in the West,” as opined by Joseph Stiglitz.

Ibon International reports that the TPP aims to achieve smooth economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region through intensified trade liberalization. Grounded on the rebalancing strategy of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, the US will utilize the TPPA to counter China’s expanding influence.

One major contending issue in TPP, intently contained in a chapter on intellectual property covers copyright, trademarks, and patents. Based from the leaked information from the ‘May 2014 draft of the TPP Intellectual Property Chapter [PDF]’, the US negotiators are pushing for the adoption of copyright measures far from restrictive than currently required international treaties, including the controversial ‘Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)’.

From the document of Secret TPP Treaty: Intellectual Property Chapter working document for all 12 nations with negotiating positions based from WikiLeaks released last 16 October 2014, it described that the revised version of the confidential draft treaty chapter from the intellectual property group of the TPP talks, negotiated in secret by delegations from each of these 12 countries, who together account for 40 percent of the global Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 

The chapter covers agreements of facilitations, restrictions and enforcement of regulations of copyright, trademark, patent, pharmaceuticals, counterfeit and piracy issues between the signatories of the agreement. The document was produced and distributed after the 20^th Round of Negotiations at Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.

Based from the report of Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the leaked US IP chapter includes many detailed requirements that are more restrictive than current international standards that would require significant changes to other countries’ copyright laws. These entail obligations for member-countries to: (1) place greater liability on internet intermediaries, (2) escalate protection for digital locks, (3) create new threats for journalists and whistleblowers; (4) extend copyright terms; (4) enact a “three-step-test” language that puts restrictions on fair use; and, (5) adopt criminal sanctions.Given the loopholes on the intellectual property, in effect countries joining the TPPA will have to surrender big chunk of their national sovereignty to the trade pact’s imperialist masterminds, according to Ibon International.  

Wider participation

The rapid transformations on the global economic landscapes are fast and deterritorializing. Inclusive growth must be felt by creating new rules of engagements by crafting transnational and multinational agreements. 

The TPP, despite legal flaws should be considered seriously by the Philippines to beat its economic momentum and renew its economic interest and ties with the United States. In a larger scale, we are weaving efforts of reconciliation of our APEC commitments with much faster movement it may acquire in greater regional significance. In TPP, the RCEP member countries alone are the most dynamic countries with high growth potential in the region.

In the end, appropriate laws must be protected that are aligned to the objectives of the TPPA to affirm existing rights and obligations of potential member-countries. Notwithstanding that there are severe and chronic issues ahead its implementation on the intellectual property rights and pharmaceutical products and medical devices which must be given emphasis and weight based from the intent and spirit of the well-crafted international agreements and treatises.

Binondo's Paradoxes

Photo courtesy of  ManilaStandardToday

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

This article is based from my original ethnographic piece, entitled, “The Paradoxes of Binondo: A parachute ethnographer’s fieldnotes and reflections [Read the full text at https://www.academia.edu/13775356/The_Paradoxes_of_Binondo_A_parachute_ethnographers_fieldnotes_and_reflections]  

World’s Oldest Chinatown

Binondo throbs vibrantly while strolling along its filthy, narrow alleys. The rays of the sun kiss the humungous red bloody arc emblazoned with dragons and Sinitic calligraphy when we arrive at the mouth of the famous Chinatown in the city. My wife and kids’ sudden immersion with me certainly awed and struck them, telling me in gist, as if they reach Beijing.

Since Binondo is the earliest Chinatown to be established in the whole world, it probably has the largest concentration of Chinese population in Metro Manila or around the archipelago. Most of the Chinese in Binondo belong to the third generation of Chinese immigrants. They own business establishments in the booming area, flamboyantly exuding their expertise on entrepreneurship.

The abundance of Chinese businessmen in Binondo could be traced back from the Spanish colonial era where it became a place to confine to the ever growing Chinese population. Though initially of low status, the Chinese slowly gained the confidence of the Spanish officials since they heavily contributed in the Philippine economy as the Spanish empire began reforming its colonial policies.

Binondo as a political unit has been very attractive to Filipino writers for it can actually expose a different political take under a modernized Chinese community in the heart of Philippine political culture. Aside from the economic reverberations of Binondo as the earliest Chinatown in Asia, where extensive trade and commerce prosper, it also captures a perfect picture how culturally-different the Chinese community as a political unit can adapt to a larger and stronger political environment.

The extent of why political culture of the Filipino-Chinese community in the first place matters in the larger Philippine political system is on how such new political system may actually influence a traditional one. Another worth noting in this political dynamics is the flexibility of Chinese strict economic purpose to be subsumed by the need to extend politically side-by-side with their intentions to constitutionally orient their local bodies.

The alien Chinese population of Greater Manila was officially reckoned to be big in number. Defined in cultural and not in legal terms, whether they be Filipino citizens or not, full-blooded or not, they are distributed throughout all of the metropolitan area, but they tend to congregate in their own enclaves.

As they create their own identity, the descendants of the mythical dragon who settled in the Philippines, shaped by history and community, would later ascribe to call themselves Chinoys or Tsinoys (Chinese Filipinos).

Lesson # 1: As I converse with one local official in Binondo, I have learned that the place is not actually a Chinese community if residential population is to be considered based from walk-in interviews. A Chinoy discloses that most of their voters are Filipinos who are said to be either natives of the Binondo area or employees who decided to reside there permanently.

Fookienized

I have been in Binondo a lot of times before. But still, I cannot forget the feeling of excitement that caught me and my kids when we started immersing ourselves in Chinatown. When we went there to observe, we did not just gain knowledge of how the people live in the place, we also have our senses fed. Its mixture leads us to imagine ourselves in a new experience. Our eyes have savored the wonderful architectural designs; a whiff of the different scent that the place gives off. But as language learners, I have felt amazed again with the language, I thought at first as thorny and difficult.

There is excitement of going and exploring the place but at different levels; it feels like we are exploring a whole new world, but of course the adaptation of the people varies differently.

After surveying the area, the languages spoken in Chinatown are mainly Filipino, English, and Fookien. Filipino and English are heard in the area because these are the languages mainly used for non-Chinese in the community. In communication, local Chinese prefer Fookien in speaking to their fellow Chinese. Fookien is a Sinitic language from Fujian province in China; most of the Chinese community here in the Philippines come from that island-province. However, most of the Fookien speakers found in Chinatown are mostly elders. The second and third generations of Fookien speakers are now using English and Filipino in everyday communication, making them to have a less command of the Fookien language.

The reason, in Chinese society, Mandarin is a prestige language. It is more often used in formal settings like in schools, the media and business. To be able to speak Mandarin is a sign of good education and a higher social status.

In Chinatowns where you would find people coming from provinces in China and where the language demands a colloquial setting, regional languages are preferred than Mandarin; so with the case of Binondo. However, you would still be able to find Mandarin-speaking Chinese in Binondo.

In Binondo, the Chinese writings that are used are in traditional Chinese. Traditional Chinese characters are more complicated than simplified Chinese characters. They are preferred when writing signs and doing calligraphy in Chinese because of its intricateness and aesthetic value compared to simplified Chinese characters which have less number of strokes, and are plain to look at. Since simplified Chinese characters were instituted during the 1950s by the Communist government of China, the Chinese in Binondo who settled there even before 1950s until today have been using the traditional Chinese writing system.

Lesson # 2: When we went to Lucky Chinatown, a sprawling middle and high class shopping mall, I have heard a lot of elderly Chinese conversing in Fookien. If you are an outsider, you would expect Mandarin to be the preferred language in a Chinese-speaking community like Binondo, but in most Chinatowns around the world, you would hear more people speaking in a regional language like Cantonese or Fookien but not Mandarin.

Religious Syncretism

The fierce glare of the sun combined with smoke from vehicles choked in heavy traffic, has led us inside the beautiful church named after the first Filipino-Chinese saint, Lorenzo Ruiz. As we enter, I feel amused with the angelic paintings on the wall, as I submerge my fingers in a bowl of holy water.

In my rumination to better know the church’s history, I have great conversation with Reverend Fr. Luis Sierra, O.P., who has toured us around the church. The modest church looks like a chapel for me with over thirty pews, small confession boxes annexed to the wall, and the imposing statues of Jesus, Mother Mary, Saint Joseph, and San Lorenzo Ruiz – the patron saint of Binondo. Because of religious syncretism apparent in the culture of assimilated Chinese in the Catholic faith, some religious image looks like Chinese particularly the tiger eyes exuded by the appearance of the saints in most religious statues.   

According to him, the first bishop of Manila, Most Reverend Domingo Salazar, O.P., began the education of the Chinese into Christian Doctrine when the Dominican missionaries replaced the Augustinian missionaries in 1587. The Binondo Church, built in 1596, was actually the third church to be erected in a series of construction, the first being constructed in Parian, dedicated to the three Holy Kings, another in Longos, dedicated to the Purification of our Lady.

During the 1896 revolution, the Dominicans relinquished the church to the seculars which, after a few years, could not handle the influx of Chinese coming from the mainland. This is the reason why there are two back-to-back parishes within the area - the first being the Binondo Church itself and secondly the Binondo Chinese Church.

Fr. Sierra laughs in optimism when I ask how the two parishes get along together and he responds both churches exist in harmony. Tagalog mass is only held in the main church but Chinese mass is conducted the Chinese Church as part of indoctrinating pure Chinese immigrants from Mainland China and orient them about Christian living. But the Chinese Binondo Church celebrates mass in three languages in English, Mandarin, and Amoy or Fookien.

Religious syncretism often takes place when foreign beliefs are introduced to an indigenous belief system and the teachings are blended. The heterogeneous religion then takes a shape of its own. In this case, Buddhism and Confucianism are foreign beliefs blended with Catholic dogma as the indigenous belief system, and when merged, it forms a unique religious practice.

The said shrine is sacred among the Chinoys here to show the importance of religious syncretism, originally erected in Ongpin Street in 1984, now it stands majestically along Tomas Pinpin Street. Though the site is sacred along a busy street, it also magnifies its touristic appeal, carved off and is installed with a golden cross of five feet in height and four feet width.   

It has a candle stands but beside the corners it has cylinders filled with joss sticks or incense. As I observe, Chinoys and some local and foreign tourists light candles and burn incense at the same time before they say their prayers before the golden cross. Despite considered a Catholic Shrine, the fusion of cultures seems obvious, and religious syncretism highlights the faith of the people in Binondo.

Lesson # 3: The Catholic faith is very strong in Binondo regardless of the heavy Chinese influence observed in the area. It is common knowledge that the Chinese have been converting into Christianity, most notably Catholicism, since colonial periods. Religion, specifically Catholicism, could be considered a neutral ground as we enter the world of Binondo.

As we leave Binondo at dusk, I have simple reflections or perhaps questions that could be answered or only time can answer it. What if the Chinese did not come to the Philippines? I think that would be impossible because of early trading and migration in the past which is innate to every nationality. Many Chinese migrated to the Philippines as paupers but now many of them have become financially blessed and few are becoming tycoons undeniably occupying very significant positions in the capitalist economy of the Philippines. Then, why Chinoys are rich and prosperous compared to other ethnic groups in the Philippines? Scholars like Go Bon Juan would claim that the ethnic Chinese were never, by nature, businessmen but it was historical conditions which pushed them to play the role of businessmen in the Philippines. For me, Binondo shall remain special at the heart of Manila’s economic miracle; its cultural richness will enliven brightly as Chinese New Year in the country is annually celebrated; religious syncretism will flourish as a fusion of various faiths continuously grow; and local politics shall become the training ground for most Chinoys to expand their political clout and influence in the national political scene.

Tuguegarao City (Land of the Ibanags)

Poem and Photographs by Chester B. Cabalza
Copyright © 2011 by Chester B. Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

- To the Ybanag youth

When I have these qualms that I might not see
My culture's impeccable legacy
Before the faces of young men to be
Like helpless, endangered eagle as me

When I consider how my life is spent
In the rich culture once treasured in tent
memories of my ancestors extinct
Passing to youngsters, less I think

When the time I shall return unto dust
I'll bring in the sky customs I've spent last
Before my ancestors I offer present
Hold like a rich garner; rest in content

From: C.B. Cabalza's Anthology of Poems, entitled, "Earthbound Spirits and other Poems" (1998)

China's Paramount Leaders

Photo courtesy of Dreamstime

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

Since the birth of the Communist Party of China in Shanghai, Chinese post-modernizing society has never been the same way now. Definitely, the ruling party is the source of all political power that exudes all the exclusive right to legitimize and control all other political organizations. It alone determines the social, economic, and political goals for the society, mostly controlled by the elites, who themselves are leaders of the party hierarchy.

Mao Zedong dominated the “First Generation” leadership of the People’s Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping and his cohorts defined the “Second Generation” as China opened its economy to the world. Jiang Zemin spearheaded China’s peaceful development of the “Third Generation” stabilizing China’s post-Tiananmen economic reforms posting a consistent economic growth trajectory. Hu Jintao’s peaceful rise and harmonious society consolidated the “Fourth Generation” while the “Fifth Generation” under Xi Jinping will beyond doubt lead an army of confident Chinese dreamers.

The five charismatic and enigmatic paramount leaders of China have led and will be leading the most populous country in the world to its Manifest destiny as it prepares for the party’s centennial celebration by 2049 since the Chinese communists theoretically founded a new political dynasty in 1949, having its seat of power in Beijing.

Chairman Mao is revered as the architect-founder of the successful political party in China, though his dominating influence or charismatic appeal wanted to purify the party and state leadership. However, he may be faulted for introducing the Cultural Revolution, excessively manifested in the Great Leap Forward, which launched a massive personality cult.

French and Russian-educated Deng should be credited for China’s staying power. Not for his pragmatic economic brilliance, China could not have reached its global status today as the ‘other’ superpower. His economic pragmatism succumb many Chinese to believe that ‘to get rich is glorious,’ and ‘it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice,’ generalized his realistic policies.

He consolidated his control over the central command structure of the armed forces, reformed the People’s Liberation Army military officer corps training, and replaced the large number of aging officers by younger in age and better educated officers. Therefore, the Mao-Deng extreme leadership values differ, as the first laid the ground on political reforms for 27 years, whereas the second paved the way for economic reforms for 14 years.

Under Jiang Zemin’s development dictatorship at the expense of ethics, he outlined his new vision. His ‘pay attention to politics’ campaign consolidated his obvious personal authority just as the Cultural Revolution was massively attached to Mao.

Three decades ago, PLA was considered a boxer suffering from ‘short arms and slow feet’. But the inferiority complex rapidly changed at the latter part of Jiang’s presidency in his effort to modernize the armed forces as it began to strengthen hardware capability and essentially contain enemies.

Stretched by Hu Jintao’s harmonious society concept, his hands on work for security, military, and defense matters greatly impacted the PLA as he earmarked more funds for the digitization of operations as well as the development and procurement of weapons. His concept of the army’s functions goes beyond ‘traditional’ tasks and embodied the role of armed forces to provide substantial force to ensure the consolidation of the ruling party status to provide strong security backing for China’s development.

When Xi Jinping ascended into power, he dreams even farther to modernize the PLA to fully realize national reunification with islands in South China Sea and renegade province Taiwan. These are all factors which place Chinese military under heavy pressure in securing the country and its border areas.

A decision to strengthen the reform of China’s national defense and armed forces was adopted at the Third Plenary Session of the 18^th Central Committee of the Party. Under Xi, China’s defense budget has increased by double digits nearly every year making China the world’s second largest military spender.

Now that China is aggressive in ocean filling, artificial island reclamation and infrastructure building within its controversial coastal geography through a U-shaped nine-dashed line map, Beijing has effectively put up its own Great Wall of the Sea in the South China Sea carrying out its Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy, certainly aimed at denying other militaries access to the energy and marine rich resources in the disputed islands.

Using historical claims to secure its sovereignty over the contested islands, China’s Koumintang government, then in battle with the Communist Party in 1947, issued a local map of the South China Sea islands, enclosing it in irregular 11-dashed line of varied lengths and distances from nearby coasts.

But Chinese incursions resulted to illegal occupation of the West Philippine Sea that outlines China’s expanse in maritime projections in forming boundaries for China’s naval defensive perimeter.

Aggressively, the People’s Liberation Army Navy made a shift from ‘coastal defense’ or land-focused to ‘offshore defense’ or ocean-focused strategy, a shift to prepare them from safeguarding their shores in the seas off the Chinese littoral to perform a mix of sea and area denials and to flex power projections in the region.

From Mao’s foundation of ideology to Deng’s pragmatism to Jiang’s three represents to Hu’s harmonious society and peaceful rise to Xi’s Chinese dream, all of them reinforce the Chinese dictum that, ‘the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest Chinese dream’. This may vary in interpretations, but still, China is maligned with internal security challenges like massive corruption, extreme gap between the rich and the poor, imminent environmental degradation, among others.

Understanding Chinese wants and dreams under the grand visions of their paramount leaders will give us a broader perspective of their current actions and behaviors in the South China Sea. Definitely the sleeping dragon is wide awake now, a reality from French General Napoleon Bonaparte’s prophesy three centuries ago when he inferred that, ‘here lies the sleeping dragon, let him sleep, for when he wakes up, he will shock the world!’

But ultimately, will China become a responsible hegemon to its smaller neighbors or will it mightily flex muscles and keep puffing potent fires?  

Bilateral or Multilateral Talks

Photo from Inquirer.net

By Chester B Cabalza

Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic 
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).

The mind over might strategy we saw in the recent legal battle of the Philippines against China at The Hague for the maritime jurisdiction of the disputed islands specifically in the West Philippine Sea demonstrates our dramatic show of force to stand on equal footing with wealthier and powerful giant neighbor.

China through its ambassador to the Philippines Zhao Jianhua expressed his continued intentions to offer for bilateral talks with our country as the best way to peacefully settle these disputes. Prior to China’s aggressive actions in the South  China Sea, it has indicated that it wants to avoid the internationalization of the dispute, as evidenced by its continued drive for bilateral negotiations.

However, during the opening salvo speech of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Peace Palace, he asserted that the Philippines has diligently pursued to resolve the problem bilaterally and multilaterally for over two decades.

Our government strongly believes to counter China’s ambiguous historic claims by espousing a multilateral approach to peacefully settle the maritime flashpoints.

Despite diplomatic efforts, China thinks alone it possesses maritime rights in virtually the entirety of the South China Sea and that the Philippines must recognize and accept China’s sovereignty.  Del Rosario enumerated incidents where China lawfully violated international maritime laws under (Unclos) - the Constitution of the oceans and forcibly seized and built structures in the disputed islands attracting dissenting opinions and violent reactions from the international community.

A year ago, the Philippines proposed a multilateral Triple Action Plan (TAP) of ASEAN in the South China Sea, which identified Arbitration as the final and enduring resolution to address the destabilizing activities in the region.

While China has indicated that it still does not intend to participate in the Arbitration case filed against it by the Philippines, the decision to issue a written response in the form of a position paper from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicates that China is indeed wary of the possible effects of the case.  

Given two hypothetical and plausible strategic dialogues for the Philippines to deal with its utmost challenging external threat today, how do we weigh our options in case multilateral engagements will falter and the only choice left would be bilateral negotiation?

Bilateral negotiation strong points benefited the Asian way of looking at our historical bilateral trade relations with China when early immigrant Chinese founded the world’s oldest Chinatown in Binondo long before western colonization of the Spaniards and Americans including the Japanese occupation in the Philippines. Over the centuries until today, Chinoys and influential taipans and some intellectuals of Chinese blood have become assimilated in our society.

Tina Clemente, a professor at the UP Asian Center describes the patterns of the bilateral economic relationships between the Philippines and China in terms of the investments, trade, labor, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) based from official statistical data, but the patterns look like asymmetric, critical and vulnerable.  But China’s rising power has attracted many ASEAN countries to open trade with them as its best economic partners, thus to factor in hedging strategies.

When I studied in Beijing at China’s National Defense University, my Chinese lecturers, most of them belonging to the Corps of Professors of the People’s Liberation Army were outspoken of bilateral negotiation to settle disputes with claimant-states in the South China Sea. They would often brag ‘respect’ and ‘trust’ on how they would shoulder the cudgel to painstakingly negotiate with sovereign smaller countries.      

Historically, bilateralism failed to provide just and equitable solutions to conflicts. This option was elucidated in highly controversial Agreements like the German-Russo Agreement in the late 1800s; German-Polish Non-Aggression Treaty signed in 1939; Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and USSR in 1939; and US-German Peace Treaty in 1921. All these bilateral treatises failed and resulted to war between and among those nations.

Some strategists believe that bilateral negotiations should be engaged by two states with almost equal economic status and military capability. But even if with equal footing in terms of military might as the above-mentioned examples have shown, still bilateral treatises would fail and can damage the world security order. In this case, the Philippines is way below the Chinese maximum credible deterrence, economic prowess, and military power projections; therefore our country will certainly end up at the losing end of the bilateral talks.   

But there are recent notable successes in bilateral cooperation courtesy of excellent negotiation skills used to resolve territorial disputes in some other countries and regions including the 2007 Australia and Timor-Leste Agreement on the 50-year development zone and revenue sharing arrangement; China-Russia Bilateral Agreement in 2004 on the disputed islands of Amur and Assuri confluence and the Argun River; and Norway-Russia Comprehensive Maritime Boundary Agreement in 2010, to name a few.

Some views that bilateral resolution of the South China Sea issue will foster maritime regional cooperation to the territorial disputes and it will pave more open communication between maritime law and enforcement agencies as well as setting up a hotline between foreign ministers for use in case of maritime emergencies. But the proposal looks ideal only for two countries with long tradition of ‘trust’ and ‘confidence’.   

Under a bilateral agreement, a range of preventive measures could ease regional tensions and de-escalate the risk of military conflict as both parties agree on resource-sharing agreement considering bilateral controlling mechanisms that would deter potential sources of conflict like illegal fishing and skirmishes arising from oil and gas exploration. Stronger military to military communication would increase dialogue to reduce conflict escalation.

But greed and megalomaniac claims over disputed islands and atolls would ruin all facets of potential cooperation under ideal bilateral agreements.   

The Philippines has proactively engaged in multilateral approach in dealing with this security threat as the best prerogative since it involves many countries in Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific in general with sprouting multi-dimensional regional and global interests that cut across political, economic, socio-cultural, techno-scientific, environmental, and military issues.  

The South China Sea dispute is multilateral in nature because it involves other claimants including Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Resolving issues between two countries will not entirely solve the dispute as other states are also claimants of islands. The dispute remains a potentially strong flashpoint especially with the ASEAN’s recent shelving of a proposed code of conduct that would have regulated aggressive activities of stronger claimants.     

 The multilateral approach will also give the country leverage against bullying tactics of the giant adversary as it will put international pressure to its misbehaviors. The internationalization of the case should also be complemented by the Philippines’ continuous strengthening of relationships with its current allies. This is especially true for Japan, South Korea and other ASEAN countries where China has ongoing territorial disputes.

Pessimist would argue that multilateralism is generally viewed as ineffective involving various parties with diverse interests which make it difficult to arrive at an acceptable agreement. It will also invite major powers in the region, not so much involved in the playing field, but will prefer to assume a neutral stance and declare non-intervention posture or may just verbalize pronouncements without tangible actions. In other words, it may not work in an anarchic international arena where interests of nations will define their wants.   

The diplomatic and legal actions our country may have chosen will certainly affect the kind of strategic culture we have mustered in the long run. The mind over might strategy we are pursuing will sum up our deterrence in this David versus Goliath maritime dilemma that we have had encountered with China.

Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards define strategic culture as a set of beliefs, attitudes and norms towards the use of military force often molded according to historical experience. Given our weak military might, alliance is a short-term remedy often favored than self-reliance as a long-term strength to better achieve modernized armed forces. It should also be noted that alliance as a form of strategic culture, apparent in bilateral or multilateral approaches, will not ensure the protection of our internal and external territories.   

On the other hand, some experts may deem that our shift to pursue Arbitration as a sign of soft power through the power of international laws that would serve as the greater equalizer among states, whether weak or mighty, has become our final resort to peacefully settle maritime disputes with China. Obviously, China is determined to show off its hard power in the Asia-Pacific as it continuously flexes muscles in the region.

   

The dichotomy between hard and soft powers in terms of strategic cultures shown by the Philippines and China in defining their bilateral and multilateral approaches in the South China Sea conundrum would highlight two different poles on the continuum of power. Both concepts imply different ideas, interactions, persuasions, and institutions for foreign and defense policies when looking at the fields of politics, security, and economics.

Christian Wagner deems that, ideally hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions in order to enforce national interests resulting in confrontational policies vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In contrast, soft power strategies emphasize common political values, peaceful means for conflict management, and economic cooperation in order to achieve common solutions. 

Perhaps with a mix verdict in the arbitration tribunal and realistic intergenerational solutions in the naval saga, the Philippines should rather play its cards conscientiously and become pragmatic in its negotiations to fight for its maritime rights in the contested islands. Despite our bravery to seek legal means in settling our bilateral differences with China, whether we win or lose, the Philippines has indeed achieved a moral ascendancy to pursue international rule of law and gained the respect of the international community.