Panaguiton Jr vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008
Facts:
Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Issue:
Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?
Held:
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.
Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.
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PCGG vs Desierto
G.R. No. 140231
July 9, 2007
Facts:
On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all non-performing loans, whether behest or non-behest.
The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan," to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG) were the loan transactions between NOCOSII and PNB.
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or only about 6% of its obligation.
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents. Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman, prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on July 23, 1999.
Issue:
Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g), specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
Held:
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied, none apply here.
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that decision will not be overturned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
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Romualdez vs Marcelo
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006
Facts:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.
Issues:
(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?
(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.
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People vs Lara
G.R. No. 171449
October 23, 2006
Facts:
On 31 January 1997, appellant Jose D. Lara, a.k.a. Joe Kalbo, was charged with Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm, and Robbery in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708, respectively, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal. Lara possessed firearms with ammunition, and without authority or license to possess said firearms, nor permit to carry them outside his residence, then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously use his shotgun in killing Chito B. Arizala who was a security guard of the Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services designated as officer-in-charge of the security detachment, assigned to guard the premises of the Sanchez Estate at Manalite II, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, then a municipality of Rizal.
Upon motion by the Public Prosecutor, Criminal Cases Nos. 97-13707 and 97-13708 cases, which were raffled to Branch 74, were ordered consolidated with Criminal Case No. 97-13706 before Branch 71 of the same court. On 16 April 1999, the cases were transferred to Branch 73, the latter being the branch designated to try heinous crimes.
Issue:
Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor?
Held:
While the prosecution was in the process of adducing its evidence, appellant escaped from detention. After the prosecution rested its case, the lower court granted the prosecution’s motion to declare appellant to have waived his right to present evidence and to consider him a fugitive from justice.
In a Decision dated 3 March 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE LARA Y DAVID is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 97-13706, 97-13707 and 97-13708. Said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties: Death for Criminal Case No. 97-13706; Prision Mayor minimum period pursuant to the provision of P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8292 plus a fine of P30,000 for Criminal Case No. 97-13707; and imprisonment for 4 years 2 months of Prision Correccional as minimum to 10 years of Prision Mayor as maximum for Criminal Case No. 97-13708. Further, the accused is hereby order (sic) to pay to the heirs of Chito Arizala P170,805.25 as actual damages, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as death indemnity, P648,000 for the victim’s loss of earning capacity and P100,000 as exemplary damages. And to indemnify Taurus Security Agency and Allied Services in the amount of P24,800.
On 22 December 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction of Robbery with Homicide and Robbery, but acquitted him for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm.
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Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco
G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
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People vs Mamantak
G.R. No.174659
July 28, 2009
Facts:
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat, Christopher, a two-year old minor, followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the fast food outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like a Muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy.
On March 27, 2001, the same Muslim-sounding woman called and instructed Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her. When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao, Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 Juliet Palafox was designated to act as Teresa’s niece. Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001. On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated meeting place.
At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak with them while she fetched Christopher.
Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes with Christopher.
Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak in the Muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a Muslim name with “Taurak” as surname.
Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money. She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter, Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside, under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak and Taurak.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, born very sickly, eventually died. The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom.
Issue:
Whether the two accused are guilty of violating the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659?
Held:
After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as charged. Both accused LIKAD SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.] Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time.[11] And liberty is not limited to mere physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare.
Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal is DENIED. In a decision dated March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not considering the demand for P30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
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