Copyright © 2010 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.
“What we do is when people have the capacity to do well,
we give them a hand”
- Mahathir bin Mohamad, 1998
One of the greatest statesmen Malaysia has ever produced in its post-independence history is the erstwhile Prime Minister and former UMNO leader, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad. A physician turned state leader from Kedah, in northernmost tip of Malaysia. Born to a mix culture of an Indian father and a conservative Malay mother. However, he considered himself to be a "full Malay", in line with Article 160 of the Constitution . He is a devout Muslim and with a heritage colored by Malay tradition. Under Article 153 of the Constitution, Malays are granted particular rights not available to other citizens. He held the Prime Minister post from 1981 to 2003. During his term in office he was credited for engineering Malaysia's rapid modernization and the resulting growth of prosperity.
Mahathir joined the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) upon its formation in 1946. As the State Party Chairman and Chairman of the Political Committee, he inadvertently angered some quarters with his proposal that the selection of candidates be based on certain qualifications for the 1969 general election . Hurt by accusations that he was scheming to put up candidates who were strongly allied to him, Mahathir refused to take part in the national election that year. Mahathir was sacked from the UMNO Supreme Council on 12 July 1969, following his widespread distribution to the public of his letter to Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime Minister. In his letter, he had criticized the manner in which the Tunku had handled the country's administration. Mahathir was subsequently relieved of his party membership on 26 September of that same year.
Fast forward to 10 July 1981, Mahathir became the Prime Minister of Malaysia and held the premireship for 22 years after which he retired from office on 31 October 2003, making him one of Asia’s longest-serving political leaders. According to Oehlers (2000), when Mahathir took office in 1981, he did so with avowed aim of transforming Malaysia into a newly-industralizing country (NIC) firmly under the dominance of such a Malay capitalist class (Jomo, 1987). In this, the “models” that were aspired to were countries such as Japan and South Korea (Khoo, 1995). In these countries, a successful transition from agriculture to industry had been realized. With the strong collaboration of the public and private sectors, a platform had been established for thriving heavy and high-technology industries under the control of indegenous peoples. In fact, Malaysia today has been one of the favorite hubs among multinational corporations (MNCs) as manufacturing and service bases in Asia. Petronas Twin Towers stand proud in the heart of Kuala Lumpur as the tallest skyscapers in the world beginning of the 21st century. It showcased Malaysia having leaped into an industralizing economy due to the benefits of its indegenous oil refinery and other manufacturing industries. It has also relied on its homegrown automobile industry, Proton, which now is being exported to other countries.
During his term as Prime Minister, he was one of the architects of Malaysia Vision 2020, a blue-print to achieve a developed-status for Malaysia and one of the strong proponents of Asian values together with Senior Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore.
The Path of Democracy and Development in Malaysia
In Malaysia, like so many other post-colonial political systems of the 20th century, it was modeled after the political system of the old mother country (Great Britain). And for some time after the independence, the Malaysian variant of British democracy appeared to be alive and functioning (Khoo Boo Teik, 1997:40)
The ‘Malaysian-style democracy’ is probably a form of rule with features of a “democracy without consensus” that is “neither democratic nor authoritarian”. Hence, Hamza Alvi argues that most post-colonial democracies (especially in Southeast Asia) fail because there exists no single and unified ruling class. Instead it has three contending ruling classes: 1. domestic bourgeoisie, 2. metropolitan bourgeoisie and 3. the landed elites.
In the case of Malaysia, in understanding the framework of development where it does not exactly lead to democracy in its fullest western context, Anek Laothamatas (1997), theoretically and historically, argues and narrates what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw in 19th century France under Napoleon and Germany under Bismarck that brought the bourgeoisie weak and set against other classes which will contradict what Karl Marx and Max Weber initially opined on the perspective that economic change or development would indeed lead states to democracy. This was based when Karl Marx saw the revolutionary change in England and France during the 17th and 18th centuries where democracy and development positively alleviated the conditions of many people. He attributed this with the rise of bourgeoisie, where democracy, as the alternative regime - defined as the business, propertied class which was the main agents for the rise of democracy in the West. But as Anek Laothamatas (1997) later expounded, Marx-Engels-Weber saw that there was rapid capitalist transformation under the auspices of an authoritarian regime. And the bourgeoisie failed to make an impact on the military-bureaucratic elite, (noticeable in several Southeast Asian regimes in the 1960s to 1980s). The troika scholars envisioned this as exceptional to the general rule of capitalism breeding democracy. Hence, going back to the larger picture of Malaysia’s general scenario, it did not experience a so-called ‘military-bureaucratic elite’, unlike in neighboring Southeast Asian countries where Thailand, Indonesia and Cambodia alike, experienced mob rule from military ranks.
Considering Mahathir’s many pronouncements on Asian values, such as the importance of traditional family as a social institution, the supremacy of societal over individual interests, strong government, and respect for authority; he also attributed Asian values concept to the relationship between democracy and development (Oehlers, 2000).
In fact, Oehlers (2000) quoted PM Mahathir by saying that, “once a government has been elected…it should be allowed to govern…”, Hence, strong and stable governments prepared to make decisions which, though often unpopular, are nevertheless in the best interests of the nation, are a prerequisite for economic development (Mahathir, 1995:8).
The problems that manifested in Malaysia encompassed on the three concerns of democracy where class, ethnicity and capitalism mattered most to politicians. Historically speaking, Malaysian democracy (Khoo Boo Teik, 1997:49-50) meant a particular political system by which the state, the ruling class, incumbent regimes, the various social classes and ethnic communities, will have to respond only to certain critical questions about Malaysian society. Malaysian democracy may, therefore, be seen as a polity which emerged from the interstices of decolonization.
To differentiate western liberal democracy in which the classical liberal characteristics of democracy require a multiplicity of parties representing competing policy agendas and clear political alternatives that have limitations on governmental authority and guaranteed rights of free expression and association from the quasi-democracy type which some Southeast Asian countries subscribe like Malaysia that mostly have evolved through hard or soft developmental authoritarianism to some form of democracy - in the sense of having elections, universal suffrage and political parties. Yet in some cases it appear to be based upon a different social premise with strong government invested with the responsibility of upholding collective needs, an absence of many liberal democratic practices, and longevity of political elites seem to be the norm (Inoguchi & Newman, 1997). For this reason, it can be debated that in a developmental context it has been possible to argue that stability and basic welfare are the priorities. But in semi-democratic states, strong government and a curtailment of some political rights are thus necessary in the interests of society. The collective goals are clear so the government's responsibility of upholding these should not be unduly hampered by democratic checks and balances.
For Mahathir, the principle of ‘growth of equity’ (Oehlers, 2000) was an integral aspect of Malaysia’s broader transition from newly-industrialized country (NIC) status and later to a developed or first world country status by 2020.
Having this background for Malaysia under its longest running Prime Minister that is Dr. Mahathir, one of the problems this paper will try to assess is to look back and revisit whether the seeds that Mahathir bin Mohamad had planted during his regime, examples of which were Vision 2020 and Asian values, became (un)popular domestic and foreign policies, that had grown and perhaps reaped success, later to say that what he had envisioned for Malaysia had been fully realized to where it is today.
Hence, the topics on the abovementioned title give a small subset of how Mahathir bin Mohamad looks at Malaysia in terms of government-business relations and his views on Asian values that affect his policies and governance of his plural and multi-ethnic nation-state.
Brief Reassessment About the Struggles of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) under PM Mahathir’s Leadership
Since its inception in 1946, UMNO has assiduously cultivated feudal traditions and values in order to portray itself as ‘protector’ of Malays, thereby reinforcing and legitimizing its hold on power (Oehlers, 2000:13). Even though Mahathir was once almost expelled in this powerful party back in 1969, he regained the supreme power in 1981 as the Prime Minister and held the premiership for over two decades with various accolades and honors.
Given the plural society set up of Malaysia (with 50.4% Malays, 23.7% Chinese, 11% Indigenous Peoples (IPs), 7.1% Indians, and 7.8% others) , the UMNO suffered a painful lost with the Chinese during the 1969 general election. Hence, the leading Malay party has long been struggling with other competing parties represented by other ethnic groups and ‘purist’ Islamic parties in Malaysia.
The 1969 Malaysian general election became a turning point in the political structures of Malaya. Because of UMNO’s failure to cast larger votes, nearly all of the opposition parties had intimidated threats to prolong emergency rule. Consequently, UMNO needed to refurbish its influence within the Malay community and national security came to be premised on Malaysian politics. This eventually paved a way to learn from the historic fall down of the UMNO which caused the momentous 1969 ethnic riots (Nathan 1998; Oehlers 2000; Singh 2004).
In 1970s, the post-1969 national election paved to the restructuring of power that brought ramifications to Malaysia’s internal security. It visibly defined the equation of power between the indigenous and non-Malay communities. The lesson that Malay political processes was “overwhelming and unassailable”. Apparently, with the ethno-religious dynamics in Malaysian politics, it contributed to the construction of ‘communalism’. Under the rubric of communalism, the opposition Chinese came to be branded as ethnic ‘chauvinists’ whereas Malays who championed the community’s interests were endearingly labeled as ‘nationalists’ (Singh, 2004:11-12).
In the 1980s, UMNO dealt a heavy problem. This time, fuelled by the Islamic resurgence abroad and by the process of modernization and identity creation at home, Islamic fundamentalism reared its head in Malaysian politics. It threatened the position of the secular-based UMNO government (Singh, 2004:11).
To some extent, the threat was contained through the cooptation of progressivist Islamic elements, especially, at the height when Anwar Ibrahim, a protégé of Mahathir, was sacked as a Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister under the UMNO party. In 1999, Anwar was sentenced in a highly controversial trial to six years in prison for corruption and in 2000 to another nine years in prison for sodomy. However, in 2004, an appeals court reversed the second conviction and he was released.
In the late 1990’s especially during the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crises, UMNO under the leadership of Mahathir was credited for preventing its currency Ringgit to plummet, despite its neighboring East Asian countries felt the abrupt financial speculations and simultaneously Asian currencies fell due to widespread effects of the economic disaster. While the Asian financial crisis was still unfolding, the Malaysian government had already begun to draw lessons from the crisis and planning ahead on how to strengthen the architecture of their financial system to lessen the frequency and severity of future disturbances (Oehlers, 2000:98). Malaysia’s economy remained buoyant by pegging its currency and defied the prescriptions of Western envoys through the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to peg its currency which caused the ire of many Western economists and politicians. At that time, Mahathir condemned Western countries by saying that IMF and WB caused more burdens to Asian economies instead of helping to eradicate financial problems. Because of this, Mahathir openly thought of instituting an Asian Monetary Fund, challenging the role of the IMF, through his concoction of an East Asian Economic Caucus with Japan and China’s support but was later detested by the United States.
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (Wong, 2004), more than any other Asian politician, has consistently critiqued the 'west' for its arrogance, double standards, and discoursed on a new colonialism. In fact, Malaysia's position during the recent 1997 Asian financial crisis won both admirers and detractors. Detractors proclaimed its naiveté, abdication of neo-classical market approaches and Malaysia's human rights record, including its detention and internment of its then sacked deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim. On the other hand, admirers pointed to Mahathir's independence, anti-colonial position and the advancement of an alternative voice within the global matrix of realist politics. Malaysia's managing of the crisis under Mahathir, for example, challenged prevailing economic orthodoxy of liberalization and pointed the way to an alternative practice of national policy autonomy in the face of a seemingly unstoppable global tsunami of liberalization.
Nevertheless as hasty surprise news in 22 June 2002, during the last day of the annual assembly of the UMNO, an emotional Mahathir abruptly announced his resignation in his closing speech. Stunned party leaders mobbed the PM in a bid to dissuade him. But three days later, amid feverish rumor and speculation, UMNO unveiled a transition plan allowing for Mahathir's departure in October 2003, and maintained all current posts including those of a Prime Minister and Finance Minister.
New Economic Policy (NEP) as a Roadmap to Rich Vision 2020
In 1991, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad had articulated his dream of a prosperous Malaysian society through his speech, “Malaysia: The Way Forward” – a conceptualization of national security combining elements of idealism and realism (Nathan 1998: 42). In fact, the New Economic Policy (NEP) from 1970 to 1990 was a key strategy through which the Malays attempted to overcome their insecurity in the aftermath of the 1969 general election, which appeared to threaten their political dominance (Nathan 1998:518).
In the 70s-80s, NEP had been perceived as a mode for interventionism and a force for authoritarianism. It was during this period that the Barisan Nasional (BN), an alliance and a coalition of parties, was created. The class pressures arose as the Alliance’s political economy of laissez faire capitalism, reliance on primary commodity production, low-level import-substitution in industrialization and limited state assistance to the rural sector fell into the familiar neo-colonial mold of underdevelopment (Khoo Boo Teik, 1997:55). But the Barisan Nasional’s development strategy was to remake the Malaysian political economy in order to deal with the class pressures and ethnic demands which the Alliance was unable to satisfy. Although, the NEP’s premises were that of poverty, Malay resentment on inter-ethnic income inequalities, and an ethnic division of labor which lay at the heart of the mass discontent with the Alliance.
Furthermore, the NEP relied on large-scale social engineering to transform Malay and Malaysian society (Khoo Boo Teik, 1997:59-60), specifically to dismantle Malaysia’s colonial legacy of a stark ethnic division of labor. The better publicized part of this social engineering programme involved the creation of a new class of Malay capitalists and professionals, or what officially came to be called a “Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community” (BCIC).
However in 1990s because of economic policies that reduced the state’s role in the economy, on the other hand, it still motivated the same objective of strengthening Bumiputera of the Malaysian economy. Such strategies for Malay ethnic survival and security included “Malaysia Incorporated”, deregulation, and the suspension of NEP implementations (Sundaram 1989: 42).
While PM Mahathir had conceded that the NEP may need to be abolished and that it was a bad policy in the long run. From the onset of the NEP, critics had always pointed out that it, like most welfare programmes, has very limited effect on the groups it is intended to help. But Mahathir was adamant, saying the NEP has made Malays “lazy” and prone to rely on “the easy way and quick way.”
Because of this, Mahathir expressed his disappointment that after 22 years at the helm of the nation-state he has failed to change the Malay mindset, by stating this:
“Mostly I feel disappointed because I achieved too little result from my task – the task of making my race a successful race, a race that is respected, a race that is honorable, a race that is highly regarded. I beg your pardon because I have failed.”
But in an effort to emulate the achievements of some successful industrialized countries in Asia like Japan and South Korea, Mahathir (Oehlers, 2000:214-215) provided a fresh twist to the programs and initiatives from NEP in his goal to encourage the emergence of the new Malay capitalist class. It is noteworthy to know that though efforts to promote a Malay capitalist class were certainly the centerpiece of the new strategy to ensure the fruits of economic growth would not fall to just a small minority of elite Bumiputeras.
Hence, the early Mahathirist program appeared to be corporatist-nationalists adventure which might also resolve the problems of NEP implementation. Dr. Mahathir also instituted the vision behind the early Mahathirist campaigns and exhortations like: bersih, cekap, amanah (clean, efficient, and trustworthy), kepimpinan melalui teldan (leadership by example), “Look East” , “Privatisation”, “Malaysia Incorporated”, penyerapan nilai-nilai Islam (assimilation of Islamic values), and “Asian values” (Khoo Boo Teik, 1997:63).
But with Mahathir’s implementation of privatization and Malaysia Inc. policies, after all, it pointed to a new state-capital alliance that the NEP had suddenly ruptured.
Although, writes KS Nathan, the NEP has been replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP), the basic contours of Bumiputera supremacy with a strong Malay population that helps Malaysia’s political economy remain intact under the leadership of the UMNO. After all, the new UMNO elite created largely by the NEP. Consequently, economic nationalism in Malaysia strengthened the link between Malay ethnicity and Malay economic security (Nathan 1998:519).
When Malaysians (K.S. Nathan, 1998) immensely felt the benefits of economic success through the formidable economic formula of Mahathir’s leadership - a brand new vision had been introduced, stepping forward to another bigger ladder. The Malaysia Vision 2020. The Vision 2020, as both conception and strategy of Malaysian nation-state aimed on the following conditions:
- to promote an outward looking Malaysian society
- to infuse society with strong moral and ethical values
- to ensure that the state is democratic, liberal and tolerant, caring, economically just and equitable, progressive and prosperous
- and to develop an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and resilient.
Therefore, to underpin the development process in Malaysia, here’s an excerpt from Mahathir’s speech…we came up with a concept of ‘Malaysia Inc.’ whereby the public and private sectors worked together to develop the country…(as a result) the private sector has prospered from collaboration rather than confrontation with officialdom (Mahathir 1995:11).
TABLE 1 (Matrix on Malaysia’s Vision 2020)
MALAYSIA VISION 2020
Political a stable Malaysia geared toward resolving political, economic, social religious, and ethnic issues within a broad framework of consensus and compromise.
Ideological a growing national confidence in Malaysian values, general acceptance if not tolerance of democracy Malaysian-style, commitment to the basic values of a free enterprise economy, and a legacy of success in overcoming the communist threat to the nation.
Economic a country that has by and large achieved the redistributive targets of the twenty-year New economic Policy resulting in an economically confident Malay (Bumiputera) community that is presumably more sensitive to the needs of other Malaysians.
Social a strengthened feeling among all Malaysians that the causes leading to the May 13, 1969 racial riots have been addressed and that a similar recurrence can be averted by good political management, mutual tolerance, and the promotion of interracial goodwill and harmony.
Regional the development of political, economic, and security mechanisms for expanding cooperation and reducing regional tension – that is, the creation of an atmosphere that is conducive to Malaysian national interests.
International a growing capacity to articulate issues that affect a wider spectrum of humanity in line with changing global interests and priorities (Nathan 1995: 220-37).
Elements of Economic Success in Malaysia
It is deemed that the concept of planned development – the attainment of rational targets based on competition and free enterprise as envisaged under Vision 2020 will eventually reduce NEP-based racial discontent (on the part of non-Malays) and presumably erase the prevailing Bumiputera-non-Bumiputera dichotomy in Malaysia’s political economy. (KS Nathan, 1998). This could only be achieved on the following conditions:
1. National integration based on multiethnic cooperation and partnership as well the trend toward deracialization.
2. The effective management for all forms of extremism, actual and potential, along the dimensions of race, religion, ideology or even political and economic doctrine.
3. The creation of a climate that will propel toward economic excellence in the next 30 years through wise management of the nation’s financial, industrial, natural and human resources, increased cooperation between the public sector and private sector, and a significant role for foreign investment in the nation’s industrial transformation.
The Mahathir Model of Asian Values
The concept of ‘Asian values’ was a popular idea in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and India, and also in some political circles in Japan. Coined in 1990s, predicted on the belief in the existence in Asian countries with a unique set of institutions and political ideologies which reflected the region’s culture & history. Because the proponents of the concept came from various cultural backgrounds, no single definition of the term exists.
Furthermore, at the height of the economic boom in Asia (Oehlers, 2000), it became fashionable to attribute the success of the region to some notion of Asian values. It promoted the idea that it was the region’s common cultural heritage and value system that largely lay behind its superior economic performance (Hofheinz and Calder 1982; Lodge and Vogel 1987; Berger 1988; Pye 1998; Hofstede and Bond 1988; Tai 1989; Martellaro 1990; Oehlers 2000).
The politicized nature of this debate derives partly from the manner in which "Asian values" are often pitted, usually falsely, against "Western values“ as another ambiguous concept. Of course commentators such as Mahathir bin Mohamad usually speak in terms of a renaissance of "Asian values", in parallel to an economic renaissance, in contrast to socially and economically deteriorating Western societies.
At the broad level, Dr. Mahathir’s articulation of Asian values (Oehlers, 2000:215) may be seen as an attempt to underpin and legitimize a state-led strategy to restructure the economy and propel Malaysia towards developed-country status. Beyond this, his Asian values provided a very effective response to critics. At the domestic level, he was able to establish some respectability and legitimacy of power to counter the accusations of detractors. Those critics could be portrayed as “unAsian” contaminated by alien Western ideas and agents of Western imperialism.
But at the close of five hundred years of European expansion (Harper, 1997) in Asia, a new Zeitgeist has arisen: the ‘Asian values’. The idea has been given wide international exposure, especially by intellectuals in the United States. It has formed the basis of a grand historical narrative in which they can locate themselves in the aftermath of the cold war. But for Mahathir’s point of view (Oehlers, 2000:216), by posing his actions as a product of unique Asian culture, he had successfully achieved a case in the international arena to justify his pursuit of state-led development. Mounting Western criticisms of practices in Malaysia during his regime, could now be safely deflected and dismissed as the “rude”, “insensitive”, and “misinformed” interjections of another race lacking any comprehension of Asian values, practices and aspirations.
East-West Dichotomy of Mahathir’s Asian Values
Culture is a construct and sometimes it is innate. In the case of Asian values, which is trying to find a place to become a universal concept, it was disliked by westerners because it carried features of ‘inferiority complex’ and ‘otherness’ of the Asians. This profound bedazzlement stems debates and dichotomy in an East-West point of views. In the long run, there is a guarded acknowledgement that Asian societies will have to create room for intellectual enquiry and to address issues of human rights and political liberties, for instance. It is no longer adequate to say that the record of modernizing governments justifies their right to rule, and this remains a big question by liberal democracies in the West against some Asian societies.
In Malaysia for example, the concept of Asian values was embraced partly because it reconciled Islam, the religion of the Malays, with the Confucianism of the ethnic Chinese, and Hinduism of the Indian descents, thereby helping to create a sense of common values between different ethnic and religious groups in those countries.
Cultural determinism (Inoguchi & Newman, 1997) argues that cultural values condition modes of social and economic organization, including patterns of political relationships, political participation, citizenship and government. Advocates of Asian values maintain that there are clear and often sharp differences between the values and traditions in the East and in the West. They argue that Asians tend to value community and Westerners value the individual. Whereas Asians appreciate order and harmony while Westerners appreciate personal freedom. Meanwhile, some western stereotypes refer to ‘Asian values’ as ethics on saving and thriftiness, insistence on hard work, respect for leaders and family loyalty. Whereas, for some Asian leaders like Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla, he defines Asian values as placing emphasis on cooperation over competition.
In the interim, the east-west dichotomy which the Asian values discourse has sprouted and even branched out to discuss issues on rights versus security. Dr Mahathir argues that the supposedly universal human rights documents and treaties actually privilege Western values to the detriment of Asian values. Instead, the Vienna Declaration of 1993 reaffirms that all human rights are 'universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.’
Also, the Mahathir Model of Asian values (Mendes, 1994) tends to emphasize the social and moral decay of the West in comparison to the newfound alternative model of Asian development. He as well would want reconcile the apparent contradiction by subsuming Malaysia’s distinctive national character in a broader obeisance to Asian values.
On the issue of political governance, vis a vis the issue of authoritarian tendencies of Mahathir in its pursuit of a Malaysian-style soft democracy compared to a western-style liberal democracy. In 2000, Dr Mahathir warned his fellow Asian nations that too much democracy can lead to violence and instability. On the other hand, the annual UN Human Development Report released in July 2002 argues that moving toward democracy actually makes for more stable societies, rebutting the argument that a slower shift to democracy is necessary to maintain order.
Asian leaders deny the weakening of cultural values in the context of the internationalization of production, rapid growth and advances in communication. As Mahathir bin Mohamad wrote, “Asian modernization has occurred as an inevitable stage of our history, not because we were Europeanized or Americanized”. Yet democratization and heightening political awareness have brought a political lexicon to East Asia (referring to Northeast and Southeast) which is common to - and perhaps emanated from - Western political thought, although this is not to say that democratization is Westernization (Inoguchi & Newman, 1997).
Authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states use arguments of cultural relativism and homegrown models of democracy, but are there a universalization of ideas and norms. If not embraced and managed, this is a source of friction for the future.
In the end, Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad steadfastly proclaimed that there is a strong correlation between rapid economic growth and strong, stable governments in East Asia, for together they provide the stability and consistency so essential to long-term investment and economic progress.
Critiques of Asian Values
A frequent criticism is that the idea of "Asian values" is most promoted by the elites who benefit from authoritarian rule, rather than the wider populace of their nation (KS Nathan, 1998).
Amartya Sen, Aung San Suu Kyi, Kim Dae Jong have been some of the concept's strongest critics. For other critics of the concept, they argue that no universal "Asian" value system exists, because the cultural diversity of Asia is too great for there to be a single set of common values across the region. In fact, the concept of "Asian values" began to lose currency after the Asian financial crisis weakened the economies of many Asian countries.
For many western academic writers and scholars (Inoguchi & Newman, 1997), they deem that Asian values are invariably discussed in the context of an East-West dichotomy. This increases the tendency to exaggerate and generalize, and leads one to conclude that the debate is more political than substantive. They feel that "Asian values" advocate and celebrate the community over individualism.
Hence, coming from the thoughts of Dr. Mahathir himself, in his pronouncement during the 29th International General Meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council in Washington, when he delivered a paper on “The Asian Values Debate”, right on the ball, he referred to the Asian Values Debate as being defensive in nature. More so, he deemed by saying that, “it was right and about time that Asia too be accorded with regard and high esteem that was its due…that there was a belief among many in the West that their values and beliefs were universal; that the advocates and champions of Asian values were merely justifying oppression, dictatorship and uncivilized behavior.” At the end, he called for “mutual respect’ among nations.
Conclusion
As K.S. Nathan deems, the principal architects of the nation’s survival strategies have been the nation-state leaders. Great leaders are judged by history. In the case of Mahathir bin Mohamad, a former Prime Minister of the Bumiputeras, he had carved the future direction of his beloved country. His Vision 2020 and Asian values using the Malay customs and traditions of ‘good neighborliness’ and ‘good relations’ have been instrumental to where Malaysia is in today. Indeed, the role of Mahathir bin Mohamad in injecting a personal vision into Malaysia’s national security formulation has been singularly instrumental to Malaysia’s present high profile in world forums. Dr. Mahathir believes that multiethnic and plural societies like his country must continuously reinvent the nation-state to strengthen national security and promote regional stability.
Looking back at Asian Values, Fukuyama himself, argues that there’s an interconnection of family ties, citizenship and society which is quite different from most generalizations. Although, the West has difficulties in defining and upholding the "common good" and reconciling it with the aspirations of individualism and liberty. At the end of the day, both Asian and Western countries must recognize and mutually respect their differences than imposing and challenging each other’s values. As long as these values, like the case of ‘Asian values’, are appropriately helpful for nation-states to preserve traditions and customs and alleviate the conditions of the majority, there is no need to contend and imitate Western values. If some Western values are seen as appropriate for the betterment of citizens in Asian countries, then it is also good to borrow and modify these values to suit in local cultures.
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