Ethnic Conflict, Secessionism, and Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Copyright © 2010 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

“In any successful negotiation, everyone wins.
The objective should be agreement, not victory”

The issues on ethnic conflict, secessionism and terrorism have sprouted a plethora of theories and methodologies in most disciplines of social sciences which had significant contributions to history, anthropology, sociology, political science and area specializations of international studies and asian studies. Only by fleshing out issues and challenges could we see gaps concerning both the general nature of ethnic conflict and the political importance on ethnicity, which certainly will encompass major issues like secessionism and terrorism.

When does ethnicity crowd out other identities such as state, society, tribe or nation and trigger conflict? When does ethnic conflict become national identity and what is the relationship between the two? Why some ethnic conflicts lead to interstate war or clash of faiths and ideologies? Why some ethnic conflicts turn to secessionist movements? Why ethnic conflicts are sometimes linked to the global challenges of terrorism? Throughout the twentieth century until today, scholars from various disciplines of social sciences and area specialists focus their work in analyzing and answering issues as well as challenges concerning ethnic conflict, secessionism and terrorism.

This paper shall review theoretical, conceptual, epistemological and methodological views on security issues, highlighting empirical data and case studies for ethnic conflict, separatism, and terrorism in Southeast Asia.


Conceptual Issues

Richard Jenkins (1997) argues that sociologists and anthropologists traced back ethnicity from its ancient origin which means ethnos, referred to a range of situations in which collectivity of humans lived and acted together, hitherto, typically translated today as people or nation. But its early and influential sociological reference to ethnic groups can be found in Max Weber’s Economy and Society (1922). Also, Jenkins (1997), Ellen and Ikenberry (1999), Adelman (2000), and Rudolf (2003), agree that ethnicity can be lost, discovered, or simply invented, since ethnicity and ethnic identity are social constructs and ethnic identity is subjective based on beliefs about common ancestry or shared historical past. Furthermore, Ikenberry (1999) notes that the number of conflict between individual groups waving the banner of ethnicity has risen.

Thomas Spira (2003) claims that an ethnic group consists of people who identify themselves or identified by others in cultural terms, such as language, religion, tribe, nationality, and possibly race. Meanwhile James Kurth (2003) believes that ethnic conflict has wider scope that ranges from differences in cultural traditions and historical legacies, uneven socioeconomic opportunities which can stoke violence among ethnic groups, political disorder which create a security dilemma and religious differences. Nevertheless, ethnic conflict can evolve to become a secessionist movement and / or faction of terrorist bandits.

David Brown (2005) stresses that ethnic conflict is the political, social and economic environment of a certain state are only contingently related to ethnicity and that what is intrinsic to ethnicity is its ideological character as a psychological political kinship myth.

Secession is the act of withdrawing from an organization, union, or political entity. Typically there is a strong issue difference that drives the withdrawal. The word derives from the Latin term secessio.

According to Sholehuddin A. Aziz, in the 1990s Southeast Asian Islam has been dubbed by leading international media such as Newsweek and Time magazines as "Islam with a smiling face". But today the region is increasingly regarded as being in a process of rapid radicalization with the rise of some militant groups; and worse still, the Muslim region of Southeast Asia is now perceived by some as a potential "hotbed of terrorism”

Although, the universal definition of terrorism is still contentious, it is better to comparatively discuss the contents used by some Southeast Asian countries. Terrorism according to UN’s Secretary General Kofi Annan is the use of “violence against civilians for political reasons”. In Singapore, regulations made under its United Nations Act avoid any reference to motive, looking only at whether the “use of threat is intended or reasonably regarded as to (1) influence the Government or any government; (2) intimidate the public or section of the public. On the other hand, in Indonesia it highlighted terrorism as the use of “violence or the threat of violence to create a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear in the general population or to create mass casualties, by forcibly taking the freedom…” Hence, in the Philippine definition, it is the “premeditated use or threatened use of violence or means of destruction perpetrated against innocent civilians or non-combatants…” Similarly, it is apparent that some Southeast Asian governments see that terrorist groups weave political objectives to their cause; violence is always a means; and ebb fear to citizens.


Theoretical Framework

Postmodernist like Bjorn Moller (1996) typically is in favor of widening and/or refocusing the security discourse. He deems that the concept of security should be less state-centric such as nations or ethnics or even individual, which can be applied to the concept of security of ethnic conflict, separatism and even terrorism. In fact, he argues that postmodernist theory has primarily been applied to theories of culture, and comparatively, it can be analyzed concentrating on the mainstream IR theory of Realism. His claims on postmodernism’s partiality in understanding conflicts and wars can be summed up, following his arguments that postmodernism advocates a de-essentialization of concepts, that have no correct meaning, for the simple reason that there is nothing outside the text, with which to compare them. Nevertheless, in his assessment he sees that postmodernists appear to have been posed themes such as identity, be it national, ethnic or religious, secessionism and terrorism.

Meanwhile, other paradigms used in studying security issues such as ethnic conflict, secessionism and terrorism can be attributed to the prestigious and renowned Copenhagen School that introduced society as a referent object (societal security) to complement the state. Collins (2003) deems that in the context of third world security, the elite usually determines what constitutes security, and more often than not, political stability, economic success, and social harmony are sought to achieve “regime security,” which the elite erroneously treats as synonymous with “national security”.


Empirical Data/Case Studies

A. Ethnic Conflict

1. The Chams of Indochina

The Chams of Cambodia have been suffering a long time discrimination in Indochina, after the fall of the first great Indianized kingdom – the Champa, even today its origin still happen to be debatable among scholars. In 192 CE came the earliest record of Champa by Chinese chroniclers. In these dynastic annals the people of Lin-yi, or Champa were described as having dark skin, deep-set eyes, turned up noses, and frizzy hair. At the peak of their power, about 12 centuries ago, the Chams controlled rich and fertile lands stretching from north of Hue, in central Annam, to the Mekong Delta in Cochinchina. Yet today Vietnamese cities like Da Nang and Nha Trang dominate these regions. Only mysterious brick temples, known familiarly as "Cham Towers", dot the skyline around Thap Cham and Po Nagar, Cha Ban and My Son, while in Cambodia the name of an eastern province and its capital, Kampong Cham, remain as mute testimony to the passing of a kingdom. The question arises, what happened? And where are the Chams - those that survive - today?

In fact, Phuong (2004) accounts that Cambodia’s two powerful neighboring countries, Vietnam and Thailand, have stretched their military prowess to the weakening Khmer civilization and the Chams suffered diasporas and exiled to the borders of Vietnam and Thailand. Consequently, Chams have been suffering second-class citizenship and massive repression from foreign masters who adopted their ways of living. In common parlance, Thailand became Cambodia's "father" and Vietnam its "mother". The struggle between Thailand and Vietnam for control of Cambodia in the nineteenth century resulted in a period when Vietnamese officials, working through a puppet Cambodian king, ruled the central part of the country and attempted to force Cambodians to adopt Vietnamese customs. Several rebellions against Vietnamese rule ensued. The most important of these occurred in 1840 to 1841 and spread through much of the country. After two years of fighting, Cambodia and its two neighbors reached an accord that placed the country under the joint suzerainty of Thailand and Vietnam. This practice, common in the history of Indochina, crippled Cambodia's ability to recover a semblance of its former greatness.

In their arbitrary treatment of the Khmer population, the Thai and the Vietnamese were virtually indistinguishable. The suffering and the dislocation caused by war were comparable in many ways to similar Cambodian experiences in the 1970s. But the Thai and the Vietnamese had fundamentally different attitudes concerning their relationships with Cambodia. The Thai shared with the Khmer a common religion, mythology, literature, and culture. The Chakri kings at Bangkok wanted Cambodia's loyalty and tribute, but they had no intention of challenging or changing its people's values or way of life. The Vietnamese viewed the Khmer people as barbarians to be civilized through exposure to Vietnamese culture, and they regarded the fertile Khmer lands as legitimate sites for colonization by settlers from Vietnam. Thus, these ethnocentric attitudes of the Vietnamese toward the Cambodians are intrinsic to any colonizing country.

Today there are 77,000 Chams in Vietnam, living mainly in the coastal provinces and at the Mekong Delta. They are divided into two quite distinct religious communities: the Hindu Chams and the Cham Bani or Muslims. In fact, one of the most important chapters in the history of ASEAN diplomacy took place during the Cambodian conflict. The ASEAN-sponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly which called for durable and comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia, receiving consistent support from the international community.

B. Secessionism in Southeast Asia

1. The Cordillera People’s Movement (CPP/NPA)

The Gran Cordillera Central Mountains in northern Luzon is the homeland of several ethnic minority groups collectively known as “Cordillerans” or “Cordillera peoples”. In 1998, the Philippine government has formally established in the area the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). The Region is presently made up of six provinces, namely Benguet, Ifugao, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga, and Apayao. It was the underground Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) that initiated the establishment of a pan-Cordillera movement for self-determination. As early as 1974, the CCP branch for the mountain provinces proposed the establishment of an “Igorot Liberation Army (ILA)”, allegedly because the peoples in the region found it difficult to identify with the national revolution being waged by the CCP and its armed wing, New People’s Army (NPA). The said Party branch believed that this difficulty stemmed from the fact that the people on the area, more particularly the Ifugaos, did not see themselves as belonging to the broader Filipino nation (Castro 1987:27).

According to Castro (2002) the ILA Proposal, however, did not take off the ground because the national leadership of the communist movement disapproved it. In 1981, the CCP initiated efforts for the establishment of the Cordillera People’s Democratic Front (CPDF). The purposes of CPDF, however, were totally different from that of the ILA. These objectives were to win over Cordilleran intellectuals into the cause of the CCP and to attract other ethnic-based movements, such as the MNLF, into the fold of the CPP-NPA and its front organizations. Even before the CPDF was formally established, the communist movement suffered a setback when the entire armed company of the NPA in the Cordillera bolted out from its mother unit and founded the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA). The CPLA advocated for an independent socialist state for the Cordillera region as part of what is called “Federal Republic of the Philippines”. This new movement immediately gained influence especially among the indigenous members of the CPP-NPA who were also disenchanted with alleged ethnic discrimination within the communist organization. Most of the CPDF’s operations are coursed through its aboveground front organization – the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA).

Castro (2002) also stresses that the CPA has been at the forefront in the protests against several development projects in the Cordillera, which, it alleges, will adversely affect the indigenous peoples. This includes the opposition to the construction of the San Roque Multipurpose Plant (SRMP), a hydropower and irrigation dam, which is the biggest dam in Southeast Asia.

2. Bangsamoro People’s Struggle (MNLF/MILF)

In 1968, a Maguindanaon leader organized the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). The groups called for the establishment of an Islamic state in Mindanao. The Bangsamoro Liberation Organization (BMLO) succeeded the MIM. This time, the group organized by a Meranao datu (chieftain). The group sent ninety youths for military training in Sabah for eventual armed warfare in the southern Philippines. From this select group sprung the leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

Buazon and Castro (2002) deem that the triumvirate leadership of the MNLF represented the three major Muslim groups in Mindanao: the Meranao, Maguindanaon, and Tausug. Led by idealistic youths, the MNLF later on repudiated traditional Muslim leaders for kowtowing to Manila. It called for the establishment of a Bangsamoro Republik. It organized the Bangsamoro Army (BMA) to launch military operations against the armed hostilities between the MNLF and the Philippine military. The Mindanao war ceased upon the singing of the Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine Government and the MNLF. This agreement called for the establishment by the Philippine Government of an autonomous government for thirteen provinces in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. In exchange, the MNLF-BMA agreed to surrender its arm and many of its armed fighters went back to the fold of the law.

The Marcos government, however, reneged on its promise to give home rule for Muslim Filipinos. Many of the MNLF fighters went back to conduct guerilla warfare. The post-1976 scenario was marked by several splits with the MNLF, first by the MNLF-Reformist Group and later on by the Moro Islamic Liberation front (MILF). There are other groups such as the MNLF Lost Command, the Pentagon Group, and the Abu Sayyaf. In 1991, the Aquino government conducted a plebiscite in Mindanao leading to the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This was followed by a ceasefire agreement between the Ramos administration and the MNLF. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari eventually became the Governor of ARMM. MNLF fighters have also been integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the government has undertaken generous financial packages for Muslim communities.

In September 1996, the Philippine Government and MNLF both observed an uneasy ceasefire until a peace process came about which culminated in the signing of the peace agreement. In 2001 ARMM election, the Arroyo government backed Parouk Hussin and won as a governor. Misuari boycotted the electoral exercises, leading to armed clashes between his loyal followers and the Philippine military. After Misuari’s forces were quickly quelled, Misuari left for Malaysia where he was taken into custody and detained by the Malaysian authorities. In early January, Malaysia deported Misuari to the Philippines and is currently facing rebellion charges while kept in a detention facility of the PNP in Santa Rosa, Laguna.

Buazon (2002) thinks that there are problems facing the implementation of the GRP and MNLF peace agreement, such as the 1) integration of the MNLF fighters into the AFP, 2) release of funds to finance livelihood activities, 3) infrastructure projects in ARMM. The reality remains though that the Muslims are themselves divided along ethnolinguistic lines. While the GRP-MNLF peace agreement is being upheld by the current ARMM leadership of Parouk Hussin, a breakaway faction of the Tausug-led MNLF known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the members of which are Maguindanao Muslims, this group is presently waging a guerilla war against the Philippine military. There is a currently a ceasefire while a peace process is also being put in place by the government resulting in a formal agreement being signed in Jakarta, Indonesia late in 2001 to observe a cessation of hostilities. The peace process with the MILF involves tackling the issue of territories. The MILF wants the government to recognize certain areas in Mindanao under MILF control as legitimate territories already of the said rebel Muslim group. Another sticking point has to do with the MILF applying the Muslim Sharia (Islamic Law) court on criminals, and executing these criminals by firing squad, thereby defying the jurisdiction of the Philippine police authorities and the country’s judicial system in dealing with such matters.

3. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)

GAM’s strategy is to base their claims on a universally legitimized principle of national self-determination. The Achenese Sultanate represents itself as a legitimate sovereign actor in the international state system. The secessionist group also uses the ‘remedial theory of secession’, which states that the Indonesian state has lost the moral right to govern Aceh, but according to some political analysts, it only strengthens that Aceh was once part of Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia’s responses to these claims hold the belief that the military is given authority by the Government to say that Aceh is part of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia that must be maintained until the last drop of blood but after the South Asian tsunami in Aceh peace negotiations with Indonesian Government has mended their differences with the help of the Dutch government as the Third party mediator.

C. Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Collins (2003) argues that Southeast Asia has been regarded as important in the war on terrorism because it is home to a number of groups that resort to violence to further their cause and because Islam is the predominant religion in the region. This has led to an overly simplistic assumption that Southeast Asia is a hotbed of Islamic radicalism, where a number of Al-Qaeda operatives can function.

The terrorist threat in the Philippines, which is principally posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group, the Communist Terrorist Movement, with links to Jemaah Islamiya and Al Qaeda, is very real and imminent, according to FBI intelligence, which has been active in combating terrorism in the region. The porous borders of the Philippines, the mass transportation system on land, air and sea, crowded shopping malls and numerous populated centers make the country highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

In post-9/11 event, three out of five deadliest terror attacks worldwide occurred in Southeast Asia. These are the following: the 2002 Bali Bombing, the 2004 Superferry nine in the Philippines, and the 2005 Bali Bombing which amassed more than a hundred casualties. Two notorious terrorist organizations emerged into the international limelight because of deadly tactics and possible link to the feared Al Qaeda Network. The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

1. Jemaah Islamiya (JI)

In 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) caught the international limelight when its members bombed Bali, a premier resort in the region, since the September 2001 terror attack. JI seeks to establish a Pan-Islamic religion across Southeast Asia. In coordination with Al Qaeda and alleged local supporters across Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. JI can break down its command structure and allow terrorist cells to operate independently and spread out operatives in different parts of the region. Based on reports, the number of Indonesian JI members has dropped by 17% or from 40 in 2003 to 33 in 2004. Key arrest and neutralization of known JI personalities such as Taufik Rifqi and Fathur Roman Al-Ghozi, respectively. Until today, the prominent imam Bashir is till in jail, claimed by Indonesian intelligence to be the mastermind behind explosive terror attacks in their country.

2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

The Abu Sayyaf Group, whose name means “Bearer of the Sword,” split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991. The founder and the leader of Abu Sayyaf until 1998 was Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani. The government’s all out war against the ASG has brought down the ASG’s membership from 1,269 in year 2000 to 420 as of year-end 2004 and also saw the decline of their firearms (see chart 2).

They made news in 1991 when their first major terrorist activity was a grenade attack in which two foreign women were killed. The following year, Abu Sayyaf militants hurled a bomb at a wharf in the southern city of Zamboanga where the MV Dolores, an international floating bookstore manned by Christian preachers, was docked. In 1994, Abu Sayyaf militants kidnapped three Spanish nuns and a Spanish priest in separate incidents. In April 1995 Abu Sayyaf carried out a vicious attack on the Christian town of Ipil in Mindanao. Gunmen razed the town center to the ground and shot 53 civilians and soldiers dead.

Five years later, this time ASG turned to kidnapping activities again, but not anymore the locals but instead victimized most foreign tourists to popular tourist destinations. In April 23, 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 foreign tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. That night when ten (10) Western tourists and eleven (11) Malaysian resort workers were abducted in the island resort of Sipadan; ASG fled across the sea border to their Jolo island stronghold. In that series of events, three-member French TV crew, a group of Philippine evangelists and an American, found themselves as unwilling guests of the Abu Sayyaf. On 27 May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including one US citizen, were murdered.


Supporting Points

The issue on ethnic conflict, secessionism or separatism, and terrorism together boil up the issue of creating ‘imagined’ nation-states. An extension of colonialism, in which a ‘nation’ or the people resist foreign and outside powers from their own territory, thus, insinuating their own independence and also uplifting their integrity. Lifting Thackrah’s definition of the term ‘nationalism’ that is, ‘the sentiment founded on common cultural characteristics that unites a population, usually producing a desire for separatism and sometimes resort to terrorism. Such perception definitely has bearing to what a ‘nation’ is. In the case studies mentioned above, apparently, religious affiliation, ethnic identity and territorial expansionism are root causes of conflicts in the region. According to Ernest Renan’s entitled book “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (What is a Nation?). He stated that a nation, being a spiritual principle, is not born out of commonality especially in ethnicity, language, and religion. To quote him, “a nation is a spiritual principle, the outcome of the profound complications of history; it is a spiritual family not a group determined by the shape of the earth. We have now seen what things are not adequate for the creation of such spiritual principle, namely race, language, material interests, religious affinities, geography and military necessity.”

Comparing Thackrah’s definition of a nation-state to Renan’s is rather opposite. The first intellectual deems that the western thought puts ethnicity, language and religion as primary bases in identifying the sense of belongingness of people while Renan’s thinking advances that it is aspiration, not and regardless of these cultural elements, that unifies. Furthermore, Renan’s idea equates to unity in diversity by integration while Thakrah’s view is suggesting secessionism meaning disintegration per se.


Conclusion

The otherwise general peace and security being experienced by the nations in Southeast Asia is punctuated by the threats or tensions arising from ethnic tensions, separatist insurgencies, and terrorism. But there are bright prospects to enhance security in the region: one is the increased cooperation and aggressive dialogue between and within concerned parties through negotiations to resolve issues. Second, several peace processes to end conflicts are moving forward to possible successful conclusion. Lastly, there must be a concerted international cooperation and efforts to fight terrorism in the region.


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