Blogger's Notes:
Commentary of an Academic
(Copyright @ 2015 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved).
by Chester B Cabalza
"Both China and India are on the fast track of economic and social development, demonstrating to the world the bright future of the two countries and the promise of a revitalized Asia" - Prime Minister Hu Jintao, People’s Republic of China
Introduction
Asia is vast. It is the largest and most populous continent in the world. Given its size, complexity, longevity, and diversity, Asia is more a cultural concept incorporating its four geographical regions than a homogenous physical entity. Culturally, four earliest great civilizations developed interdependently in Asia with the rise of: Sumerian/Mesopotamian civilization in West Asia; the Indus civilization in South Asia; the Sinitic civilization in Northeast Asia; and the agrarian/maritime civilization in Southeast Asia.
But two longest geographical centers in Asia survived by the Indus (Indian) and Sinitic (Chinese) civilizations are now re-emerging in the 21st century, reversing the tide and centrifugal force in trade and commerce, power and wealth, and leveling off the playing field in a fast globalizng world.
The Dragon’s Peaceful Rise
“The Chinese poet had written: "All people have their day, and the new generation will invariably succeed the old."
China is the world’s oldest continuous civilization but its official policy on peaceful rise must be inferential. However, too few detailed case studies exist of specific interactive situations involving the People’ Republic of China (PRC) to lay foundation for systematic generalization (Macridis, 1998), until lately when it opened up to the world.
Shared memories and beliefs shape international relations of all countries. One way that memories of events are passed from generation to generation is via writing and interpreting of history. In few countries no history play a greater role than in China (Graver, 2003).
For more than two millennia, successive imperial dynasties and generations of Confucian scholar-officials found in the history of earlier eras explanations of the moral waxing and waning of society and its institutions. From this they drew conclusions about how the affairs of their own era ought to be governed. The legitimacy of each dynasty was closely tied to this historical explanation, and each dynasty produced an orthodox history justifying its rise to power.
In the case of China, Marxism, with its search for historical “laws”, coincided with and reinforced China’s hoary concern with the past. In Marxism, as in Confucianism, the fundamental workings of society and the relationship between power and morality is revealed through a study of history. The propensity of both Confucianism and Marxism to explain and justify policy in terms of historical principles probably contributed to the intellectual appeal of various grand theories of international relations to the leaders of the PRC. The PRC leaders have usually felt a need to frame their foreign policies in terms of broad historical epochs and categories.
By 1972, Beijing had formulated a new grand scheme, the Three Worlds Theory, in which the US and the USSR made the First World, the economically developed capitalist and socialist countries other than US and the USSR made up the Second World War, and the developing countries constituted the Third World. Historical necessity and progress required, according to this theory, that the Second and Third worlds unite against the First World. While these various historical schemes were rooted in China’s immediate political situation and needs, they also reflected traditional Chinese notions about the appropriate relationship between power and morality. Power had to serve a moral purpose which was derived from a study of history.
The Myth of National Humiliation
The central aspect of recent Chinese history, as interpreted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is the Chinese people’s struggle against the “humiliation” of China by foreign imperialism during the 110 years between 1839 and 1949. To the CCP, the era between the first opium war and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China is essentially a chronicle of wars imposed by aggressive and arrogant imperialist powers, and, increasingly, harsh terms forced on China the consequence of its defeat in those wars.
The century of National Humiliation can be termed myth, but not because the episodes pointed to by Chinese scholars did not occur. It is mythic, rather, in the sense that the fact of belief is more important than what actually occurred. The story of National Humiliation is constantly told and retold in Chinese schools, in mass media, and in countless mandatory study sessions attended by Chinese citizens. Belief in the century of National Humiliation is virtually universal in China; even most dissidents share it.
The myth of National Humiliation stands at the center of the political culture of PRC. It has greatly influenced China’s approach to the world by giving rise to an ardent determination to end all aspects of China’s “humiliation”, to blot out all remnants of China’s past weakness and degradation.
But other scholars differ regarding the impact of the foreign influence on China in the century 1839 to 1949. Some attribute it to endogenous variables as population growth, exhaustion of available arable land, and the emergence of new social elites and classes.
The experience of National Humiliation was a major factor impelling many young Chinese to embrace the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism in the early 20th century. Lenin’s theory about the evolution of industrial capitalism into imperialism and his observations about the rapacious nature of imperialism seemed to fit with the facts as seen by many young Chinese.
The Japanese invasion of China during the 1930s was, from the Chinese perspective, the bitter culmination of the century of National Humiliation.
The Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945 was a brutal, searing experience for China. Japanese occupation forces were imbued with a spirit of contempt for China and the Chinese, and they often acted barbarically. The murder of perhaps 200,000 civilians in Nanjing after the fall of the city in December 1937, is an example.
The Japanese aggression from 1931 to 1945 had a deep impact on PRC foreign relations. Fears of Japan rooted in that experience contributed to China’s 1949 decision to ally with the USSR and again in the 1980s to the decision to normalize relations with Moscow as Tokyo reemerged as a major military power.
The Traditional and Modern Chinese World Order
Perhaps, the most bitter aspect for Chinese growing contact with the west, is the fact that, China was inferior to the foreign powers in the very areas of Confucianism which was long held to be the proof of China’s superiority over others. Confucianism had held that skill in the art of governance and superior material well-being were proof of China’s higher level of civilization.
By the time of the Tang dynasty (618-907 AD), educated Chinese generally accepted the idea that lands populated by Chinese and making up the Chinese cultural area ought to be united under a single ruler. This idea was handed down from generation to generation and still has a significant influence on the behavior of China’s leaders.
The Triangular Alignments:
- Alignment with the USSR against the US (1949-1963)
- Alignment with the US against the USSR (1972-1982)
- Opposition to both the US and USSR (1945-1949 and 1963-1970) and cordial relations with both superpowers (1986-1992)
In 1949 to 1950 there was a more balanced PRC relation with the US and the Soviet Union. Several factors combined to rule out a more neutral PRC orientation toward the superpowers in 1949. Mao and other CCP leaders were dedicated Marxist-Leninists. Though critical of Stalin’s “great-power chauvinism,” they considered the USSR a progressive, socialist country and the US a monopoly capitalist, imperialist country.
Foreign Influence and Maintaining Chinese Essence
The problem Chinese faced, as they realized that they would have to adopt many ideas and techniques from the west, was how to assimilate western thoughts without allowing those foreign thoughts to corrode China’s distinctive moral essence.
While western science, technology, and organizational methods are welcome, these imports are not to be allowed to erode China’s distinctive, superior and socialist morality. In 1980, Deng authorized suppression of the movement of dissident young intellectuals advocating western-style liberty. In 1983, there was another campaign against western-derived “spiritual pollution”. In 1987 another campaign was launched against ‘bourgeois liberalism.” In 1989, another clampdown on all forms of heterodox thinking and activity.
The Retreat from the Revolution
China’s relation with Southeast Asia, started since the Western Han times (206 BCE-220 CE) through trade and commerce, was diplomatic rather than cultural. The emperors of China assumed the status of paramount patrons and protectors of the rulers in Southeast Asia, a status that was acknowledged by the dispatch of occasional diplomatic envoys to the Chinese court.
Bordering on China itself, Tonkin (in the northern area of present Vietnam) felt Chinese power and influence more directly, than any other part of Southeast Asia. Successive regimes in China brought Tonkin under control, and the eastern Han followed the example about the middle of the first century CE.
In modern times, this is apparent with the succeeding love-hate relation of both communist capitals of Peking and Saigon at that period of the post-Cold War confrontations. In fact, (Graver, 2003:170) the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations in the late 1970s pushed Beijing toward disengagement from insurgent movements.
In November 1978, as the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation neared the point of war, Deng Xiaoping visited several Southeast Asian countries to rally support for China. Deng’s visit came shortly after a similar tour by Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, in which Dong had pledged that Vietnam would not support foreign insurgencies. Deng refused to make a similar promise, but argued that China would not let party-to-party ties interfere with the improvement of state relations.
In February 1981, Premier Zhao Ziyang went a step further, during a state visit to Bangkok, saying that CCP relations with Southeast Asian Communist parties were only “political and moral”, and that China would “make efforts” to ensure that relations with these parties, saying that it “would not affect our friendship and cooperation with ASEAN countries”.
China’s New Official Policy
There are four characteristics which distinguish ASEAN-China ties in the post-Cold War era: First, the disappearance of the ideological barriers that eventually paved the way for the restoration or establishment of diplomatic ties between China and all ASEAN states in 1991. Second, the importance of economic links that have created both convergent and divergent interests for the two sides. Third, the salience of the Spartly territorial disputes in shaping the ASEAN-China interactions. Fourth, the gradual emergence of multilateralism as a mode of diplomatic interaction between the PRC and ASEAN countries (Kuik Cheng-Chwee, 2005:103).
Simon Tay asks, why, then, East Asia now? Several factors are at play:
1) past economic crisis;
2) cooperation has grown; and
3) regionalism is a process for dealing with globalization.
In fact, Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2005:103) narrates that the attendance of the then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the opening session of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial meeting on July 1991, as a guest of Malaysia, was an important event for Sino-ASEAN relations.
This was followed by China’s presence in the ASEAN meeting in its capacity as the group’s consultative partner in 1992, as well as its attendance at the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994.
Together, these events marked the beginning of the multilateral process between China and the ASEAN States. According to Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2005), he agrees that Beijing’s move to engage itself in ASEAN activities since the early 1990s was part of the country’s “good neighborliness” policy and China now views multilateral institutions as useful diplomatic platforms that can be utilized to advance its own foreign policy objectives.
Such perceptual changes have slowly, but significantly, led to a greater emphasis on multilateral diplomacy in China’s ASEAN policy. Multilateralism strengthens regionalism and now plays a complementary, rather than a supplementary, role to bilateralism in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy towards ASEAN in the age of globalization.
The Elephant’s Roots of Look East Policy
“I reiterate India’s commitment to work with ASEAN and other East Asian countries to make the 21st century truly an Asian century” - Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, India
India has geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and it shares maritime boundaries as well as land borders with Southeast Asia. India’s association with Southeast Asia can be traced back to ancient times. No other country has influenced the region as much as India by way of religion, language, culture, and civilization. There is also enormous historical evidence to suggest that there were flourishing economic and cultural relations between India and the countries of Southeast Asia in the pre-colonial era.
In the first half of the 20th century, the common colonial past was a strong feature, which united India and Southeast Asia. India’s freedom struggle for independence was a great source of inspiration for the freedom movements in Southeast Asian nations. The first closer relations resurfaced against colonialism at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947. The move to end colonialism acted as the cohesive bond that brought India and Southeast Asia together. Furthermore, the Bandung Conference of 1955, which laid down the principle of peaceful coexistence, had given a new direction.
In the post-second war phase, global politics was defined by Cold War power politics and military alliance system. In the early sixties, the Cold War bloc politics caused a great deal of insecurity, which affected India’s relations with Southeast Asia, and both were placed at opposite sides of the Cold War divide. As a newly emerging country, India had tried to remain outside the alliance system and voiced its opinion through its Non-alignment policy. Indonesia also became a founding member of the Non-alignment movement. However, the regional geopolitical and strategic equation had changed due to the Cold War power politics. In the meantime, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed. India’s response to the formation of the ASEAN was not very encouraging. Earlier, India did not welcome South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).
India perceived that some of the ASEAN countries had direct defense link with the United States. India’s foreign policy, at one stage, was closely linked with the erstwhile Soviet Union, which led to unfavorable relations with the United States and her allies. It had difficult relations with China. At the same time, the stand of the Western powers was critical on the issue of Kashmir. It was a coincidence that the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam became close friends and the dynamics of the Cold War placed them on the opposite side of the ASEAN. India could not build good relations because they were pro-west and anti-communist. India’s stand on the issue of Vietnam and Cambodian crisis had created further mistrust among some ASEAN countries. Thus, India’s relations with ASEAN worsened since 1980s. However, the end of the Cold War had given a new opportunity to rehabilitate their relationship.
The ASEAN countries realized that India was becoming an important player in shaping the future political and security environment in Asia. They see India’s competitive strength in democratic tradition, resilience, and stability of India’s political institutions. In the meantime, economic liberalization, initiated by Prime Minister Rao in 1991, has given a new direction for the global economy with a special emphasis on economic diplomacy.
As a result, India formally shaped the Look East Policy to foster closer economic ties with its South and Southeast Asian neighbors with emphasis on renewing political and economic contacts with ASEAN members. This policy has led to making India a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN. This has resulted in a wider engagement and India becomes a Full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN at the fifth summit in Bangkok in December 1995. This institutional linkage further enhanced in July 1996 when India became a member of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which deals with strategic and political issues in the Asia Pacific region. In November 2002, the first ASEAN-India summit was held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia to mark a major milestone in integrating India into Southeast Asia. The fifth India-ASEAN summit recently held in Cebu, Philippines in January 2007 resolved to implement free trade agreement and is considered a significant breakthrough for the Look East Policy.
The Rise of China and India: Security Challenges
"Let us work together to enhance China-India strategic and cooperative partnership, build a world of enduring peace and common prosperity and create a bright future for our two countries and two peoples," - Prime Minister Hu Jintao, People’s Republic of China
An offshoot of the increasing economic power of the two giant countries in Asia, China and India are now playing major actors in many bilateral and multilateral engagements in the Asia-Pacific region.
Rajeshwar (2008) deems that China’s relations with India’s neighboring countries have always concerned India. Chinese and Indian analysts view events differently.
China-Pakistan Relations – China-Pakistan relations are not recent. The intention of China’s policy is to befriend all its neighbors. However, India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons capability, which extremely worries China that any escalation of conflicts over Kashmir could precipitate nuclear exchange with horrifying consequences. But Indian analysts see it the other way around, that China behaves differently by building strategic vantage points to India’s neighbors. Hence, China founded several naval projects from Pakistan to Bangladesh to Sri Lanka to Maldives, seen as China’s quiet encirclement of India.
The US Factor – India has been facing terrorism for quite some time and has acquired a lot of expertise from the US on this matter. However, the US has placed both China and India as key partners in achieving regional stability and harmony. It engages both nations now at a higher level. The relations between India and China are naturally bound to be affected by such rigorous engagement.
Nuclear Weapons – One of the key issues that caused turbulence in China-India relations was the Indian nuclear explosion in 1998. Nevertheless, China has targeted India since 1970s, and currently has 66 nuclear missiles that can reach all of India’s major cities and military bases. Chinese feelings toward India soured temporarily after India’s 1998 nuclear testing, though China insists it was not the tests themselves that they perceived as a threat. However, China asserts that India is not a major security concern to China today. But Chinese analysts feel that China should handle the requirements posed by India on a similar platform as they would for other countries also looking for nuclear power.
Environment and other Dimensions – There are a number of issues that concern both China and India, which, in a globalized world, are becoming important. Resource (water) and energy needs (including nuclear energy) in sustaining growth and development, even environmental issues, are aspects which are likely to govern their relations.
The Importance of ARF – Each member of the ARF has had a prior link to ASEAN. Apparently, ARF is built upon the structures of ASEAN. The reason why China engaged in multilateral forum like the ARF (its first involvement) is to shift its perception from a threat neighborhood to a friendly Big Brother after realizing the process of participating is not to isolate itself in the region. Copying it from the ASEAN model and operationalized on the basis of “ASEAN Way”, ARF features in the forms of informal, wide consultative, consensus and incremental approach. On the other hand, India has become a member of ARF in 1996. There has been the growing cooperation on security issues between India and ASEAN countries through dialogue and practical measures, as well as through the establishment of legal frameworks under the ARF. The ARF is the only political and security dialogue forum in the region. It helps India to work jointly with the ASEAN countries for ensuring regional peace and stability. India has, for many years, consistently urged the ARF to take up the issue of global terrorism which has remained one of the principal security challenges of present times.
Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
Hu Jintao quoted Chinese sage and philosopher Confucius, who had said, "One who wishes to achieve success should also help others achieve success," to illustrate the point that the rise of India and the rise of China are "not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing" and both countries can help each other in achieving larger developmental goals.
China and India Policies
China's “Good Neighborliness” Policy
Bilateralism:
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with each of the ten-member countries of ASEAN which prospered to become China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
Multilateralism
ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC;
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF);
ASEAN Plus Three (APT);
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM);
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);
China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA);
China-ASEAN Summit;
East Asia Summit (EAS)
India's "Look East" Policy
Bilateralism
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) between India and Singapore;
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Thailand
Multilateralism
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF);
Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-Sectoral Economic and Technological Cooperation (BIMSTEC);
Indo-ASEAN Summit;
East Asia Summit (EAS);
Kunming Initiative (KI);
Mekong Ganga Cooperation(MGC)
References
Brookes, Peter. (2001). Dragon’s Dance: The Evolving Security Situation in Northeast Asia, in Julian Weiss (Ed), Tigers’ Roar: Asia’s Recovery and Its Impact, Armonk: New York and London: England, An East Gate Book Publication.
Cabalza, Chester (2007). The Dragon’s Peaceful Rise: A New Dawn for Sino-Asean Relations. (Unpublished paper) University of the Philippines, Asian Center.
Cheng-Chwee, Kuik. (2005). Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration. Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, no.1:102-121.
Dilip Gogoi (2007). East through Northeast: India and Southeast Asia in the New Asia, (Unpublished Paper) Gauhati University, Assam, India.
Graver, John W. (2003). Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Rajeshwar, PS Col. (2008). India-China Relations: Its Implications on the Asean. National Defense College of the Philippines (thesis).
Schwarz, Adam. (2001). ASEAN, Asia, and the Rise of Regional Identity, in Julian Weiss (Ed), Tigers’ Roar: Asia’s Recovery and Its Impact, Armonk: New York and London: England, An East Gate Book Publication.
Tay, Simon, S.C. (2001). ASEAN, East Asia and the Pacific Rim: Thoughts on the New Regionalism, in Julian Weiss (Ed), Tigers’ Roar: Asia’s Recovery and Its Impact, Armonk: New York and London: England, An East Gate Book Publication.
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