Copyright © 2010 by Chester B. Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.
Chinese or Indian Discovery of the Philippines: A New Perspective
A new look in our history is currently in circulation now whether the Spaniards or the Chinese first discovered the Philippines. Spain called our country, the Philippines, in honor of King Philip, while based from Chinese records their chroniclers called one of our islands as Mai. In June 1993 Palawan archeological discovery, the wreck of a 15th century Chinese junk yielded thousands of artifacts including jars, ceramics, and coins bearing date of “1414” that coincided with the time frame of Admiral Zheng He’s expedition and circumnavigation of the world. These findings are now displayed prominently in our National Museum.
According to Ming dynasty annals, some of Zheng He’s ships were more than 140 meters long, larger than Santa Maria, the largest of the three ships of Columbus sailed almost a century later. From 1401 to 1433, under Admiral He, seven large naval expeditions some carrying as many as 28 thousand soldiers sailed throughout the China sea and Indian ocean.
China was the world’s foremost superpower in the 15th century under the Ming dynasty through its supremacy in education, invention, manufacturing, diplomacy and maritime outreach (Fidel V Ramos, page 46, China Rising, US Falling Behind? BizNews Asia 2011).
However, if we expand the context of history in Southeast Asia, particularly on the discovery of the Philippines, the region had been "Indianized" in first century A.D. - which meant that Indian governance, architecture, language and culture, or their ways of life were transported in Southeast Asia. The Philippines, boasted of its sophisticated "baranganic organizations", however, those who led these "barangays" carried Indianized titles such as "rajahs". In other words, it could be that Indians first discovered the Philippines, or perhaps Indonesians during the Indian-influenced Srivijayan orthogenetic or maritime empire based in Java, in which the Visayas group of islands was concocted by the Srivijayan voyagers (Cabalza, The Re-emergence of China and India, 2011).
From first century A.D. to 15th century, China and India were the world's major economies with the Roman empire through its "Pax Romana" as their counterpart in the West. Now and in the coming decades, China and India will re-emerge as the planet's economic superpowers, co-existing with the United States' hard power, however, declining "Pax Americana" will still represent the West, as triumvirates in the coming decades (Cabalza, The Re-emergence of China and India, 2011).
Therefore, the Philippines should seriously engage with these three great powers that will rule our multipolar world in coming centuries.
Chinese Maritime Strategy
According to Thomas Kane in his book, "Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power," he stressed that if China wishes to claim a leading role in international politics, it must become a superpower. Maritime strength is a fundamental part of global strategic leverage for any nation, but it is particularly important for People's Republic of China (PRC).
Can China Become a Maritime Power?
China's maritime development has occurred in an atmosphere of considerable uncertainty. The nation has long been a continental power with a feeble navy. Recent assessments, however, suggest that this historic pattern could be changing. China appears increasingly determined to create a modern navy. But? While the possibility cannot be excluded outright? It seems that China is not developing long-range power projection capabilities. Rather, Beijing seems to be focused on building a navy geared to achieving asymmetric sea-denial capabilities in its immediate periphery in order to defend its growing maritime interests and particularly to resolve the volatile Taiwan issue.
Chinese naval strategists have made submarines the centerpiece of their ambitious naval modernization program, and nuclear submariners now lead China's navy. In addition to purchasing the extremely quiet Kilo-class diesel submarine in large numbers, China is now also producing more than one class of high quality, indigenously designed diesel submarines. Air-independent propulsion could vastly increase the stealthy characteristics of these submarines. Simultaneously, Beijing is fielding two new classes of nuclear submarines. Given the inherent difficulty of anti-submarine warfare, these submarines enhance China's military options in any confrontation. Another asymmetric Chinese naval strategy focuses on sea mines.
China's navy is one of very few that regularly practices mine laying. It is far easier to lay mines than to find and disarm them, particularly in Taiwan's shallow coastal waters.
Problems in China's defense industrial complex which is already showing some evidence of improvement will not constrain sea-mine deployment. As with submarines, what China cannot develop indigenously in the near term, it can procure from Russia. At least for now, Beijing does not seem intent on fielding carrier battle groups. Therefore, the Chinese navy is developing in such a manner that it looks very different from most other large navies, and from the U.S. Navy in particular.
Nevertheless, its combat potential should not be underestimated.
Extent of Chinese Maritime Power in Indian Ocean
Maritime power represents military, political, and economic power, exerted through an ability to use the sea or deny its use to others. It has traditionally been employed to control "use-of-the-sea" activities undertaken by nations for their general economic welfare and, often, even for their very survival. Maritime power and naval power are not synonymous, the latter being a sub-set of the former. Traditional land powers are more and more focusing on developing their maritime capabilities to safeguard their economic interests and extend their sphere of influence.
Historically, China has been a land power. However, over the past two decades, it has found itself increasingly dependent on resources and markets accessible only via maritime routes. This has left Beijing with the dilemma of how to safeguard its trade routes and flow of resources in a world in which the United States is the dominant naval power, and both India and Japan — China's neighbors and strategic rivals — are stepping up their own naval capabilities.
Ensuring a continuous supply of energy has come to be the most important prerequisite for China in building an advanced, industrialized state. Despite being the world's sixth largest oil producer, China has been a net importer of oil since 1994. It imported 40 million metric tons in 1999 and is projected to import 100 million tons by 2010. China's dependence on seafood has increased in recent years. China will therefore have to ensure security of its sea lanes and shipping industry to ensure its continued development As of today, 85 percent of China's trade is sea-based. Also, with its 26 shipyards, China has emerged as the world's fourth largest shipbuilder. Thus for both reasons, China needs assured access and control over its adjacent oceans.
China and Indian Ocean Nations
China's perceptions regarding other major powers, especially Moscow and Washington, have been the most important external factor molding its Indian Ocean vision and policy initiatives. While initially it was American containment that explained all their activities in the Indian Ocean, the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's made China suspicious of Moscow's initiatives and intentions in this region.
In the recent years, a new great game has begun between India and China to bring the Maldives and Sri Lanka under their respective sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean Region (I.O.R.). After Myanmar and Bangladesh, to complete the "arc of influence" in South Asia, China is determined to enhance military and economic cooperation with the Maldives and Sri Lanka. China's ambition to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives, its recent entry into the oil exploration business in Sri Lanka, the development of port and bunker facilities at Hambantota, the strengthening military cooperation and boosting bilateral trade with Colombo, are all against Indian interests and ambitions in the region.
Although China claims that its bases are only for securing energy supplies to feed its growing economy, the Chinese base in the Maldives is motivated by Beijing's determination to contain and encircle India and thereby limit the growing influence of the Indian Navy in the region. The Marao base deal was finalized after two years of negotiations, when Chinese Prime minister Zhu Rongzi visited Male' in May 2001. Once Marao comes up as the new Chinese "pearl," Beijing's power projection in the Indian Ocean would be augmented.
Recently, Sri Lanka allocated an exploration block in the Mannar Basin to China for petroleum exploration. This allocation would connote a Chinese presence just a few miles from India's southern tip, thus causing strategic discomfort.
In economic terms, it could also mean the end of the monopoly held by Indian oil companies in this realm, putting them into direct and stiff competition from Chinese oil companies. At Hambantota, on the southern coast of Sri Lanka where Beijing is building bunkering facilities and an oil tank farm. This infrastructure will help service hundreds of ships that traverse the sea lanes of commerce off Sri Lanka. The Chinese presence in Hambantota would be another vital element in its strategic circle already enhanced through its projects in Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
It is Sri Lanka's strategic location that has prompted Beijing to aim for a strategic relationship with Colombo. Beijing is concerned about the growing United States presence in the region as well as about increasing Indo-U.S. naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean. China looks at using the partnership with Sri Lanka to enhance its influence over strategic sea lanes of communication from Europe to East Asia and oil tanker routes from the Middle East to the Malacca Straits. China has been consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi, through the China-Burma road to Burmese ports and through the Malacca Straits, especially once they have established their supremacy over the South China Sea.
China's Indian Ocean policy has been clearly influenced by its ties with the other major powers. Its interest in the Indian Ocean started partly as a reaction to its perception that increasing United States presence there was aimed at encircling China. The policy has also been directly linked to its problems with New Delhi. China feels India is facilitating the American presence in the Indian Ocean region as a means of countering Beijing.
The United States Navy maintains a substantial permanent presence in the I.O.R. from its Fifth Fleet base in the Gulf, its substantial naval and air assets at Diego Garcia as well as by rotational deployments of Seventh Fleet units from the Pacific, centered on one or two nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed aircraft carriers. It was last deployed in major hostilities against Iraq, was briefly involved in Somalia and was on call to resist the Australian preemptive intervention in East Timor.
Chinese Naval Power and the Indian Ocean Region
The Indian Ocean, along with other sea lines of communication, have attracted the attention of Chinese naval planners. The takeover of the Panama Canal by a private Chinese firm after the United States withdrawal in 1999, reported Chinese threats to intervene in the Straits of Malacca and the active Chinese role in the West Asian region indicate unfolding Chinese interest this region. Beginning from the early 1980's, Chinese naval modernization underwent a sea change, partly with the modified perceptions about the value of the oceans.
China has launched an ambitious futuristic weapons development program, including high energy microwave beam-weapons, ship-based laser cannon and space-based weaponry to destroy communication and reconnaissance satellites. The country is the greatest source of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. History has shown that China is not averse to using force in order to achieve its aims, and its attitude towards its neighbors is a constant source of concern.
Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sitwe (Akyab) in Myanmar have functioned essentially as fishing harbors. The growing Chinese interest in these places and China's generous offer of assistance to these countries for converting their fishing harbours into maritime ports of international standards has aroused doubts about Beijing's motive in increasing its naval presence in the region.
Beijing is trying to give its Navy a greater visibility, operability and rapid action capability in the Indian Ocean region than it enjoys now. Gwadar, Hambantota and Sitwe form important components of its maritime security strategy. China is also interested in the island nation of Seychelles. It is important to monitor the growing Chinese interest there as part of any study of China's maritime strategic moves.
Beijing has given signal to the world of its aspirations to assume a role beyond its natural geographic and historical maritime boundaries. Any Chinese threat to India's maritime interests in the near future is economic and political as well as military. China is setting up a series of military bases as part of an endeavor to project its power.
In Bangladesh, Beijing is seeking extensive naval and commercial access. Dhaka already shares close defense ties with Beijing.
In Myanmar, China is also building naval bases and electronic intelligence gathering facilities at Grand Coco Island in the Bay of Bengal. However, the military junta, wary of excessive dependence on China, has turned to New Delhi for military supplies.
In Cambodia, Beijing is helping to build a railway line from South China to the sea. In Thailand, China is funding the construction of a $20 billion canal across the Kra Isthmus. This would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca. China has also set up electronic posts near the Persian Gulf to monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.
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