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G.R. No. 156382 December 18, 2008
MCDONALD’S (KATIPUNAN BRANCH) and/or MCGEORGE FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
MA. DULCE ALBA, respondent.
Facts:
Ma. Dulce Alba (respondent) was hired as part of the service crew of petitioner McDonald’s Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights branch on November 15, 1993. During the orientation of newly hired employees, petitioner provided respondent with a copy of the Crew Employee Handbook on rules and regulations including its meal policy which instructs: (1) All breaks must be consumed in the crewroom or designated area; (2) Crew are prohibited from taking their meals in the lobby when there are a lot customer [sic] (for stores without a crewroom); and (3) Crew are advised to follow these steps in requesting for their meal breaks: (a) Inform crew’s zone manager he/she wishes to take a break; (b) Punch out for break and proceed to assemble meal. Sandwiches/Entrees must be taken from the warming bin; (c) Crew brings assembled meal to zone manager for checking and signing of the timecard; (d) Crew takes his/her break in the crewroom; and (e) Upon completion of allotted break time, crew punches in for work and has same zone manager sign the timecard. (NOTE: Crew must consume the allotted break time completely before he punches back in for work).
Rizza Santiago, also a crew member, witnessed respondent eating inside the crew room while on duty on April 8, 1995 which she reported to the store manager Kit Alvarez (Alvarez) by an undated written account.
Petitioner McDonald’s thus suspended respondent for five days starting April 14 until April 18, 1995.
Petitioner thereafter sent a show cause notice to respondent why no disciplinary action should be meted against her. Replying, respondent, despite her initial above-quoted written admission of the questioned act, denied having violated the meal policy.
After petitioner conducted what it claimed to be a "thorough investigation," it found respondent guilty of flouting company regulations and immediately terminated her services in a letter of April 27, 1995.
Respondent thus lodged a complaint against petitioners McDonald’s and/or McGeorge Food Industries, Inc. before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) NCR Arbitration Branch which dismissed it without prejudice, for failure to prosecute, by Order of October 30, 1995.
Respondent refiled her complaint on January 24, 1996 but the motion was, however, denied. On August 22, 1997, Labor Arbiter Pablo Espiritu Jr., by Decision held that while respondent violated the meal policy of McDonald’s, dismissal was too harsh a penalty, and suspension without pay would have sufficed.
On appeal to the NLRC, petitioners raised as errors the Labor Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal and the judgment award. By Decision of March 31, 1998, the NLRC denied the appeal and ruled that there was no "intentional or willful conduct on the part of the [respondent] to disregard the rules regarding meal policy."
After filing a Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion on June 18, 1998 to present three payroll sheets to show that respondent did not render eight (8) hours a day of work.
Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari wherein, in addition to imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, it raised as new issue the denial of their constitutional right to due process, the Arbiter having failed to set the case for hearing.
Issues:
a) Whether the Labor arbiter should have conducted a clarificatory hearing to resolve the factual issue in the instant case.
b) Whether the penalty imposed upon respondent was excessive.
c) Whether the payroll sheets filed by the Company during appeal should have been given appreciation.
Held:
The appellate court (CA), by Decision of May 23, 2002, affirmed the decision of the NLRC, it finding in order the NLRC resolution of the case on the basis of the parties’ position papers, responsive pleadings and documentary evidence. It bewailed petitioners’ belated presentation of the payroll sheets only when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC decision.
On the procedural issue, the Court finds the Arbiter’s not conducting a clarificatory hearing unavailing. This issue was raised for the first time before the appellate court, hence, it may not be considered.
In any event, the NLRC Rules allow the Labor Arbiter to motu proprio determine whether there is a need for a hearing or clarificatory conference. In this case, the Labor Arbiter prudently saw it best to dispense with a hearing since the position papers and responsive pleadings, together with the attached documentary evidence, provided more than sufficient bases to resolve the case. Petitioners’ right to due process was thus not violated.
Indeed, payroll sheets are inconclusive to disprove respondent’s eight-hour-per-day work shift. Instead of payroll sheets, the time cards would have been more reliable. Petitioners, however, did not present the same. When a party has in its power to produce evidence that would overthrow the case made against it but fails to do so, the presumption arises that such evidence, if produced, would operate to its prejudice and support the case of the other party.
On the substantive issue, there is no dispute that respondent violated petitioners’ meal policy. The only issue is whether such violation amounts to or borders on "serious or willful" misconduct or willful disobedience, as petitioners posit, to call for respondent’s dismissal. By any measure, the Court holds not.
Moreover, petitioners likewise failed to prove any resultant material damage or prejudice on their part as a consequence of respondent's questioned act. Their claim that the act would cause "irremediable harm to the company’s business" is too vague to merit consideration.
In fine, given the totality of respondent’s employment record, the penalty of dismissal is too discordant with the infraction she committed.
The Court, however, modifies the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision in that the award of full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, should be reckoned from the time of respondent’s dismissal on April 27, 1995 up to the finality of the Court’s decision while the award of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, should be computed from the time petitioners engaged respondent’s services on November 15, 1993 up to the finality of this decision.
The Decision of August 22, 1997 of the Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, should be reckoned from the time of respondent’s dismissal on April 27, 1995 up to the finality of the Court’s decision, while the award of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, should be computed from the time petitioners engaged the services of respondent on November 15, 1993 up to the finality of this decision. In all other respects, the Labor Arbiter’s decision is AFFIRMED.
There being no data from which the Court can properly assess petitioners’ total monetary liability, the case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter only for that purpose.
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