Protecting our Marine Environment: Issues and Concerns on Marine Oil Spill

Copyright © 2010 by Chester Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

BACKGROUND

The Philippines is an archipelago with vast internal and archipelagic waters and bordered with long coastlines. Such geographic conditions as well as its physical configuration make it vulnerable to various maritime disasters including marine oil spill resulting in great loss in life and property.

Marine oil spill poses serious threats to the marine environment specifically on mariculture, marine habitats and coastal activities. Thus, posing both environmental and economic challenges. The extent of the effects of the spill depends on several factors including the physical and chemical characteristics of the oil and the weather and sea conditions among others. Sound prevention strategies and risk reduction measures will greatly minimize environmental and economic impacts of marine oil spill.

Based from historical literature on marine oil spill that have occurred in the world, Europe first experienced the tremendous effect of oil spill on 18 March 1967 when the Torrey Canyon ran aground off Cornwall spilling 80,000 tons or 919,000 barrels of crude in the United Kingdom. In North America, the first incidence of oil spillage was via the Argo Merchant in 1976 but in 24 March 1989, the Exxon Valdez hit rocks in Prince William Sound spilling some 240,000 barrels of crude oil onto the Alaskan shores. In the Middle East, Oman first experienced the oil spill on 19 December 1972 after a collision with Brazilian tanker Horta Barbosa and the South Korean tanker Sea Star spilled about 840,00 barrels of crude into the Gulf of Oman. In the Pacific, a Liberian-registered Hawaiian Patriot caught fire in the northern Pacific that leaked 723,000 barrels. Africa experienced the same fate in Trinidad and Tobago on 19 July 1979 when about 2.2 million barrels of crude spilled after a collision off Tobago between the Atlantic Empress and the Aegean Captain. Southeast Asia was not also spared from the devastating catastrophe when a Liberian-registered tanker Nagasaki Spirit collided with container Ocean Blessing in the Malacca Straits spilling some 12,000 tones of crude on 19 September 1992.

At the turn of the new millennium, the Philippines encountered the effects of oil spill in February 2000 after running aground on January 24th on the coast of Sual town in Lingayen Gulf. The Singapore-owned vessel MV Nol Schedar was suspected to have left behind an oil slick after she was floated on February 2nd. The spill was later said to have destroyed 2,700 meters of coral reefs and other marine resources, and the case is pending in court.

The following year, an oil spill in Cavite was threatening to contaminate Laguna de Bay, caused by a bursting oil pipeline of an industrial and electronics firm at the People’s Technological Complex in Barangay Maduya, Carmona town. The June 20, 2001 oil spill had already affected a six-kilometer stretch of Carmona-Biñan River, just a few kilometers away from the Laguna Bay. Aside from the affected river, the spilling bunker oil and industrial fuel oil also affected land base areas surrounding the firm.

Another oil spill occurred in the country on 19 January 2004 when an oil spill coming from a diving boat that ran aground at the Apo Manor Reef in December, a protected marine park off Mindoro Island, was threatened to destroy one of the world’s best dive sites. Residents of Barangay Siblayan in Occidental Mindoro, a nearby coastal town, said that the M/V Island Explorer has started to leak bunker fuel, endangering the reef that serves as a fish nursery and the major source of livelihood of the surrounding communities. The surrounding waters are abundant with marine fauna and luxuriant coral growth with more than 500 coral species. Marine life includes sharks, stingrays and manta rays.


M/T SOLAR I MARINE DISASTER

M/T Solar I, vessel of 2,128 DWT, chartered by Petron Oil Company from Sunshine Maritime Development Corporation (SMDC) carrying 13,000 barrels (approx. 2.1M liters) of industrial fuel oil (IFO) or bunker oil from Lamao, Bataan en route to Zamboanga City with 18 crew members and two (2) cargo surveyors on board. At about 4:20 PM, 11 August, it sank in heavy seas at position 10º115.52’N 122º29.15’E, about 13 NM south of Luzaran Point, Guimaras Island. 18 survived the sinking by using the ship’s donut-type life raft while two 2 were reported missing.

41 barangays in five (5) towns of Guimaras were affected and 29 barangays in two (2) Iloilo municipalities. Moreover, there are 37 cities or municipalities in Iloilo and Negros that is being threatened by the spill. There were 8,580 families, amassing 42,109 individuals who were affected in both Guimaras and Iloilo. Out of this number 1,897 health cases were recorded, verified via the number of consultations.

Affected ecosystems in Guimaras include marine reserves (1,143 HA), coastline (220 km), coral reefs (16 km2), mangroves (439 HA), seaweed farms (107 HA) and fishponds (535 HA). In Iloilo, the affected are as follows: 15 km of coastline, 40 HA of mangroves, and 439 HA of fishponds.


OBJECTIVES

This study aims to identify issues and concerns in confronting threats of marine oil spill in the country especially in the prevention and response aspects. Policy recommendations will be formulated based on the identified issues and concerns. Proceedings during the conduct of the Executive Forum on Marine Oil Spill conducted by the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) last December 7, 2006 will form significant views taken into consideration in the discussions of relevant concepts.


SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

It is significant to highlight the issues and concerns surrounding marine oil spill given its enormous environmental and economic effects and threats to the marine environment. There is need for proper understanding of such issues to come up with appropriate policy recommendations that will cover both the prevention and response dimensions. It will also look at the effects on the shipbuilding industry particularly on the 2-hall ships and the effects of disastrous oil spill to oil companies.


REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

In an attempt to explore various issues and concerns that need to be considered to ensure maritime safety and security, several viewpoints should be highlighted to complement the objectives of this research paper. The Maritime Review , a publication of Maritime League offers significant articles that will be helpful in the development of this paper.

In an article on the safety of sea travel in Philippine waters in the Maritime Review, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) highlighted that sea safety is the concern not only of government agencies in maritime safety such as the PCG and Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) but also by the ship owner, the crew, class society or the private surveyor and the riding public. Government agencies may provide for regulations to ensure the safety of maritime vessels, but the ship owners have the primary responsibility to follow these regulations. The article also emphasized that though overcrowding of passengers or excess of authorized capacity may not be the primary reason for the occurrence of sea accidents, it has contributed to the number of casualties. It was also emphasized that based on investigation conducted by the PCG, most accidents are caused either by “human error” or “force majeure” thus highlighting the important factor of competency of seafarers. Government agencies involved in maritime safety have equal responsibility of providing for regulations and guidelines that will ensure the safety of the ship, the crew, the cargo and the riding public.

In a related article with focus on stopping the circle of death at sea (Odono, 2003), the human factor in sea accidents was underscored since research has shown that up to eighty percent of maritime accidents could be attributed to human error or failure on the part of those in command of the vessels involved. Col. Leonardo Odono cited the case of Dona Paz incident in 1987 wherein the conclusion of the investigation indicated that the smaller vessel, MT Vector, a petroleum tanker was at fault. The article also called for competency testing and rigid requalification process for seafarers and raised concern on major patrons commanding vessels citing the need to upgrade the level of education and training among those entrusted to command our domestic vessels as part of an accident-prevention strategy.

Overall, his article puts emphasis on pre-departure vessel inspection and clearance system since the whole procedure is intended to keep an unseaworthy vessel or an overloaded passenger ship from leaving port. It was perceived that increased organizational capability of Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) at least on its departure inspection function will help reduce the risk of accidents at sea. But to enable the PCG to do a good inspection job, there is need to triple the coastguard’s personnel count. The pre-departure inspection system should be able to effectively prevent overloading of passenger ships since it is all a matter of setting up a passenger processing and manifesting system similar to what we have in the airports. A call was also made on our maritime authorities to formulate a long-term national merchant fleet development plan that should provide for the retirement over time of wooden-hulled vessels and obsolete steel-hulled ships thus emphasizing the need to modernize our merchant fleet and our port system.

In relation to weather conditions, an article mentioned that there is no organized way for vessels to receive authorized or official weather advisories. Consequently, ship operators and ship crews depend generally on commercial radio broadcasts of weather reports from our weather bureau and from official advisories from the Japan Maritime Commission, to plan whether their vessels can leave port or whether take shelter after leaving port. Such concern is based on the condition that most sea accidents happen in times of heavy weather with rains and strong winds inducing rough seas and reducing visibility at sea. A recommendation was made that the Philippine Coastguard detachments must be given very specific guidelines on granting vessels departure clearance at the onset of stormy weather in their areas of jurisdiction. Furthermore, for the areas where there is no coastguard station, the PCG should be allowed to deputize local government units or the local police to act on a vessel’s request for departure clearance. This arrangement can be covered by a Department of Transportation and Communications-Department of Interior and Local Government (DOTC-DILG) agreement since it is best not to leave the decision to sail in uncertain weather to the ship owner of the ship captain. In regard to vessel traffic separation, the author expressed the difficulty to understand why the government has not found it important to establish navigational sea-lanes and mandatory vessel traffic separation schemes in narrow passages and congested harbors. It is worth noting that the author emphasized that we cannot grow as an archipelagic country for as long as we have an unsafe and inefficient sea transport infrastructure.

Capt. Raul Ruivivar focused his study on the existing search and rescue (SAR) communications system capability for maritime disaster communications interoperability during SAR operations. One of the findings of the study referred to the environmental implication to national security. It was emphasized that the implication of maritime disaster communications interoperability to national security particularly to marine environment is catastrophic in scale if not acted upon immediately by the concerned agencies. Failure of communications to conduct immediate transmission or reporting to the PCG in an event of ship sinking or grounding resulting turmoil spillage in scene of incidents can have damaging effects which will endanger marine life. Such situation in turn affects the economic livelihood of fishermen or the community as a whole in the vicinity of incidents. He highlighted the importance of the rapidity of SAR communications system to respond to distress messages will further determine the response action to be taken by the concerned agencies to SAR Operations.

Related article on international instruments on marine oil spill highlighted the Protocol and Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, published in 2000, has now achieved enough ratifications for entry into force on 14 June 2007, twelve months after its accession by Portugal, on 14 June 2006, the 15th State to ratify the treaty. It provided background on the Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation-Hazardous and Noxious Substances (OPRC-HNS) Protocol which is aimed at providing a global framework for international cooperation in combating major incidents or threats of marine pollution from ships carrying hazardous and noxious substances, such as chemicals. It is worth noting that the OPRC-HNS Protocol follows the principles of the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, which itself entered into force in 1995. Furthermore as in the OPRC Convention, Parties to the OPRC-HNS protocol will be required to establish measures for dealing with pollution incidents, either nationally or in cooperation with other countries. The article further elucidated that liability and compensation regimes for oil pollution incidents are covered by the 1992 protocols.

Another Maritime Review article focused on international conventions underscored that MARPOL 73/78 is considered one of the most important instruments for controlling pollution of the marine environment from shipping activities. Its primary objective is to preserve the seas and coastal environment from pollution and minimization of accidental discharges from ships and it deals with all forms of marine pollution except the disposal of land-generated waste into the sea by dumping. The article provided the background that on 19 March 2001, the Philippine Senate Resolution No. 88, concurred with the Philippines accession to the International convention for the Prevention of pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978, including its succeeding Protocols and annexes I to V, better known as MARPOL 73/78. With this development, the Philippines have completed its domestic legal requirements to become a state party to this international treaty. The article pointed out that the Department of Foreign Affairs has instructed the Philippine Embassy in London to deposit the Philippine Instrument of Accession with the IMO Secretary General and that the convention will enter into force for the Philippines three months after the deposit of the Instrument of Accession. It is worth noting that the Convention has two protocols dealing with reports on incidents involving harmful substances and arbitration.

The article highlighted that marine environment protection is one of the principal concerns of the Philippine government being a maritime state and one of those countries rich in biodiversity. Furthermore, it is a major objective of the government to monitor and control ship-generated pollution and thereby minimize the indiscriminate discharge of waste at sea by ships. To understand the advantages of being a state party to this international treaty, the Philippine compliance with MARPOL 73/78 requirements, particularly provision of waste collection systems and/or reception facilities in ports, will benefit not only foreign vessels but more importantly, domestic vessels, as well as promote a healthful and safe environment in general.

The article also outlined other obligations by the Philippines under MARPOL 73/78 which include compliance with standards/regulations as regards the construction of vessels, provision, operation and maintenance of on-board equipment for preventing marine pollution, documentation and reporting of pollution prevention operations and the training of officers and crew in pollution prevention and management practices. Five government agencies that will directly be involved in the implementation of MARPOL 73/78 in the Philippines are the following: PCG, MARINA, Philippine Ports Authority, Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Department of Interior and Local Government. The article concluded that close coordination and cooperation among these agencies is therefore imperative to enable the Philippines to fully implement MARPOL 73/78 and, in the process, contribute to the development of the maritime industry in the country. More importantly it is assured that the DFA will continue to lend its support and assistance in the endeavor.


RESPONSE TO THE DISASTER

According to Dr. Anthony Golez, responses conducted included relief operations, health assessment, and environmental clean done through environmental assessment, oil recovery, and waste disposal, containment, and dispersal. 83 families (342 persons) were received in 8 evacuation centers in Guimaras. The DSWD for its part provided relief for 8,538 families (41,887 persons) through the cash-for-work program for affected townspeople, which led to controversies later on. This type of livelihood is more convenient than their former fishing livelihood.

In terms of health assessment, the DOH provided regular health assessment of coastal cleaners. Initially 1,897 consultations were recorded but cases decreased after workers were issued half-face respirator masks. Petron also conducted medical missions to the affected local government units and non-governmental organizations.

The BFAR conducted regular sampling of fish from the area, the EMB-DENR did monitoring for Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S), while the PCG went on daily aerial survey over Guimaras, Iloilo and Negros Occidental. Recovery operations included the clean-up of 190 km of coastline where 1,200 metric tons of debris were collected. A remote off-loading system (ROLS) to siphon off the remaining oil inside the sunken tanker will take effect January of next year.


CLEAN UP OPERATIONS AND REHABILITATION

Furthermore, Dr. Anthony Golez stated, that the clean-up operations used two main methods - containment and dispersal. Under containment, it utilized the use of oil spill booms to limit the spread of the oil slick. In addition, the use of hair, straw, coco fiber and other materials as improvised containment measures was also done. In the dispersal operations, the Coast Guard employed chemical and microbial oil dispersants and surfactants, however this was made controversial when the scientific community questioned the safety of use of dispersants.

The cost of assistance to the victims totaled 115.39 million pesos, which included assistance in cash, food, water, medicine, materials, equipment, services, etc. for both relief and clean-up operations. Of this amount, the affected local government units shouldered 6.60 million pesos; 61.38 million pesos came from the national and regional governments and 47.41 million pesos was given by non-governmental organizations.

The rehabilitation plan now is working toward the giving of “Clean Bill of Health” to the areas affected. It will detail the presence of potable water, clean air, etc. In addition it also seeks the rehabilitation and restoration of mangroves, and the continuous monitoring of marine ecosystems. Moreover, Petron and the DSWD have been providing alternative livelihood, skills training and enterprise development to the affected populace. The rehabilitation plan also includes reparation or compensation for the victims. This is where the Protection and Indemnity Insurance (P&I) and the International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) under the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992 CLC). They have already started the process on how they can compensate the affected communities. Currently, investigations and dialogues are being done to arrive at the settlement of the issue of compensation.


TASK FORCE GUIMARAS

The Task Force Guimaras is composed of the following agencies: National Disaster Coordinating Council, Office of Civil Defense, Department of Health, Department of Environment and Natural Resources through the Environment Management Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Science and Technology, Department of Transportation and Telecommunications particularly Maritime Industry Authority, Philippine Coast Guard and Marine Board Inquiry, Department of Employment and concerned Local Government Units. The Department of Agriculture particularly the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Petron Philippines, University of the Philippines in Visayas, Siliman University and the World Wildlife Fund Philippines.


Task Force Guimaras is working on the following:

I)Comprehensive Community Rehabilitation Plan that includes a Detailed Shoreline Clean-Up & Waste Management Plan, Environmental Plan, Health Plan, Socio-Economic Plan, and Science Plan in Support to the Environment Plan;

II)Measures to Prevent Oil Spills;

III)Preventive Measures via Legislation such as the prohibition of ships to ply in sensitive areas;

IV)NDCC Urgent Capacity-Building in Emergency Response Preparedness and;

V)Monitoring and Coordination of the Implementation of the CCRP.


ISSUES AND CONCERNS

A. Incident Command System “Who is in Charge?”

In any disaster event, the question on who is in charge is always brought out given the various players expected to respond. The identification of the lead agency especially in the initial response phase is crucial in coordinating efforts and resources. With specific reference to the Guimaras Oil Spill, the question on who is in charge persisted amidst the functions of the Philippine Coast Guard to act as a point of contact for oil spill response operations and prepare national oil spill contingency plan. The creation of three task forces covering the national, regional and local government unit to respond to the disaster further underscored the question on the lead agency. Clear incident command system will prevent conflicts in roles and responsibilities and will address lack of common protocols and inconsistencies in public announcements.
Basically, by virtue of its mandate Republic Act 5173 and Presidential Decree 600 and Presidential Decree 979 the Philippine Coast Guard is the primary agency responsible for pollution due to ships (MARPOL 73 Convention) under international regulations. The convergence of various mandates (DENR, DOTC, OCD/NDCC) often results in confusion among the regional and local players.

B. Mandate of the Philippine Coast Guard

According to Capt. Arturo Olavario of the Philippine Coast Guard, since the 1970s, the PCG has been given the mandate as the lead agency in marine environmental protection. The first law that created the Coast Guard is RA 5173, and under PD 979 which provides for the creation of the PD 600 governing marine pollution, later known as the “Marine Pollution Decree of 1976” that mandated the PCG as the prime agency in marine environmental protection. Furthermore, PD 600 known as the “Marine Pollution Decree of 1974,” seeks to prevent and control the pollution of seas, rivers and tributaries. Then, Presidential Decree 602 was created to establish the Oil Pollution Operations Center of the Philippines, located at PCG headquarters, which is now known as the National Oil Pollution Operations Center or NOPOC.

NOPOC serves as the point of contact of ASEAN member counterpart. Under Republic Act 8550 , the official law of BFAR, which deputized the PCG to enforce rules and regulations in the aquatic division, and also Republic Act 9275 known as the “Clean Water Act” which designates the PCG to enforce environmental laws and regulations on marine water.

The provisions made in the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Convention of 1992 and the Civil Liability Convention of 1992, the PCG being the lead agency in responding to oil spill, act as principal actor in the adjudication of pollution cases, but also seeks compensation of damages and installation of preventive measures to threatened areas.

C. Seafarers Competence

Ensuring the competence of the crew and officers of the ship is one of the primary considerations to prevent marine oil spill and other maritime disasters. Questions on their qualifications and credentials usually arise in the aftermath of a maritime disaster. In the case of the recent Guimaras Oil Spill, one of the findings identified after initial investigation is the incompetence of the captain and the crew, which contributed to their inability to respond to the emergency situation.

D. Vessel Seaworthiness

Seaworthiness of a vessel is a primary responsibility of the ship owner. Government agencies involved in maritime safety have equal responsibility of providing for regulations and implement guidelines that will ensure the safety of the vessel. Marine oil spill prevention can definitely start with ensuring the seaworthiness of the vessel through strict implementation of regulations and full compliance of shipowners especially through vessel inspection and clearance system.

E. Role of the Local Government Units

Local government units (LGUs) and the local community of Guimaras play significant role in disaster management especially during initial phase of disaster response being the first line of responders upon impact of a disaster in their area of responsibility. Initial response to the Guimaras oil spill demonstrated the lack of experience and capability of the LGUs in responding to marine oil spills as well as lack of awareness on the National Oil Pollution Contingency Plan and the concerned agencies to mobilize in an event of a marine oil spill.

F. National Oil Spill Contingency Plan

The National Oil Spill Contingency Plan is a three (3)-tiered response system promulgated by the Philippine Coast Guard, which includes phases of action for oil spill response. Lack of awareness on the existence of such plan was demonstrated during the initial response to the Guimaras oil spill and a question on whether such plan was enforced during the disaster was raised by stakeholders. There is need for coastal communities to be informed of such plan to be more aware of appropriate actions.

G. Compensation and Liability

In the aftermath of the Guimaras oil spill, the question on where or from whom can the affected communities seek financial assistance persisted. While the Philippines has ratified international conventions on liability and compensation for oil pollution, unfortunately an implementing legislation has yet to be passed. The cost of cleaning up and retrieving the oil spillage from the sea is enormous. Concerns on who ought to pay given the principles of reimbursement and admissibility for compensation should be clear.

H. Clean-up Operations

One of the methods in the clean-up operations in the Guimaras Oil Spill is the chemical dispersal. The use of chemical dispersants was confronted with concerns especially among the scientific community. Questions were raised on the safety of use of such dispersants as well as their effects in the environment. The dilemma in using chemical dispersants led to queries on existing scientific data and protocols on their possible use as well as the environmental benefits that they can bring about.

The incident also shows the lack of sufficient capability-booms, oily water separators, small craft as well as surveillance in combating oil pollution.

I. Political Interests

The entry of partisan political interests in dealing with disaster-stricken public can greatly affect rehabilitation and recovery efforts. Concerns on preferential treatment based on political ties and relationships can hamper post disaster activities. Competition on the delivery of compensation and attention to victims may affect distribution of livelihood projects among affected communities.

J. Rapid Assessment

Initial findings of rapid assessment made by the Task Force Guimaras at the onset of a marine oil spill can greatly facilitate response and rehabilitation efforts. Prompt assessment especially in terms of environmental and health aspects can provide basis for actions in a timely manner. Disagreements in manners of assessing and the results produced can affect the development of an action plan in dealing with the impact of the disaster.


SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Significant recommendations have been brought out for considerable policies, based from the discussions on issues and concerns during the “Executive Forum on Marine Oil Spill” held on December 7, 2006 at the National Defense College of the Philippines.


Issues Concerns Operations

A national effort must be exerted to promote unification of rules and procedures in order to establish clear guidelines in the event of oil spill. Under RA 5173 the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is vested with sole authority to lead the Incident Command System (ICS) in terms of responding to maritime threats and disasters. - Formalize and institutionalize an incident command system especially for marine oil spill disaster to identify lead agency and delineate roles and responsibilities among key players.

- Strengthen and disseminate the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan and plan the development of regional oil spill plans integrating and involving the Local Government Units for better coordination among coastal communities.

- Ensure prompt completion of rapid assessment at the onset of a marine oil spill disaster to facilitate timely plan of action.

- Promote continuous training and inter agency capability building of primary responders to marine oil spill and enhance maritime safety equipment.
Enforcement and Implementations of Maritime Laws The PCG and Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) must uphold their positions

- Strengthen the human factor in the maritime vessel by strict monitoring of the qualifications and credentials of officers and crew.

- Ensure the strict implementation and enforcement of regulations and standards by regulatory maritime agencies and the full compliance of ship owners to promote seaworthiness of vessel.

- Enhance maritime communications equipment and capability to facilitate immediate transmission of reports in an event of a disaster.

- Document lessons learned from previous marine oil spill incidents to serve as references in policy making.

Conduct Scientific researches and livelihood programs For DOTC/ Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)/ Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)/ Department of Agriculture (DA)/ Department of Employment (DOLE)/Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)/ and Department of Tourism (DOT)

- Enhance the awareness and strengthen the capability of the Local Government Units especially coastal communities in dealing with marine oil spill.

- Encourage scientific research on appropriate clean-up techniques especially on the use of dispersants to explore safer options.

- Put up livelhihood programs and revival of tourism projects in affected communities.

Legislation and Ratification of International laws Philippine Congress and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) should scrutinize laws - Support the passage of the implementing legislation for the Philippines’ ratification of international conventions on liability and compensation for oil pollution.


CONCLUSION

The geographic conditions of the Philippines as well as its physical configuration make it vulnerable to various maritime disasters including marine oil spill, which usually result in great loss in life and property.

Proper handling of contingency plans and proper coordination of both the private and public sectors help lessen the liabilities during disasters. The best practices and lessons learned from previous disasters should always be emulated. Response and responsibility should come together to prevent more problems in the process. The need for an inter-agency coordination is necessary for a coordinated response in preventing and preparing for threats in marine oil spill.

The Executive Forum on Marine Oil Spill was able to provide an avenue for a dynamic interaction among stakeholders on ways and means to prevent and prepare for threats of marine oil spill. Sound prevention strategies and risk reduction measures will greatly reduce vulnerability and minimize environmental and economic impacts of marine oil spill in the country.

The private sector has agreed to continue dialogue and developing ways and means to ensure that we progress in this endeavor, including placing this in the regular agenda of the Maritime Forum series.


REFERENCES

Capt. Raul D Ruivivar PN (JSC). Thesis: “An Assessment of Maritime Disaster Communications Interoperability”, National Defense College of the Philippines, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 2002.

Cmdr. Niel J. Wark, The Impact of Philippine Navy Warfighting on the Coastal Marine Environment, RAN, 2002.

“How Safe is Sea Travel in Philippine Waters?” Maritime Review, July-August 2006, pp. 22-23.

Primer to Rescue Shipping.

Maritime Review, Maritime Chemical Spills Clean Up – International Preparedness, Response and cooperation Protocol to Enter into Force in 2007.
Transcription of the EXECUTIVE FORUM ON MARINE OIL SPILL, sponsored by the Emergency Management Institute of the Philippines-National Defense College of the Philippines (EMIP-NDCP), 7 December 2006, NDCP Honor Hall, Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES

http://www.amsa.gov.au/marine_environment_protection/National_Plan/Reports-Fact_Sheets-Brochures/National_Plan_fact_sheet.asp

http://www.api.org/ehs/partnerships/environmental/emergency-spill.cfm

http://www.osmprogram.com/courses.html