Warlordism and Private Armies in the Philippines

Copyright © 2010 by Chester B Cabalza. All Rights Reserved.

The Crisis Management Institute (CMI) will conduct an academic forum on 27 January 2010 on the said topic.

“The government, which was designed for the people, has got into the hands of the bosses and their employers, the special interests. An invisible empire has been set up above the forms of democracy.“ - Woodrow Wilson (1856 – 1924).

BACKGROUND

The massacre of 57 people in Maguindanao on 23 November 2009 left the whole country, and later on the world, in shock that such a gruesome and unworldly act was committed. It was named the worst single case election-related violence in Philippine history and the single most deadliest event for journalists in history wherein 31 journalists were killed. The victims were members of the convoy which was about to file a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor Esmael Mangudadatu to challenge Mayor Andal Ampatuan, Jr. in the forthcoming 2010 Maguindanao gubernatorial election. The 57 casualties include Mangudadatu's wife, his two sisters, journalists, lawyers, aides, and motorists who were witnesses or were mistakenly identified as part of the convoy. On November 24, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) responded to the news of the massacre by declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City citing that an urgent need to prevent and suppress the occurrence of several other incidents of lawless violence. The President directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution” in carrying out her orders in the province.

Filipinos all over the country cried out for justice for the victims. The media, being spurred with passion for justice for their colleagues, covered the story indepthly. The horrific crime was attributed to Mayor Ampatuan and his relatives who were members of a powerful political clan in control of Maguindanao since 2001. Mangudadatu revealed that it was Ampatuan who threatened him against running in the gubernatorial elections and that he will be "cut into pieces" if he did so. Mangudadatu chose his wife, along with several women and the media to file his candidacy for him since he thought they would not be harmed. Women are respected according to Islamic tradition. However, the massacre was committed and the facts of it which was disseminated by the media and the government further fueled the anger of the people. Reports showed that the women were raped, bodies were dismembered and a gravesite was dug before the murders. People demanded that the GMA administration act quickly and charge the perpetrators of the henious crime pointing to the powerful Ampatuan political clan.

Meanwhile, media along with political analysts have shown the strong political ties of the Ampatuan political clan with GMA. Ampatuan Sr., father of Mayor Ampatuan and governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), was a member of the GMA's LAKAS-KAMPI party, often holding prominent positions in it. It was said that he delivered the votes for GMA in Maguindanao to help the latter win the presidency in the 2004 national elections, and the 12-0 winning of administration senatorial candidates. It was also shown how powerful the Ampatuan political clan were in Maguindanao and that they continued to rule because of strong and close ties to the current administration. Public opinion soon arose that due to their strong ties, the government was not working quickly enough to prosecute the immediate suspects, the Ampatuan political figures. The

On Thursday, November 26, 2009, Ampatuan Jr. was taken to the National Bureau of Investigation headquarters in Manila for a preliminary investigation. He was soon charged with over 20 counts of murder. GMA soon transferred her power of general supervision of the ARMM to DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno. Government troops and the police remained in the area and undergone several investigations, finding firearms in several locations belonging to the Ampatuans. On December 4, 2009, GMA placed the province of Maguindanao under a State of Martial Law and also suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province. Proclamation No. 1959, which formally instituted martial law, stated that a state of rebellion was present in the area where armed groups have established positions to resist government troops, depriving the Executive of its powers to enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety. Following the declaration, authorities carried out a raids for arms in several Ampatuan establishments. There were also arrests of alleged perpetrators of the massacre and several members of armed groups loyal to the Ampatuans.

OBJECTIVES

The Crisis Management Forum will aim to explain the concept and history of warlordism in the Philippines, including its effects to the rule of law. It will also look into the government's response when there is a crisis or conflict involving a warlord or a powerful political clan having control over a certain area, using the case of the Maguindanao Massacre. Lastly, it will look into possible solutions to the problem of the existence of warlords in the country.

RATIONALE

The Maguindanao Massacre opened the eyes of the Filipino public to the evils that a powerful political clan or person who has control over a province may wield over their "territory"; they are, as traditionally called, warlords. The Ampatuan political clan is labeled as the warlords of Maguindanao, led by its acknowledged patriarch, ARMM Governor Andal Ampatuan Sr. They wield political power, inspire fear, and maintain strong control over a certain area through their heavily-armed private armies and strong political ties. Meanwhile, the 1987 Constitution bans private armed groups. In July 2006, however, the Arroyo administration issued Executive Order 546, allowing local officials and the PNP to deputize barangay tanods as “force multipliers” in the fight against insurgents. In practice, the EO allows local officials to convert their private armed groups into legal entities with a fancy name: civilian volunteer organizations (CVO). This is not an isolated case, there is the presence of warlords all over the country. There is the Lluch-Badelles clan of Lanao, Ramon Durano Sr.’s dominance in Danao and Dy in Isabela to name but a few.

The massacre triggered a series of events in the country’s history which concerns our national security, particularly the hold of the Republic over Maguindanao. First, a declaration of a state of emergency was effected to prevent “lawless violence” in the area, wherein the AFP and the PNP were called in secure the area. Subsequently, a state of Martial Law was proclaimed over Maguindanao, citing that a state of rebellion was therein present through armed groups and employees loyal to the Ampatuans. In the political aspect, the opposition was crying foul over every move of the GMA administration. Critics blamed GMA for coddling and colluding with the Ampatuans which gave them a stronghold over the area. The imposition of Martial Law was criticized as unnecessary, unconstitutional and a means for the Ampatuans to escape the crimes they have committed. Indeed, a crisis was triggered in the security and political landscape of the country.

It is important and necessary for us to look into the causes of the threats to our national security, wherein prevailing events point towards warlordism and their private armies. It is then important to answer the following questions. Does the presence of warlords and their private armies affect our national security? If so, how? Is the rule of law being ignored by these people? If the answer is positive in both cases, how can then this be remedied by law or other policies?

The presence of warlords and their private armies can be named an immediate threat to our national security. This forum will seek to answer these questions so that such crisis that started with a horrible massacre may be avoided.

SCHOLASTIC DEFINITIONS OF WARLORDS AND WARLORDISM

According to Mackinlay (2000), he states that, “warlords are disarmed, faction fighters return to their factories, elections are freely and fairly held, and soon after, the troops return home.” While scholar Pye (1971) deems that, “the basis of warlord politics was the institution of personal armies at the disposal of individual military commanders.” Pye’s contribution highlights the missing link in the literature of warlordism, thus his research remains tin the military domain. He further argues that, “although the reputation and success of failure of warlordism and private armies in the political field was contingent upon the strength of their armies, the warlords found it necessary to compete with others like commanders in obtaining political and economic rewards”. However, Nourzhanov (2005) criticizes warlordism, saying that, “were sovereign over their organizations and their domains, and there were no formal or legal authorities that could regulate or control their actions.” In essence, Guistozzi (2005) infers that, “warlordism might be an indirect outcome, as when non-state political organizations, such as armed movements, experience a weakening of the hold of the central leadership over its field commanders, who might then develop into warlords.”

AO 275: GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE ISSUE OF PRIVATE ARMIES

The Administrative Order No. 275 was signed on December 8, 2009, when President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo did not only directed the creation of an independent commission that would oversee the dismantling of private armies in Maguindanao and other hot spots in the country, but also to provide the commission with duties to be the government's sole voice on such issue.

The commission is composed of the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) headed by Butuan Bishop Juan De Dios Pueblos; the Ulama League of the Philippines (ULP) headed by Mahmod Mala L. Adilao; the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) headed by BGen Jamie Echeverria of the Association of Generals and Flag Officers; the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by retired Police Director General Virtus Gil; the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) headed by Mr. Herman Basbano; and the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) Mr. Dante Jimenez.

The powers of the investigative body is provided in Section 37, Chapter 9, Book One of the Administrative Code of the Philippines of 1987 where they have the authority to take testimony or receive evidence that is conferred upon any administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee, or other body, such as authority shall include the power to administer oaths, summon witnesses, and require the production of documents by a subpoena duces tecum. The said commission has also the power to clear and disapprove all pertinent media statements by any member of the Administration. Power to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out provisions of the Administrative Order. Power to call upon any agency of the Government for such assistance as it may require in the discharge of its functions. Power to engage the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel which may be necessary to carry out its functions. And power to deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Philippine National Police, the Department of Justice, and any other law enforcement agency to assist it in the performance of its functions.

Disclaimer: Part of the background, objectives and rationale is written by Ms. Madelaine Meris, Training Specialist, Crisis Management Institute. The A.O. 275 is written by Ms. Aurora Quilala, Defense Research Officer, Institute of National and Special Studies. Thanks Madz and Au for lending me your ideas. It's your copyright. That's your right :-)