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G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960
FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO, oppositors-appellees.
Facts:
Faustino Ignacio is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, dismissing his application for the registration of a parcel of land.
On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal, with an area of 37,877 square meters. Later, he amended his application by alleging among others that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion.
To the application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions. Gutierrez later withdrew his opposition. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto.
In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.
It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the application, holding that the parcel formed part of the public domain. He appealed his case.
Issues:
1) Whether the parcel of land in question belongs to the petitioner by the law of accretion, having been formed by gradual deposit by action of the Manila Bay, and he cites Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code).
2) Whether Articles 1, 4 and 5 of the Law of Waters are not applicable because they refer to accretions formed by the sea, and that Manila Bay cannot be considered as a sea.
3) Whether the land in question formed part of the public domain, having been gained from the sea, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for any public use or purpose, and therefore, became disposable and available for private ownership.
Held:
The tribunal has some cases applied the Law of Waters on Lands bordering Manila Bay. (See the cases of Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil., 732, involving a parcel of land bounded on the sides by Manila Bay, where it was held that such land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay).
Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off. Gaz., 2905, it was there held that: Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)
Consequently, until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership.
Appellant next contends that he had acquired the parcel in question through acquisitive prescription, having possessed the same for over ten years. In answer, suffice it to say that land of the public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.
In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs.
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