Tomoyuki Yamashita v. Wilhelm Styer

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G.R. No. L-129 December 19, 1945

TOMOYUKI YAMASHITA, petitioner,
vs.
WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.
Col. Harry E. Clarke and Lt. Col. Walter C. Hendrix for petitioner.
Maj. Robert M. Kerr for respondent.
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo appeared as amici curiae.

EN BANC

Facts:

Tomoyuki Yamashita was an erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. He was charged before an American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever committed against the American and Filipino peoples.

Filed before the Court were petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific.

It was alleged that General Yamashita, after his surrender, became a prisoner of war of the US but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused charged for war crimes before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer.

Petitioner wanted to be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him.

Issues:

(1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is without jurisdiction;

(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the Military Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction therein;

(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the implementing trial against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore, the Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try the petitioner;

(4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of war; and

(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission purports to be acting denied the petitioner a fair trial.

Held:

The Court deemed that petition for habeas corpus is untenable.

The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.

Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer. The military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Constitutionality of the Military Commission

The Commission has been validly constituted by Lieutenant General Styer duly issued by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army Force Pacific, in accordance in authority vested in him and with radio communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the Land Welfare a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of the war criminals must be designated by the belligerent. And the belligerent's representative in the present case is none other than the Commander in Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific.

The Military Commission thus duly constituted has jurisdiction both over the person of the petitioner and over the offenses with which he is charged. It has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by reason of his having fallen into the hands of the United States Army Forces. Under paragraph 347 of the Rules of the Land Warfare, "the commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."

As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over war crimes, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status rights and duties and of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons and offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)

Philippine jurisdiction to the case

Petitioner is charged before the Military Commission sitting at Manila with having permitted members of his command "to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the Philippines," crimes and atrocities which in the bills of particulars, are described as massacre and extermination of thousand and thousands of unarmed noncombatant civilians by cruel and brutal means, including bayoneting of children and raping of young girls, as well as devastation and destruction of public, or private, and religious property for no other motive than pillage and hatred. These are offenses against the laws of the war as described in paragraph 347 of the Rules of Land Warfare.

It is maintained, however, that, according to the Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific. "the Military Commission . . . shall have jurisdiction over all of Japan and other areas occupied by the armed forces commanded by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific" (emphasis supplied), and the Philippines is not an occupied territory. The American Forces have occupied the Philippines for the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of Japanese tyranny, and the creation of a Military Commission for the trial and punishment of Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war of liberation.

Third Issue – Spain as “protecting power” of Japan

It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice before trial was begun against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But there is nothing in that Convention showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of Military Commissions appointed by victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the unconditional surrender of Japan and her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Ultimatum are a clear waiver of such a notice. It may be stated, furthermore, that Spain has severed her diplomatic relation of Japan because of atrocities committed by the Japanese troops against Spaniards in the Philippines. Apparently, therefore, Spain has ceased to be the protecting power of Japan.

Dismissal of the petition

And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of procedure and evidence being followed by the Military Commission in the admission of allegedly immaterial or hearsay evidence, cannot divest the commission of its jurisdiction and cannot be reviewed in a petition for the habeas corpus. (25 Am. Jur., 218; Collins vs. McDonald, 258 U. S. 416; 66 Law. ed., 692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).

For all foregoing, petition is hereby dismissed without costs.