Bracewell v. Court of Appeals

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G.R. No. 107427 January 25, 2000

JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.

In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., who acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.

On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued in the name of petitioner, canceling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.

On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the public domain.

On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower court's Order. It also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30, 1992.

Issues:

a) Whether the failure of the petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time?

b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for?

Held:

The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand, it is the respondents' position that since the subject parcels of land were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.

A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public domain.

In the said case, this Court ruled as follows —

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 340).

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. These petitioners failed to do.

The homestead patent was issued to petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead patent was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development from which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.